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1. Introduction 
Armed conflicts have inflicted and will continue to inflict enormous human suffering 
in addition to severely damage societies, economies and the environment. ‘Peace on 
earth’ is at best a very distant goal, but it is certainly worth striving for and research-
ing on. Enhancing our understanding of the underlying causes and dynamics of 
armed conflict better equips the international community to limit the number, reduce 
the intensity, and facilitate the ending of armed conflicts.   
For the most of the time since the Second World War, civil war has been the 
dominant type of conflict. In 2001, 33 out of 34 armed conflicts with more than 25 
battle-related casualties were domestic and internationalized civil wars. Armed con-
flict occurred in 28 different countries, and in 11 of these conflicts more than 1,000 
people were killed (Gleditsch et al., 2002). An overview of the different types of con-
flict is presented in Figure 1.  
Figure 1. Number of Armed Conflicts by Type 1946-2001 




Wars between and war within states are two rather different phenomena, and 
are usually analyzed from different theoretical frameworks. However, the category 
‘internationalized civil war’ includes conflicts where international actors interfere in 
civil war, and blurs the distinction between interstate and intrastate conflict. This the-
sis focuses on the causes of intrastate conflict, but considers ‘internationalized civil 
war’ as more of a civil war than interstate war, and includes these conflicts in the 
analysis. Both civil war and international civil war have their origins in domestic rela-
tions, even though the warring parties might ask for help or be supported by external 
actors. 
Civil war occurs more frequently in poor countries, and worsens the prospects 
for development, stability, prosperity and peace. Armed conflicts are not evenly 
spread over the globe. The map in Figure 2 visually presents an overview of where 
different types of conflicts have taken place since World War II. 
















* Numbers based on PRIO/Uppsala Conflict Dataset (Gleditsch et al., 2002). Conflicts for 2001 could not be displayed    





Studies of why civil wars endure and how they end constitute an important 
part of research on civil war, but this thesis narrows its analysis to the study of onset 
of civil war: what characterizes countries where civil war breaks out, and how do 
they differ from those that continue to remain peaceful? Table 1 presents an overview 
of global and regional conflict onsets in the entire PRIO/Uppsala dataset as well as 
the period covered by this study (1960-97). Sub-Saharan Africa, Asia and the Middle 
East have been much more prone to conflict than the Americas and Europe (including 
the Caucasus). 
Table 1. Regional Distribution of Civil War Onsets and Armed Civil Conflict Onsets 
1946-2001 




Middle East and 
North Africa 
Asia Sum 
Civil Wars 11 12 28 13 30 94 
Percentage of 
country years  
1.0 0.8 1.8 1.6 2.6 1.6 
Armed Civil 
Conflicts 
21 24 63 23 46 177 
Percentage of 
country years 
2.1 1.6 4.4 3.5 4.9 3.2 
1960-1999 
Civil Wars 10 12 27 12 27 88 
Percentage of 
country years 
1.1 0.9 1,8 1.7 2.7 1.6 
Armed Civil 
Conflicts 
19 24 60 20 40 163 
Percentage of 
country years 
2.2 1.9 4.4 3.4 4.8 3.3 
* Numbers based on PRIO/Uppsala Conflict Dataset (Gleditsch et al., 2002) 
 
The causes of civil war are rooted in numerous sources and complex dynam-
ics. Explanations for the outbreak of conflicts are many, and the emphasis differs. 
Traditionally, the explanations for civil war have been attributed to ethnic and reli-
gious hatred, economic, political and social discrimination. A language of grievance 
and suffering dominates the conflicting parties’ rhetoric, media headlines as well as 
researchers’ agenda. 
Turning somewhat away from the traditional grievance-based rhetoric, some 
researchers have recently started to emphasize a more cynical explanation, suggesting 
that greed rather than grievance serves as a better theoretical and empirical explana-
tion for civil conflict ‘The true cause of much civil war is not the loud discourse of 
grievance, but the silent force of greed’ (Collier, 1999: 8). Lately, more focus has 
been paid to the economic basis for rebellion. The World Bank has established a re-
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search program on ‘The Economics of Civil War, Crime and Violence,’1 and numer-
ous works on civil war, economic growth and natural resources have been produced 
(Addison, Billon & Murshed, 2001; Auty, 2000, 2001; Collier & Hoeffler, 1999, 
2001, 2002; de Soysa, 2002; Hauge & Ellingsen, 1998; Homer-Dixon, 1999, 2000; 
Le Billon, 2001; Sachs & Warner, 1995). This new literature on civil war emphasizes 
the crucial importance of access to finances, either in the form of foreign support for 
the insurgency, the availability to raise revenue through the extraction of resource 
rents, or indirectly through ‘taxing’ goods passing through rebel-controlled territory. 
With the end of the Cold War, foreign support for rebel groups has decreased, and 
rebel movements have increasingly been forced to find their own source of revenue. 
In this new conflict environment, the line between civil war and crime has become 
increasingly blurred. 
 This thesis bases its analysis on the models developed by Paul Collier and 
Anke Hoeffler at the Center for the Study of African Economies, Oxford University 
and the World Bank. In several papers Collier & Hoeffler (1998, 1999, 2001, 2002) 
have used a ‘greed vs. grievance’ perspective to investigate the causes of civil con-
flict. Their model and theoretical argument has gained prominence in the quantitative 
field of the study of civil war, and has provided valuable insights—in particular into 
the role of economic factors generating civil war. A testimony to this is the February 
2002 issue of the Journal of Conflict Resolution. Paul Collier co-edited a special is-
sue entitled ‘Understanding Civil War,’ and much of the research was based within 
the framework of Collier & Hoeffler’s model (Collier & Sambanis, 2002). Collier & 
Hoeffler’s recent and unpublished report for the World Bank ‘Greed or Grievance in 
Civil War’ has already been cited 16 times in academic journals.2 Collier heads the 
Development Research Department at the World Bank, and was instrumental in set-
ting up the ‘The Economics of Civil War, Crime and Violence’ research program. 
The research conducted under the auspices of Collier shapes to some extent the poli-
cies of the World Bank. It is of paramount importance that this research is scrutinized 
and critically assessed. 
                                              
1 http://www.worldbank.org/research/conflict/ 
2 Search conducted on the ISI Web of Science on 4 October 2002. 
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In brief, Collier & Hoeffler’s model present two competing and complemen-
tary explanations for civil war: atypical levels of grievance or atypical opportunities 
for forming a rebel organization. Their rational choice-based analytical model focuses 
on conditions that favor the formation of rebel organizations, and their econometric 
model predicts the probability of a civil war being initiated in a country during a five-
year period. While the title ‘Greed and Grievance in Civil War’ alludes to either 
greed or grievance as being the main explanation for civil war, Collier & Hoeffler 
conclude   
Most proxies for grievances were insignificant. … Opportunity as an explanation of 
conflict risk is consistent with the economic interpretation of rebellion as greed-
motivated. However, it is also consistent with grievance motivation as long as per-
ceived grievances are sufficiently widespread to be common across societies and 
time. Opportunity can account for the existence of either for-profit, or not-for-profit, 
rebel organizations”  (2001: 17) 
While inequality, political rights, ethnic polarization and religious fractionalization 
were insignificant, natural resource dependence emerges as a very significant factor 
in CH’s study. Economic development and access to finance, through the form of 
foreign contributions or control over natural resources, supports a combined 
greed/opportunity explanation for civil war.  
This thesis’ main objective is to critically assess Collier & Hoeffler’s model of 
civil war. Their published article ‘On the Incidence of Civil War in Africa’ in the 
Journal of Conflict Resolution serves as the main reference and organizational 
framework for this thesis. This thesis assesses both their research design and theoreti-
cal approaches. With regards to the design, Collier & Hoeffler use five-year periods 
for each country as the unit of analysis. This is a rather unusual design in political 
science. I therefore develop the Collier & Hoeffler model into an annualized dataset. 
Regarding their theoretical approach, I focus on regime type and natural resources. 
Regime type is dropped from Collier & Hoeffler’s model because it was not signifi-
cant. I reexamine their finding by employing a different measurement of regime type.  
A significant part of this thesis focuses on the relationship between natural re-
sources and civil war. The two are linked theoretically through both scarcity and 
abundance. The link between resource scarcity and civil conflict is prominently ad-
vocated by Homer Dixon and the Toronto Research Group (Homer-Dixon, 1999; 
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Homer-Dixon & Blitt, 1998). This group of researchers argues that competition over 
scarce resources—caused either by a deteriorating environment, population pressure 
or systematic inequality—creates social conditions that might lead to conflict. The 
scarcity view on conflict is criticized by researchers who argue that social and politi-
cal variables have more explanatory power than resource scarcity (Gleditsch, 1998; 
Hauge & Ellingsen, 1998).  
A competing perspective emphasizes the link between abundant natural re-
sources and civil war. Control over natural resources might serve as a motive in itself 
for conflict, or provide the income needed to finance rebel organizations (Addison, 
Billon & Murshed, 2001; Collier & Hoeffler, 1999, 2001, 2002; de Soysa, 2002; 
Hauge & Ellingsen, 1998; Le Billon, 2001). In addition to being a source of finance 
for rebel organizations, natural resources are equally crucial sources of revenue for 
governments, in times of conflict as well as peace. Contributions from economists 
and political scientists demonstrate that dependence on natural resource rents have 
consequences for long-term political and economic development (Auty, 2001; Be-
blawi & Luiciani, 1987; Karl, 1997; Noreng, 1997; Rodriguez & Sachs, 1999; Ross, 
1999, 2001a; Sachs & Warner, 1995). Do natural resources—through their influence 
on political and economic development—create the potential for grievance-based 
conflicts? Do natural resources—due to their value as income and loot—serve as the 
very incentive for conflict? With these questions in mind, I therefore add a differenti-
ated measurement of primary commodity dependence. Differing methods of extor-
tion, ways of transport, degree of vulnerability and structure of markets for natural 
resources are factors that influence natural resources‘ usefulness for warring parties.  
Collier & Hoeffler investigated the difference between primary commodity products 
and found a significant, but not substantial, difference between oil and all other pri-
mary products (2002: 16). Collier & Hoeffler did not pursue the distinction further, 
but this study emphasizes the need to differentiate between various natural resources 
and pays particular attention to the importance of oil. The geographical qualities of 
oil make it attractive only to groups who are launching a coup d’état or secessionist 
wars. Its physical qualities make it a commodity less likely to be looted by rebels. In 
addition, oil dependency has an important impact on economic and political devel-
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opment, and therefore presents a unique category of natural resources that needs more 
commentary and nuanced analysis than what Collier & Hoeffler’s study  provide.  
Collier & Hoeffler pay special attention to Africa in their 2002 article. In order 
to investigate if their model is relevant to an analysis of conflict in another part of the 
world, I apply their model to the Middle East and North Africa.3 This region is rich 
on both resources and conflicts and presents a challenge to the study of causal rela-
tionships behind civil conflict. The Middle East is the most oil-rich region in the 
world, both in terms of production and reserves, and has been the main source for 
literature on ‘rentier states’. The region remains an authoritarian stronghold, and is 
treated as the odd-man out in the democratization literature. Diamond, Lipset & 
Linz’s (1988-89: xx)4 study of democratization in developing countries, excluded the 
Arab world in their analysis: ‘the Islamic countries in the Middle East and North Af-
rica generally lack much previous democratic experience, and appear to have little 
prospects of transition to even semi-democracy’. Since 1974 ‘the third wave’ of de-
mocratization has swept over Southern Europe, Latin America, Asia, and more re-
cently Eastern Europe, but has yet to reach the Middle East (Huntington, 1991). The 
region is the birthplace of Islam, and the large majority of the inhabitants are adher-
ents of the Prophet Mohammad. Violent protest and actions in the name of Islam has 
been a very visible opposition for outside observers and media. In the academic 
realm, the thesis of civilizational clashes, in particular between the West and Islam, 
has gained prominence (Huntington, 1993). This thesis attempts to shed some light 
on the complex relationships between politics, economics, religion, natural resources 
and conflict, in the Middle East as well as globally.   
In short, this thesis replicates and critically assesses Collier & Hoeffler’s 
analysis of civil war in Africa (2002). Their model is applied on an annualized de-
sign, and on conflicts with a lower threshold for battle-related deaths. Different speci-
fications of regime type and natural resource dependence are added. Their model is 
                                              
3 This thesis follows the World Bank’s definition of the Middle East and North Africa. I use the Middle East, the Middle 
East and North Africa and MENA interexchangeably, referring to the following countries: Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, 
Libya, Egypt, Jordan, Israel, Lebanon, Syria, Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, 
Qatar, Oman and Yemen. 
 
4 The quote is taken from the introduction where the page numbers are Roman numbers. 
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also used to examine the causes of civil war in the Middle East and North Africa re-
gion.  
The thesis proceeds as follows: Chapter 2 presents the theoretical framework 
for the Collier & Hoeffler model (hereafter CH). Causes of civil war are presented in 
two categories: grievance/motive and greed/opportunity, each with sub-categories 
covering economic, social, political and geographical/environmental aspects. A sec-
tion on the Middle East and North Africa and the region’s unique combination of 
some of the explanatory variables then follows. The third chapter outlines the re-
search design, and describes the variables. The fourth chapter starts by replicating the 
CH analysis within their five-year period design, and later moves on to test their 
model on an annualized dataset, with civil war and armed civil conflicts (a lower bat-
tle-death threshold) as dependent variables. The CH design is then applied to an 
analysis of the Middle East region.  
The main finding of this thesis is that both the grievance and opportunity ex-
planations for civil war are strengthened. There is little evidence to make judgments 
about the personal motives (greed) of rebels. As opposed to CH’s study, ethnic domi-
nance emerges as statistically significant in all variants of the CH model, and 
strengthens the grievance explanation. The recurrent finding of an inverted U-curve 
relationship between regime type and conflict strengthens both the opportunity and 
grievance approaches. The opportunity to revolt is nearly non-existent in authoritar-
ian regimes, while the causes for grievance is less in ‘fairer’ democratic regimes. 
Semi-democracies are sources for both opportunity and grievance, and are the most 
conflict-prone. Natural resources emerged as significant for conflict, but this does not 
necessarily tell us much about greed as the very motive for conflict. An equally plau-
sible explanation is that only people who suffer and who have access to a source of 
finance are able to finance their rebellion. The headline grabbing ‘greed and griev-
ance’ phrase needs to be replaced with the less catchy ‘opportunities, grievances, mo-
tivations, and their interaction under the unfortunate collection of conditions cause 
civil war.’ 
Neither CH’s study nor this one found a particular effect of Sub-Saharan Af-
rica or the Middle East and North Africa regions. Both studies point to economic de-
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velopment as being the core factor in limiting the risk of conflict. Although both au-
thoritarian and democratic regimes are less prone to conflict than semi-democratic 
regimes, there is some evidence that democracies are less prone to domestic conflict. 
Since economic development and democracy are positively related, there is every 
reason to believe that a more democratic and more developed world in the end also 
will be more peaceful. 
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2. Review of the Literature on Causes of Civil War  
Why do people, groups and states take up arms and fight? The underlying forces be-
hind and triggers of armed conflict are many and complex, and can be analyzed on 
several levels (systemic, dyadic, national and sub-national) and from several theoreti-
cal perspectives (realism, liberalism and radicalism). Popularized presentations of 
civil war highlight ethnic, religious and ideological aspects of conflict, while underly-
ing economic, social and political structures seldom make it to the headlines.  
There is no single, agreed-upon model of civil war, but rather several compet-
ing and complementary explanations. Rupesinghe & Anderlini (1998) group civil 
conflicts into four types: resource-based conflicts (socio-economic factors); identity; 
governance/authority; and ideology. Both the articles by Gates (2002) and Sambanis 
(2002) summarize the ‘status quo’ of empirical research on the causes of civil war. 
Gates and Sambanis’ discussions and classifications of the empirical relationships 
correspond well with Rupesinghe & Anderlini’s theoretical typology. An overview of 
their assessments of the empirical causes of civil war is presented in Table 2. 
Table 2. Causes of Civil War: Agreed-upon and Debated Relationships 
 Economic      Political Geographical     Identity      Others 
Concensus • Poverty 
• Lack of 
economic 
opportunities 
• Level of 
economic 
development 
• Stability (G)  
• Change (G) 








































Table based on Gates (2002) and Sambanis (2002). The two authors argue address and agree on most of the issues. While 
Gates classifies ‘political stability and change’ in consensus, Sambanis place ‘regime change’ among possible causes. 
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The starting point for this thesis is the article ‘On the Incidence of Civil War in 
Africa’ by Collier & Hoeffler (2002). The CH model serves as the basis of the analy-
sis in Chapter 4, and their theoretical approach constitute the organizational frame-
work for the theoretical discussion. Collier & Hoeffler model conflict as a function of 
either extreme levels of suffering (grievance), or extreme levels of opportunity 
(greed). Both perspectives contain economic, political, social, historic and geographi-
cal/environmental explanations. Following the discussion of the CH model, several 
other possible causes of civil war are discussed.  
In their analysis, Collier & Hoeffler make a strong case that conflict in Africa 
to a large extent is caused by the region’s poor economic performance. By assigning 
the economic characteristics of other developing countries in the 1990-95 period to 
the Sub-Saharan Africa region, the CH model predict that Sub-Saharan Africa would 
had experienced 4.7 rather than 8.6 percent conflict. Collier & Hoeffler conclude 
their article that Africa’s poor economic performance is the most important explana-
tory factor explaining civil war in the region. This thesis uses the Collier & Hoeffler 
model to perform the same analysis on another conflict-ridden region, the Middle 
East and North Africa (MENA). There is reason to anticipate that the MENA region’s 
conflict-correlates differ from the African ones. Some of the countries in the MENA 
region are fairly rich, and the region is culturally and ethnically more homogenous 
than sub-Saharan Africa. The last section of this chapter discusses aspects that make 
the Middle East and North Africa a particularly interesting region for an analysis of 
armed domestic conflict. The conflict-ridden region’s home to abundant resources, 
authoritarian regimes and Islam are key factors in this respect. 
2.1 Overview of the Collier & Hoeffler Method 
The CH model has been developed in a series of papers and published articles 
(Collier, 2000a, b, c; Collier & Hoeffler, 1998, 1999, 2001, 2002). The most exten-
sive model appears in the 2001 report ‘Greed or Grievance in Civil Wars’ where 
proxies of finance, grievance, military viability and conflict history are included to 
model the probability of rebellion. Insignificant variables were then dropped in a 
process of stepwise elimination. An overview of the initial variables is presented in 
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Table 3. Significant variables are colored in gray, and correspond with the ones in-
cluded ‘On the Incidence of Civil War in Africa’ (Collier & Hoeffler, 2002).  
Table 3. Greed and Grievance in Civil War: Variables from Collier & Hoeffler, 
2001 
MODELS VARIABLES PROXIES 
Greed and Opportunity   
Financing of rebellion Natural resource extortion Primary commodity exports to 
GDP 
 Diaspora donations Size of emigrant population in 
US as proportion of population 
in country of origin 
 Hostile government support Cold War period (before 1990) 
   
Atypically low cost Foregone income Mean income per capita 
Male secondary schooling* 
Growth-rate of economy 
 Conflict specific capital Time since most recent conflict 
 Government military capability Terrain: forest and mountains 
Geographic dispersion 
 Social cohesion Social fractionalization 
   
Objective Grievances   
 Ethnic/religious hatred Ethnic fractionalization 
Religious fractionalization  
Polarization 
 Political repression Politiy III 
 Political exclusion Ethnic dominance 
 Economic inequality Ratio of top-to-bottom quintiles 
of income (Gini) 
   
Control variable 
 
Scale effects (opportunities 
proportional to size) 
Population size 
 Consistently significant variables (included in combined greed and grievance model) 
*   Correlated with mean income per capita, and could not be included in model 
 
Collier & Hoeffler combine microeconomic and general socio-political theo-
ries on resource capture and civil conflict. Their model focuses on conditions that 
favor the formation of rebel organizations, and predicts the probability of a civil war 
being initiated in a country during a five-year period. Conflict is viewed as a function 
of microeconomic motives and socio-economic-political environment. Their model 
and line of arguing also gives a plausible explanation for why wars reappear. While 
conflict is bad for the majority of the population, some are ‘doing well out of war’, or 
at least doing better than before. 
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Collier & Hoeffler argue that—regardless of their legitimate reasons for griev-
ance—groups only revolt if they have the financial infrastructure to do so. In brief, 
they present two explanations for civil war: atypical levels of grievance or atypical 
opportunities for forming a rebel organization. Access to finance, through the form of 
foreign contributions or control over natural resources, are important aspects of the 
opportunity model. Natural resources are linked to conflict with the ‘lootable re-
sources’ argument: the existence of ‘unmovable’ resources (i.e. diamond mines) pro-
vides a fruitful base for rebel groups (Collier & Hoeffler, 2001, 2002; de Soysa, 
2001, 2002; Ross, 2001a, b). Collier & Hoeffler conclude that the greed/opportunity 
perspective outperform grievance as an explanation for civil war. Access to natural 
resources emerges as a strong factor in their analysis, and supports their theoretical 
argument that natural resources greatly facilitates the formation and financing of 
rebellions.  
A discussion of the theoretical aspects of the CH model is presented below. 
Collier & Hoeffler concede that the effect of the various variables can be interpreted 
in multiple ways. I base my presentation on the two underlying perspectives: griev-
ance and greed, and some of the variables are discussed in both sections. Hypotheses 
are developed and presented after each theoretical sub-section. The emphasis of the 
theoretical chapter is natural resources, an understudied area in the field of civil war 
studies. 
2.2 Grievance and Motive 
2.2.1 Poverty 
It is no surprise that poverty and civil war are related. Poverty-ridden countries host 
hungry, unemployed and dissatisfied populations. Almost any study of civil war finds 
that conflict is more frequent in poor and underdeveloped countries (Collier & Hoef-
fler, 1998, 2001; Hauge & Ellingsen, 1998; Hibbs, 1973).   
High levels of economic development provide fewer reasons for grievance and 
frustration. When basic needs are covered, there is less dissatisfaction and frustration 
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with the incumbent regime. Hibbs (1973) argues that wealth reduces class conflict, 
which again favors negotiation and compromises—a corner stone in building a de-
mocratic regime. De Soysa (2002) emphasizes the re-distributive powers of a gov-
ernment with higher income. Large state revenues can be used to either satisfy or si-
lence the population. At the same time higher income raise the opportunity cost for 
rebel groups. In contrast, in some poor countries, the salary and food provided by a 
rebel army is preferred over unemployment and little or no income. The first hy-
pothesis thus states:  
H1: Countries with low levels of GDP per capita are more likely to  
experience civil war than countries with high levels GDP per capita. 
2.2.2 Lack of Economic Growth 
Dismal prospects for an increase in income and little hope of a better future also cre-
ate a base for grievance. The lack of prospects for a better economic future (economic 
growth) intensifies and adds to (real or perceived) sense of suffering and grievance. If 
the economic situation shows no sign of improvement or even worsens, the prospects 
for conflict should increase. Consequently: 
H2: Countries with lower rates of economic growth are more likely to  
experience conflict that countries with higher growth 
2.2.3 Economic Inequality 
Inequality, or relative deprivation, is theorized to lead to conflict (Hibbs, 1973; Sen, 
1973). In societies where some people are visibly much better off than others, disad-
vantaged groups might start to protest, radicalize, and even resort to violent conflict. 
In populations where income is unequally distributed, the incentives to join a rebel 
movement is high among the poorer segments of the population. However, the rela-
tionship between economic inequality and conflict is complicated. Lichbach (1989) 
provides an extensive discussion of the literature and studies on the relationship be-
tween economic inequality and political conflict, and concludes that ‘economic ine-
quality is neither necessary, sufficient, nor clearly probabilistically related to dissent’ 
(Lichbach, 1989: 464). Hauge (2002: 387) concludes her PhD dissertation that ‘… 
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inequality alone is not a sufficient factor to cause armed conflict. The comparison 
between the two peace cases and the conflict cases has provided the study with a con-
stant reminder about the need to identify the right combination of factors, or identity 
building contexts, within which socio-economic disparities bring about armed con-
flict.’ When controlling for level of economic development, several studies find no 
relationship between conflict and inequality (Boswell & Dixon, 1990; Deininger & 
Squire, 1997). Data on economic inequality are also less reliable. Since Collier & 
Hoeffler find no effect of their economic inequality variable I do not include this as-
pect in my analysis.  
2.2.4 Identity and Inter-group Hatred 
Narratives and descriptions of civil wars are often based on ancient hatred and irrec-
oncilable differences between different cultures—ethnic, religious or linguistic 
groups. Shared history, religion, customs, institutions and an awareness of being a 
unique community are the main elements that shape cultural identities. The literature 
on culture and conflict generally falls into three categories: primordialism, instrumen-
talism and constructivism (Lake & Rothchild, 1998).  
 Primordialists see culture as given and unchangeable. Cultural identity is em-
phasized as having a unique and overriding importance, and conflict along cultural 
divides is therefore natural (Kaplan, 1993). Variation in levels of conflict over time 
and place is not well explained by this view. If cultural identities are fixed, how does 
one explain the emergence of new identities? If cultural differences are conflictual, 
how does one account for the times cultures do not clash? 
 Instrumentalists see culture as a tool that elites use to obtain political or eco-
nomic ends. ‘Ethnic engineering’ describes a situation where the masses as mobilized 
to conflict. In contrast to the primordial view, researchers in this tradition fail to take 
into consideration that culture is not something that can be created and manipulated 
out of the blue. Culture is rooted in a long history and tradition. 
 Emerging as a synthesis of the two aforementioned categories, constructivism 
is gaining more academic acceptance. Cultural differences are not viewed as inher-
ently conflictual. Culture is viewed as dynamic and changeable, but also rooted and 
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controlled by society as a whole. Constructivists argue that conflict is ‘caused by cer-
tain types of what might be called pathological social systems, which individuals do 
not control… it is the social system that breeds violent conflict, not individuals, and it 
is the socially constructed nature of ethnic than can cause conflict, once begun, to 
spin rapidly out of control’ (Lake & Rothchild, 1998: 6). Identity relates to conflict in 
that it is needed for a group to provide a base from which to mobilize (Gurr & Harff, 
1994; Tilly, 1978). In the cases where identity does not confine to the nation state 
border, a conflict may rise.  
Smith (1991) asserts that we all have multiple identities depending on the con-
text we are in. Thus the centrality of our ethnic identity in our lives can vary and does 
not always serve as a base for ethnic leaders to mobilize to conflict. Identity alone is 
not a sufficient cause for conflict. ‘When a group with a common identity is discrimi-
nated against, it is likely to be aggressive and hostile’ (Gurr & Harff, 1994: 83). Dis-
crimination on a political and or an economic level leads to frustration, which again 
can lead to aggression. If scarce economic and political resources are distributed ac-
cording to ethnic lines, this provides a fruitful base for revolt. Gurr (1993) and 
Väyrynen (1994) assert that most domestic conflicts originate from an ethnic base. 
Gurr reports in Minorities at Risk (1994) that discrimination and competition for 
scarce resources, was experienced economically by 147 and politically by 168 of the 
233 ethnic groups he studied. Most groups organized to defend their right, and in 
more than 80 cases the conflict turned violent (1994, 6). Gurr demonstrated that dis-
crimination and grievance often was conducted and based on ethnic, religious or lin-
guistic grounds, which again serves as a base for identity and mobilization. However 
in a later work, Gurr (2000) points to a reduced role of ethnic conflict since the mid-
1990s, caused by an apparent global strategy to contain ethnic conflict.  
The bipolar and omnipotent Cold War to a great deal overshadowed and sup-
pressed nationalism and ethnic conflict. With the lifting of the iron curtain, 
Mearsheimer (1990) predicted a bleak future for the newly democratized regimes, 
and likened the process to taking the lid of a pressure cooker. Rupesinghe (1992) 
points out that the democratic wave after the Cold War will result in new conflicts, as 
new democratic regimes open up and allows groups to express their dissent. The peak 
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in domestic conflict in 1992 (Figure 1) supports these fears, while the recent decline 
does not seem to fulfill these predictions. Ellingsen (2000) finds support for the fact 
that multi-ethnicity increases the propensity for conflict, especially for smaller scale 
domestic conflicts. The recent conflicts in the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda are 
visible and violent testimonies to the devastating role that the sentiments and feelings 
connected to ethnicity and religious identity can play under the wrong circumstances. 
Popular perceptions, recent wars and much conflict theory assert that multi-ethnicity 
generates conflict. 
H3: Socially fractionalized countries are more likely to experience civil war  
than homogenous countries 
2.2.5 Political Exclusion: Ethnic Dominance 
Societies where one ethnic group is dominant can create the basis for a political sys-
tem where one or more ethnic minorities are discriminated against or even perma-
nently excluded. As one of four measurements of ethnic heterogeneity, Ellingsen 
(2000) finds that countries where the dominant group constitutes less than 80 percent 
of the population have a higher propensity for conflict. When the minority is suffi-
ciently large (above 20 percent), polarization and mobilization to conflict is more 
likely. Along the same lines, Collier & Hoeffler argue that in countries where an eth-
nic majority constitutes a small majority and identity follows ethnic lines, an ethnic 
majority (constituting 45 to 90 percent of the population) creates a conflict-generating 
situation where there is a permanent incentive to exploit the resources of large minor-
ity groups.  
H4: Countries where one ethnic group constitute between 45 and 90 percent  
of the population are more likely to experience civil war than countries  
with a very large ethnic majority, or no ethnic majority at all 
2.2.6 Grievance in Authoritarian Regimes 
Political repression is an important source of grievance. The characteristics of politi-
cal regimes determine the distribution of economic and political rights (Jaggers & 
Gurr, 1995). While a democratic regime ensures majority rule and minority rights and 
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is less likely to discriminate against minorities, autocratic regimes control and force 
people. The repressive tools used by authoritarian regimes often create discrimination 
and injustice—a fertile ground for violence. A hypothesis on the relationship between 
regime and conflict is developed after the discussion on democratic regimes. 
2.3 Greed and Opportunity 
2.3.1 Opportunities in Democratic Regimes 
Frustration and grievances alone are insufficient to create rebellion. There also needs 
to be opportunity to revolt (Gurr, 1970). Tilly (1978) interprets the link between frus-
tration and opportunity from a rational actor perspective, which sees rebellion as a 
calculation of costs and benefits. In Mobilization to Revolution (1978, 81) Tilly theo-
rizes that a group will only rebel if the chances of success are good. Violence be-
comes a cost-benefit analysis, weighting grievance against opportunity.  
Rummel argues that ‘democracy is a general method of non-violence’ (1995: 
26.). A democratic regime is more likely to provide room for negotiation and com-
promise, and offers greater leeway for expression of frustration. Gurr & Lichbach 
find that democracies are ten times more likely to experience protest, but are unlikely 
to experience civil war and violence (1981: 69). An autocratic regime offers little op-
portunity to express discontent, and likewise civil violence is unlikely to take place 
even though the reasons for frustration are plenty. Ellingsen & Gleditsch (1997) and 
Mueller & Weede (1990) both show that democracies and rough authoritarian states 
are less prone to civil violence than semi-democracies. The distribution of domestic 
conflict is thus expected to take the shape of an inverted U—less conflict in both 
ends, but for opposite reasons. 
The empirical evidence for the relationship between regime and rebellion is 
mixed. Several scholars find no support for the importance of regime type in civil 
wars (de Nardo, 1985; Francisco, 1995), yet other studies find an inverted U-shaped 
relationship (Gleditsch, 1992; Muller & Weede, 1990). The relationship between civil 
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wars and regime type is hypothesized to be curvilinear, with semi-democracies most 
conflict-prone.5  
H5: Semi-democracies are more likely to experience civil war than either  
democracies and autocracies 
2.3.2 Foregone Income: Income and Economic Growth 
Low levels of income and little prospects for improvement creates a base for griev-
ance, as well as facilitates recruitment to rebel organizations. In addition to the fact 
that poverty is a cause for rebellion due to suffering, the lack of income (GDP per 
capita) and little prospects for a better economic future (low economic growth or de-
cline) provide strong incentives for joining a rebel organization that offers food and 
employment. Although the reasoning behind are different, economic development 
and growth impacts rebel recruitment is the same hypothesized way as in the griev-
ance section (Hypotheses 1 and 2). Low levels of economic development and eco-
nomic growth facilitate the opportunity to recruit to rebel organizations. Conse-
quently, countries with low levels of economic development and economic growth 
should experience more conflict. 
2.3.3 Social Fractionalization 
In contrast to the hypothesis presented in the identity and hatred section, Collier & 
Hoeffler hypothesize fractionalization to reduce the propensity for conflict. Due to 
the lack of social cohesion in fractionalized societies, mobilization to conflict is made 
more difficult. Organizations with ethnic and religious diversity are theorized to func-
tion less effectively. Restricting the pool of possible members to only one ethnic or 
religious group reduces the chances for a rebel group to be effective. In contrast to the 
hypothesis on social (ethnic and religious) fractionalization, from an opportunity per-
spective, high levels of social fractionalization impedes mobilization.  
                                              
5 Semi-democracies includes both regimes in transition and institutionally hybrid regimes. Institutional inconsistent re-
gimes do not have institutions that mutually reinforce each other, and are therefore likely to be unstable. A discussion on 
the institutional composition of regimes is outside the scope of this thesis. A thorough discussion (and a new dataset) is 
provided by (Gates et al., 2000). 
 
 26
H6: Countries with high levels of social fractionalization are less likely to  
experience civil war 
2.3.4 Primary Commodity Abundance  
A central variable in the Collier & Hoeffler’s opportunity model is the access to fi-
nances. The major emphasis is put on access to natural resources/primary commodi-
ties. Collier & Hoeffler (2001) point to a direct link between natural resources and 
conflict, caused by greedy bandits (often masking themselves with a language of 
grievance), or rebel-leaders seizing the opportunity to finance their rebellion with 
profits from natural resources. In the post-Cold War climate rebels receive less for-
eign aid, and have to rely on their own sources for finance. Easily lootable natural 
resources, such as diamonds and drugs, provide lucrative sources of income for 
armed insurgencies. Addison et al. (2001) present a model of the cost of peaceful be-
havior, where the parties prefer a low-intensity conflict over peace, because it pro-
vides financial opportunities, including the control of natural resources, that are out-
of-the-way in peacetime. A thorough discussion of the natural resources and conflict 
will be provided in Section 2.4. From an opportunity perspective, access to natural 
resources is hypothesized to facilitate the financing of rebellion. However, at high 
levels of primary commodity export (the proxy for natural resource abundance), the 
government is theorized to control and either repress or buy off its citizens. Conse-
quently,  
H7: Countries with medium levels of primary commodity dependence are  
more likely to experience civil war, than countries with low and high 
levels 
2.3.5 Population: Geographic Dispersion and Size 
The geographical dispersion of the population is by Collier & Hoeffler theorized to 
proxy government capability. A prime example of this is Zaire, a large country with 
its population distributed on the edges of the country. Herbst (2000) argues that Zaire 
is prone to rebellion because the government is unable to assert its control over the 
entire country. This applies to both military power and governmental services. In 
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countries where the population is evenly spread around, government services will be 
more expensive to provide. In contrast to what is predicted by neo-Malthusian theory, 
population density might be good for development in that administrating health and 
education is made easier when people live within smaller geographical areas.   
H8: Countries where the population is evenly spread around the country are  
more likely to experience civil war than countries with concentrated 
populations 
 
A variable on population size is included to control for the fact that countries 
with large populations are more likely to surpass the minimum casualty line than 
smaller populations. This would be more relevant for civil wars than armed civil con-
flicts. Also, larger countries could be more likely to experience conflict because they 
could be the home of more conflict generating factors.  
H9: Countries with larger population are more likely to experience civil war  
than countries with smaller populations 
2.3.6 Time Since Last Conflict 
The time since the last conflict outbreak is of importance to the outbreak of a new 
conflict in several ways. Collier & Hoeffler places this variable in the opportunity 
model, proxying the access to conflict specific capital. The shorter the time since the 
last conflict, the better the access to trained soldiers and weapons.  
 Time since last conflict also relates to the grievance perspective in the way 
that ‘time heals’. Extended periods with peace should make the population less ready 
for conflict. Hypothesis 10 captures both logics: 
H10: The longer time since a civil war broke out, the less likely a country is 
to  
experience civil war 
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2.4 Additions to the Collier & Hoeffler Model 
This section discusses alternative specifications and interpretation of some of Collier 
& Hoeffler’s variables. 
2.4.1 Natural Resource Scarcity 
In contrast to the natural resource abundance argument, many researchers argue that 
natural resource scarcity causes conflict. Systematic inequality, population pressure 
and deteriorating environmental conditions are theorized to pressure people to com-
pete for increasingly scarce resources. In some situations, resources become so scarce 
and competition so fierce that armed conflict breaks out. The link between resource 
scarcity and civil conflict is analyzed in many academic circles (Homer-Dixon, 1999; 
Homer-Dixon & Blitt, 1998; Kaplan, 1994; Renner, 1996). Klare (2000, 2001a, b) 
argues that control over natural resources is of increasing importance to governments. 
Competition over resources is intensifying and could easily turn into open conflict, in 
particular for the crucial commodities of petroleum and water 
The resource scarcity paradigm has prominently been advocated by Homer-
Dixon and the Toronto Research Group. Their research is based on several case stud-
ies that explore the link between scarcity and violence. Homer-Dixon identifies three 
types of scarcities: supply-induced (deterioration, pollution), demand-induced (popu-
lation growth) or structural (inequality)—all of which are theorized to lead to a higher 
propensity for conflict (Homer-Dixon, 1999). Resource scarcity is seen as the pri-
mary force behind civil conflict, and theorized to work in two main ways: resource 
capture and through an ingenuity gap.  
The recent violence in Haiti, Mexico (Chiapas), Rwanda, South Africa and the 
Philippines are thought to be products a process where resource scarcity triggers el-
ites to gain control over resource, at the cost of less powerful groups. ‘Resource cap-
ture occurs when the degradation and depletion of renewable resources interact with 
population growth to encourage powerful groups within a society to shift resource 
distribution in their favor’ (1999: 177). 
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Homer-Dixon also links scarcity directly to conflict through the lack of ingenu-
ity (2000). In poor countries, the lack of innovation hinders the development of tech-
nological progress and economic growth from within. Thus, poor and resource-scarce 
countries are trapped in a vicious cycles of ‘no resources—no innovation—no eco-
nomic development—no solution to environmental scarcity—no economic growth…’ 
Homer-Dixon’s theory has gained prominence, and is supported by a large literature 
on neo-Malthusian fears of a population explosion (Ehrlich, 1968; Ehrlich & Ehrlich, 
1972) and the ‘coming anarchy’ (Kaplan, 1994), these researchers predict a bleak 
future ridden with conflicts caused by resource scarcity.   
Several researchers have challenged and criticized the scarcity approach. First 
and foremost, Homer-Dixon is accused of a flawed research design by selecting cases 
on the dependent variable (conflict). Homer-Dixon’s cases have both resource scar-
city AND conflict. Consequently, the studies do not contain a relevant reference 
group, and the conclusions they draw are less certain. Furthermore, the model con-
tains many independent and interacting variables, making it almost impossible to test 
empirically. In addition, variables that often are included in studies of conflict, such 
as regime type and economic development, are not included in the model. Finally, 
Gleditsch (1998) argues that Homer-Dixon fails to account for the potential of 
economizing and technical inventions, as well as for the fact that many scarcities are 
local, and not global.  
Overall, empirical testing of the scarcity approach finds little support. Hauge & 
Ellingsen (1998) find that democracy, economic growth, and development provide a 
stronger explanation for conflict than resource scarcity. De Soysa (2000) points out 
that Hauge & Ellingsen’s study is not testing scarcity, but depletion. The deforesta-
tion rate in Brazil is much higher that in Saudi Arabia, but that does not tell us much 
about scarcity. Brazil host vast areas of rainforest, and the high rate of depletion is 
only a sign of the government exploiting an abundant resource (albeit at an unhealthy 
rate). Saudi Arabia is basically a desert. By using per capita availability and making a 
distinction between renewable and non-renewable resources, de Soysa find that re-
source abundant countries, not resource poor countries, are more likely to experience 
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conflict. This thesis focuses on natural resource abundance, and does not test the 
scarcity approach. 
2.4.2 The Differing Nature of Natural Resources 
Collier & Hoeffler argue that the windfall profit potential that controlling a resource-
rich area generates becomes the main motive for an armed rebellion. Primary com-
modities are very different in terms of size, transportation needs, extract cost, market 
structure etc., and some resources are of more use to rebels than others. Collier & 
Hoeffler’s wide category thus needs disaggregating. Le Billon  (2001: 573) presents a 
useful typology of natural resource, based on the distinction between the geographi-
cal location (‘proximate’ or ‘distant’ to the capital) and the geographical concentra-
tion (‘point’ or ‘diffuse’) of the various resources. An overview of conflict types and 
natural resources in the country is presented in Table 4. 
Table 4. The Nature and Geography of Resources and Types of Conflict  
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 Point  Diffuse 
  Proximate State control/ coup  Rebellion/ rioting 
 Algeria (gas)   El Slavador (coffee) 
 Angola (oil)   Guatemala (cropland) 
 Chad (oil)   Israel-Palestine (freshwater) 
 Congo-Brazzaville (oil)   M exico (cropland) 
 Iran-Iraq (oil)   Senegal-M auritania (cropland) 
 Liberia (iron ore, rubber)  
 Nicaragua (coffee)  
 Rwanda (coffee)  
 Sierra Leone (rutile)  
  Distant Secession   Warlordism 
 Angola/Cabinda (oil)   Afghanistan (opium) 
 Caucasus (oil)   Angola (diamonds) 
 DR Congo (coper, cobault, gold)    Burma (opium, timber) 
 Indonesia (oil)   Caucasus (drugs) 
 Papua New Guinea/ Bougainville (copper)   Cambodia (gems, timber) 
 Senegal/ Casamance (marijuana)   Columbia (cocaine) 
 Sudan (oil)   DR Congo (diamonds, gold) 
    Kurdistan (heroin) 
    Lebanon (hash) 
    Liberia (timber, diamonds, drugs) 
    Peru (cocaine) 
    Phillipines (marijuana, timber) 
    Sierra Leone (diamonds) 
    Somalia (bananas, camels) 
    Tadjikistan (drugs) 
    F.R. Yugoslavia (marijuana, timber) 
 
* Table is based on Le Billon (2001: 573) 
 
Resources that are far from government centers and concentrated in one area 
are vulnerable to rebel attacks (2001: 570). According to Le Billon’s typology, re-
source-rich regions offer potential for secessionist civil wars. The majority of re-
sources in both the proximate and distant point category are oil and gas. This indi-
cates that oil inhibits a very unique set of conflict dynamics. Le Billon argues that 
‘resource rents constitute ‘the price’ for controlling the state and can lead to violent 
bids for the government… Alternatively, bids for state control can be motivated by 
the greed of competing elites’ (2001: 573). Along the same lines as Le Billon, Auty 
argues for the importance of the different natural commodities’ value-to-weight ratio. 
Auty distinguishes between bulk commodities (copper, oil, sugar) and conflict com-
modities (diamonds and drugs).  
High-rent commodities like oil sustain such corrosion for longer than low-rent com-
modities and foster political underdevelopment that elicits military challenges. In ad-
dition, natural resource commodities with high value in relation to weight (like drugs 
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and diamonds) located in remote regions supports secessionist regimes and/or war-
lords (2002: 12) 
Furthermore, other dimensions of natural resources also influence the 
‘lootability’ and role in conflict. The technology and infrastructure required for the 
extraction of the varying resource plays an important role. The mining of gold ores, 
copper, bauxite and kimberlitic diamonds require fairly advanced machinery and 
technology. This is also the case for oil and gas extraction, with some areas being less 
hospitable and more expensive to extract than others.6 
                                             
 However, once extracted, the physical quality of the primary commodities dif-
fers immensely. The dense format of gold, drugs and diamonds make them easy to 
smuggle, either by humans, animals or normal vehicles of transportation. On the 
other hand, the transport of oil requires trucks, tankers or pipelines, and requires an 
extensive infrastructure. The size, format and the rather fixed transportation routes of 
oil and timber also make them less-preferred commodities for rebel organizations. 
However, one way rebels might profit from controlling territories with oil wells and 
timber forests is to make them subject to ‘taxation,’ agreeing to let companies con-
tinue their business against the payment of a mafia-style protection fee. Auty (2002) 
argues that proximity to porous borders enhance the usefulness of i.e. timber as a 
source of income. This is the case along the Cambodian border, and in some remote 
Indonesian regions.  
 The nature of the market of the various commodities also varies. Narcotics are 
illegal commodities, and the whole market remains outside government or interna-
tional control. Statistically, it is difficult to assess the contribution of drugs to the 
economy of war, since the commodity itself is illegal and official statistics is rare or 
missing. Until recently, few cared about the origins of diamonds, and all diamonds 
entered a rather shady, but international and legal market. Due to much focus on 
‘conflict diamonds’, international NGOs and parts of the industry itself (including De 
Beers, the world’s largest diamond trading company) have worked towards an inter-
national certification arrangement that traces the origin of diamonds.  
 
6 Drilling oil wells deeps in North Sea is much more technologically demanding and expensive ($10/barrel) that in the sand 
dunes of the Arabian deserts ($2/barrel).  
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 Most oil companies are willing to take huge risks to gain access to new and 
promising oil and gas fields—including operations in conflict zones. Nevertheless, oil 
is sold in an internationally regulated market, and there are fewer opportunities for 
illegal oil to access the market if international sanctions are in place. Due to the 
unique composition of each oil field (weight, sulfur-level and density) its origin can 
easily be traced. The Iraqi sanction regime provides a good example of the restriction 
of the international oil market. While Iraq is known to smuggle oil to Syria and Jor-
dan, attempts to smuggle oil into the international market have to a great extent been 
discouraged and discovered. 
 Finally, drugs play a more complex role in the natural resources and conflict 
nexus than most other commodities. Plants used in the production of drugs can be 
cultivated in most warm areas in this world. However, actual cultivation of these 
plants is dependent on the political and economic situation in these areas. The cultiva-
tion of drugs is likely to be endogenous with conflict, as well as the major economic 
and political explanatory variables. In a conflict climate where the government has 
little legitimacy and/or control, the production of drugs cannot be controlled or 
stopped by the government. In a difficult economic situation, farmers are more likely 
to choose to plant hashish than wheat. 
2.4.3 Natural Resource Dependence and Economic Growth  
Men of a fat and fertile soil are most commonly effeminate and cowards; whereas 
contrariwise a barren country makes men temperate by necessity, and by conse-
quence careful, vigilant, and industrious (Bodin, 1576. Quoted in de Soysa, 2000: 1) 
The early wisdom of Jean Bodin neatly summarizes a lesson most resource rich re-
gimes seem not to have learned. Natural resource abundance is associated with poor 
economic growth and greater social and economic inequality (Sachs & Warner, 
1995). The title of Sachs & Warner’s article (2001) speaks for itself: ‘The Curse of 
Natural Resources’. Paradoxically, since the 1960s, most resource rich countries have 
performed poorer then resource poor countries. Per capita growth in resource poor 
countries has on the average been two to three times faster than in resource rich coun-
tries and resource poor countries are often associated with more equal societies 
(Auty, 2000; Sachs & Warner, 1995, 2001).  
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The reason why resource-rich countries display lower growth rates than re-
source poor countries is attributed to several factors. First, ‘Dutch disease’ is often 
used to explain the economic challenges resource rich states face. ‘Dutch disease’ 
originates from the Dutch experience in the 1960s, when an the discovery of gas in 
the North Sea increased export revenues and led to the overvaluation of the currency. 
Simultaneously, the petroleum sector drained capital and labor away from the manu-
facture and agriculture sectors, and consequently raised their production costs. This 
led to a decline in the export of goods from these sectors, and increased the cost of 
goods and services that could not be imported (the non-tradable sector). However, 
Ross points out that Dutch Disease might not be as common in developing countries, 
because the labor market is not saturated. Increased investment in the petroleum sec-
tor does not drain labor from other sector, but rather decreases unemployment and 
encourages foreign investment (1999: 305-307). 
 Secondly, states that experience a sudden influx of income they did not work 
hard to get to, do not need neither the fiscal nor financial discipline normally re-
quired. If it is too good to be true, it probably is… Rodriguez & Sachs (1999) argue 
that resource-rich states tend to be living beyond their means. ‘Resource-abundant 
economies grow more slowly precisely because they have an unsustainable high level 
of income’ (1999: 278). Murshed (2002: 2) highlights the possibility of growth col-
lapse following resource booms.  
Thirdly, in resource-rich countries, much of the economic activity is focused 
on gaining access to the lucrative resource cycle. Productivity is declining because 
resources are diverted to rent seeking. Little initiative and energy is placed on innova-
tion. This starkly contradicts Homer-Dixon’s ‘ingenuity gap’ argument. Sachs & 
Warner (1999) argue that resource-rich countries do not experience endogenous 
growth because they live comfortably off resource rents, and do not need to innovate 
to ensure a steady flow of income (at least in the short term perspective). On the other 
hand, resource-poor countries are forced to develop more competitive and diverse 
production and economies, and are less prone to fluctuations and price of one prod-
uct.    
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Auty (2001) contrasts two development trajectories: while resource poor coun-
tries follow a competitive industrialization, resource rich countries are caught in a 
staple trap. In poor countries, politician and their people share interest that can only 
be achieved with prudent policies. Auty argue that governments in resource rich 
countries  
… will find it easier to satisfy its financial need by capturing the rents than by in-
vesting to generate wealth so that the latter will be neglected in favour of the former. 
Effort will be diverted into the political process by which rents are extracted and 
away from measure to raise productivity, like improving institutions. Indeed, effec-
tive institutions may be regarded as an impediment to rent-seeking behaviour be-
cause they increase government accountability and promote competition, both of 
which shrink rent-seeking opportunities (2001: 4) 
Auty also argues that the potential for economic distortion, and therefore a growth 
collapse, is greater with ‘point’ natural resources than with resources with diffuse 
socio-economic linkages like peasant crops 
2.4.4 Natural Resource Dependence and Political Development  
In addition to the economic consequences of windfall profits from natural resources, 
the development of political institutions is also severely impeded. The core of the 
rentier-state dynamic is found here. Economic and political activity becomes domi-
nated by rent-seeking behavior. The centralized income, controlled by the govern-
ment, creates a system of patronage and clientilism. Rentier states develop democracy 
more slowly (if at all), and that dependence on one lucrative primary commodity 
hampers the development of a healthy economy (Beblawi & Luiciani, 1987; de 
Soysa, 2002; Karl, 1997; Noreng, 1997; Ross, 1999, 2001a). Leite & Weidemann 
(1999) find that ‘natural resource abundance creates opportunity for rent-seeking be-
haviors and is an important factor in determining a country’s level of corruption’. 
Moore (2000) emphasizes the distinction between earned or unearned income 
as powerful explanations for the political underdevelopment. The main focus of po-
litical underdevelopment is the weak dependence of state elites on their citizens. This 
is in great deal attributed to the ways in which these states have been created, and the 
way they earn their income. Moore envisage three overlapping circumstances allow-
ing for these high levels of dependence: strong external financial and/or military sup-
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port; dependence on ‘unearned income,’ such as mineral revenues or foreign aid; and 
abundant resources are used to buy military equipment and personnel to be used 
against their own citizens (Moore, 2000: 4).  
Brynen et al. argues that a ‘…narrow base of the economy (centered on the pe-
troleum and public sectors) deprives most societal actors any degree of economic lev-
erage vis-à-vis the state. Society is atomized into individual rent- and reward seekers, 
and the development of the autonomous institutions of civil society is severely 
stunted’ (1995: 15). Hadenius finds a significant negative correlation (-0.42) between 
commodity concentration and democracy. The commodity concentration variable 
explains 17.7% of the variance in level of democracy (1992: 94-95).   
Ross (2001a) tests the ‘does oil hinder democracy?’ proposition and find 
overwhelming evidence that oil and democracy do not mix. This finding is not just 
restricted to the Middle East. Ross also finds some support for the three explanations 
of this finding: the rentier effect (taxation and spending, group formation effect), re-
pression effect (resource wealth allows governments to spend more on internal secu-
rity and military) and the lack of modernization discussed above. Democracy presup-
poses occupational specialization, urbanization and higher levels of education 
(Diamond, Linz & Lipset, 1995; Diamond, Lipset & Linz, 1988-89; Inglehart, 1997; 
Putnam, Leonardi & Nanetti, 1993). Without these elements being the by-products of 
economic development, democracy will not evolve. Thus it is not wealth per se, but 
the economic and social diversification generated by modernization that changes so-
ciety, and the skills and composition of it work force, citizens and society.  
Based on the discussion presented in the three previous sections, I argue that 
middle levels of primary resource dependence should yield a higher propensity for 
conflict. Countries where there are no or little resources from which rent can be cap-
tured, will experience less conflict. Countries where resources are abundant are also 
not likely to experience conflict, because the government is theorized to capture that 
rent. The populations in resource rich countries are then either bought off or held 
down by abundant government spending on social welfare or military expenditures. 
Countries with medium levels of resource revenues are likely to experience conflict. I 
include three variables to test this link. All are measured as percentage of total ex-
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ports. It is the possibility to obtain rent that is crucial in this argument. Only if the 
commodities can be sold on are they of value to the warring parties. The widest vari-
able includes all primary commodity exports. Two sub-sets of primary commodities, 
oil and minerals, are also tested. Unfortunately, data on crucial conflict commodities 
such as drugs and diamonds could not be obtained. The direct link between natural 
resource dependence and conflict is found in the opportunity for rent capture. The 
hypothesis on primary commodity dependence was presented in section 2.3.4. Oil 
and mineral dependence is hypothesized to display the same relationship.  
H11: Oil dependence displays an inverted U-shaped relationship with civil  
war 
H12: Mineral dependency displays an inverted U-shaped relationship with  
civil war 
2.4.5 Regime Transition and Stability 
Political change and instability, whether towards democratization or autocratization, 
creates potential for civil violence (Sahin & Linz, 1995; Tarrow, 1994). In a classical 
passage, de Toqueville argues that ‘revolutions do not always come when things are 
going from bad to worse… Usually the most dangerous time for a bad government is 
when it attempts to reform itself’ (Tocqueville, [1856] 1955: 182). Transition brings 
about hope for better times, but might not be delivered. Then, violence is likely to 
occur (Gurr, 1970: 596).  
Huntington (1991) asserts that political violence is connected with democrati-
zation. In regime transition processes, major change is going on, and the ones who 
benefited from the previous system are likely to oppose change. The implementation 
of market economy changes the property relations and such changes are unlikely to 
take place without serious conflict. Horowitz (1985) argues that changes are espe-
cially violent in areas where several ethnic groups share the same territory. Espe-
cially, if autocratic regimes fail in the process of reforming themselves, ethnic entre-
preneurs might take advantage of the reigning sense of chaos and uncertainty. 
The fact that democracies and autocracies are equally peaceful, and that de-
mocratization increases the risk of conflict, has been used to argue against democrati-
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zation (Mansfield & Snyder, 1995). The democratic peace argument originates from 
empirical research on interstate war: two democracies have never fought a war 
against each other (Babst, 1964; Doyle, 1983a, b, 1986; Russett, 1993a, b; Russett & 
Oneal, 2001). From the findings on a dyadic level, the democratic peace argument 
has sparked hope that increased democratization will lead to a more peaceful world 
(the systemic level). What implications does the democratic peace argument have for 
the substate level? Is the issue of democratization also relevant to internal conflicts? 
The type of regime is theorized to affect two important aspects of civil violence: frus-
tration/grievance and opportunity. A recent study finds some support for the fact that 
democracies are more stable than autocracies (Hegre et al., 2001). Even though de-
mocracies and authoritarian states are equally peaceful, democracy seems to be a bet-
ter recipe for long-term stability, human welfare and peace, on an international as 
well as domestic scale. Hegre et al. conclude that “… durable democracy is the most 
probable end-point of the democratization process. The democratic civil peace is not 
only more just than the autocratic peace but also more stable” (2001: 44). Is there 
reason to believe that the inverted U might tilt towards democracy’s side? I do not 
investigate the direction of change (toward autocratization or democratization ) in this 
thesis, but includes a measurement where change is defined as a doubling or halving 
of the regime score. Gates asserts that the finding that stability promotes peace and 
that change—both democratization and autocratization—generates conflict, belongs 
in the ‘certain relationship’ category.  I therefore hypothesize that: 
H13: Countries in transition are more prone to civil war 
2.5 The Middle East and North Africa 
Collier & Hoeffler investigate sub-Saharan Africa in their analysis. I would like to 
examine the Middle East and North Africa region. The main reason the Middle East 
and North Africa region merits a close examination of its correlates of civil war, is 
because of its conflict history and overrepresentation of variables that directly and 
indirectly are thought to generate conflict. The region is the home to abundant natural 
resources, authoritarian regimes and Islam. The region has failed to join the global 
trend of democratization, and Islamism is a vibrant counter-ideology to democracy. 
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Combined with recurrent conflicts and the entrenched Israeli-Palestinian conflict, in 
addition to the world’s highest military spending (per capita) the Middle East is often 
regarded as a hopeless case where both democracy and peace are doomed to failure. 
This section discusses some important features that sets the Middle East and North 
Africa region out from other developing regions, namely the political and economic 
consequences of natural resource abundance, the region’s resistance towards democ-
racy, and the sensitive and complex relationship between culture and conflict. 
2.5.1 Rentier States 
A rentier economy is defined by Beblawi & Luciani as an ‘… economy substantially 
supported by expenditure from the state, while the state is supported from rent accru-
ing from abroad’ (1987: 11). Marshall (1920: 350) defines rent as ‘income derived 
from the gift of nature’. These definitions incorporate, but are not restricted to natural 
resources. Substantial foreign aid and foreign workers’ remittances would also be 
included in Beblawi & Luciani’s definition. In the Middle East, Israel and Egypt are 
receivers of ample amounts of foreign aid, in particular from the US. Workers’ remit-
tances play an important role in the Jordanian, Palestinian, Egyptian, Syrian and 
North African economies.  
Many of the countries in the Middle East and North Africa region are homes to 
generous reserves of oil and obviously fit into the ‘rentier states’ definition. The de-
pendency, directly or indirectly, on oil has been a formative feature of modern Mid-
dle East politics, economies and societies. The Gulf States are prime examples7, while 
also Iran, Iraq and Algeria are significant oil producers. Dependence on one 
commodity and its revenue—rent—affects the producing country in many ways. The 
consequences of oil dependence for political and economic development are 
discussed below. 
                                             
Political Consequences: Authoritarianism 
Oil seems to produce a patterned response in most countries in which it constitutes 
the major share of state revenue. This peculiar kind of economy affects the develop-
 
7 Yemen and to a certain extent Bahrain and Oman are exceptions.  
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ment of the state and its political and social structures. This phenomenon is not re-
stricted to the Middle East, but for geological reason, this region has a high concen-
tration of such states. In the Middle East, the abundance of oil has made already pa-
triarchic and hierarchic societies even more authoritarian, by leaving control of the 
enormous revenues in the hands of a few. Competing and dissident voices have easily 
been bought off. Citizens have been provided with extensive social services, and pay 
little or no taxes in return. With the basic needs met by a generous welfare state, and 
with little more than demands for quietness and loyalty in return, the populations are 
politically inactive, obedient and loyal to its rulers. Crystal (1990) analyzes the for-
mation and changes of the political, social and economic structures in Kuwait and 
Qatar, and demonstrates how oil has eliminated the merchant class, and has left the 
rulers with no political opponents:  
The rulers exacted a price for their economic largesse—political quiescence. In both 
states the transition to oil was accomplished through a tacit arrangement between the 
ruler and the trading families, a trade of formal power for wealth. In exchange for re-
ceiving a sizable portion of oil revenues, the merchants renounced their historical 
claim to participate in decision-making (1990: 9) 
Politically, the entire MENA region remains an authoritarian stronghold. No 
wave of democratization is in sight, in great part due to the foreign and domestic ar-
rangements created by continued and vulnerable reliance on petroleum. After the fall 
of communism, the Middle East remains the only region where a vibrant counter-
ideology to democracy has emerged. Islamic movements are first and foremost a re-
sponse to opposition towards the incumbent authoritarian regimes in the entire re-
gion. The topic of Islamic fundamentalism provides enough material for numerous 
books and dissertations, and is not the topic for this thesis. It suffices to say that Is-
lamic movements and Islamic fundamentalism are based on a common cultural heri-
tage, but moreover are products of illegitimate regimes and the lack of channels for 
legitimate political opposition. In these authoritarian regimes, the mosques have often 
been the only area outside the control of the government. Restrictions on free speech 
have hindered the development of a free press, and have to a large extent channeled 
political opposition and frustration to the pulpits and Friday prayers. The lack of open 
information channels has also created a fertile ground for conspiracy theories. 
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Democratic regimes in the West fear Islamic fundamentalism. Consequently 
and paradoxically, foreign intervention and support from liberal democracies have 
been provided en masse to authoritarian regimes guilty of serious and systematic 
breaches of human rights. The close relationship between the US and Saudi Arabia 
and the international inaction in the case of the Algerian elections in 1995 are prime 
examples of this. The peoples of the Middle East have seen the democratic West pro-
tecting autocratic regimes, with little legitimacy in their own people, in the name of 
protecting democracy.  
Economic Consequence: Slow Growth and Little Diversity 
The economic consequences of natural resource dependence were discussed in sec-
tion 2.4.3. In the Middle East, oil has dominated and shaped economic development, 
both for producers and the entire region. Paradoxically, the region is today the host of 
some of the most developed and least developed countries in the world. Oil has cre-
ated enormous wealth for the large producing countries and has offered their citizens 
high standards of living. The oil dependent economies have, however, failed to diver-
sify and levels of industrialization is low. For more than three decades, plentiful oil 
has been pumped out of the ground, allowing the elites to remain in control. How-
ever, fluctuations in oil prices combined with high military spending, growing popu-
lations and unemployment is posing serious social and economic challenges to the 
incumbent regimes. In the Arab Gulf, all of the oil monarchies are faced with the 
problem of a growing population, overstaffed bureaucracies, unemployment, lack of 
economic diversity and unclear lines of succession.  
In addition to the oil-rich Gulf countries, the Middle East hosts fairly industri-
alized economies such as Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Syria and Tunisia, and 
the low-income country of Yemen. These economies have been severely affected by 
the influx of petro dollars and fluctuations in oil prices. The economic policies of the 
region’s governments have been exceptionally state-focused and oriented toward the 
domestic market. Privatization has been extremely slow, taking place within a politi-
cal framework of corruption and nepotism.  
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Based on the strategic importance of oil, the Middle East has developed un-
usual ties to the world market. Two types of rentier-states, those dependent on oil and 
those that received substantial foreign aid (Israel and Egypt), are important features 
of this formation. Anderson strongly criticizes this economic structure, and its influ-
ence on political organization.  
Not only has this disproportionate reliance on external, politically driven income en-
hanced the sensitivity of these regimes to the concerns of international patrons and 
diminished their accountability to domestic populations about which they know lit-
tle, it has also led to a political economy based on non-economic bottom line, or 
what is known as soft budget constraints … The availability of soft budget constraint 
bailouts for compliant regimes has left the region with economies and social struc-
tures that are profoundly distorted by conventional capitalist market standards, and 
profoundly inauspicious for democracy (2001: 55-56) 
 Economic wealth also opens up for the possibility for high levels of military 
spending. High military expenditures are seldom conducive to productive economies 
as both people and money are bound up in activities whose sole purpose is to main-
tain order and stability. Hadenius’ data show that the correlation between democracy 
and high military expenditure is negative and significant (-0.43) and accounts for 
18.2% of the variance in democracy. Hadenius concludes that ‘large armed forces … 
have an adverse effect on democracy’ (1992: 141). Evidently, military expenditure is 
also endogenous with conflict. A country at war needs to use its weapons, and buy 
new ones.  
 The Middle East and North Africa is a highly militarized region, both in 
terms of weapons import, per capita spending and share of GDP (Bureau of Verifica-
tion and Compliance, 2000; Sköns et al., 2002). Rulers in the Middle East have de-
veloped unique ties with countries with military production, in particular the United 
States, Great Britain and France. In addition to the linkages to the international actors, 
Noreng interprets the high military spending in the Middle East in the following way: 
The persistent priority given to military expenditure and internal security over civil-
ian tasks can be seen as an indicator of the rulers’ fears of each other and of their 
own population, of the need to back their power with military means, and, not last, 
the effect of foreign manipulation (1997: 2)  
The amount of money spent on maintaining external and internal security is a 
powerful indicator of the stability and peacefulness of the country. ‘The situation is 
particularly distressing from the viewpoint of democracy when the military arm of the 
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state, the armed forces, is politically dominant’ (Hadenius, 1992: 138). An army’s 
access to effective means of coercion (trained soldiers and arms), its ability to admin-
istrate through its centralized, hierarchic and disciplined system and its strong sociali-
zation-function gives it the opportunity to develop itself—over time—into a state in 
the state. Gause (1995: 285-6) argues that heavy emphasis on war preparation con-
centrates power, makes it easier to stigmatize and oppress opposition forces and gives 
the state greater control over the economy and allows for the building of large coer-
cive institutions.  
2.5.2 Modernization and Democratization 
The causes of the lack of democracy are closely connected with economic develop-
ment. The Middle East and North Africa region has been excluded in most studies of 
democratization, and seems to be the region the most resistant to what appears to be a 
global trend. Democracy and economic development are not unrelated. What are the 
conditions for democracy? Is economic development possible without democracy? Is 
either‘s relationship with civil war an artifact of the other? Economic development is 
crucial to domestic stability and peace, as well as its impact on democracy (Burkhart 
& Lewis-Beck, 1994; Dahl, 1971; Lipset, Seong & Torres, 1993).8 Modernization 
theorists argue that occupational specialization and education is a precondition for 
democracy. Wealth favors the growth of literacy, urbanization, and mass media, and 
this process of modernization is a precondition for stable democracies (Inglehart, 
1997; Putnam, Leonardi & Nanetti, 1993). This description does not fit the Middle 
East’s rentier states. Little effort was put into diversifying their economies since the 
major source was the easily accessible the oil beneath the rulers’ feet. Wealth came 
easy and with little effort. The social and economic conditions prevailing in the Mid-
dle East is not a recipe for modernization and democratization. The prerequisites for a 
market economy are not fulfilled, and economies largely lie either in total control or 
totally outside government control (Anderson, 2001). The rentier concept is a power-
                                              
8 However, O’Donnell (1986) argues that some regimes in transition, i.e. Argentina, Taiwan, Korea and Singapore, re-
mained authoritarian in order to avoid rebellion while creating economic development. Contrary to O’Donnell’s claim, 
Feng (1997) argues that democracy leads to economic growth through it emphasis on individual initiative. 
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ful analytical tool for explaining the peculiar economic and political structures in the 
region. But is oil-dependency really the only variable explaining Middle East excep-
tionalism, in terms of economic development, authoritarian dominance and preva-
lence of conflict. What is the role of culture in this picture? 
2.5.3 Clash of Civilizations?: Culture, Society and Islam 
The resistance or failure to develop democracy is the main important feature of Mid-
dle Eastern exceptionalism. Another factor that makes the Middle East a unique re-
gion is its near dominance of Islam. Islam has been and continues to be a major force 
in shaping the societies of the countries in the Middle East and North Africa. Islam is 
an intrinsic part of society and culture, as well as the political and judicial systems. 
Some scholars argue for both the inherent authoritarian nature of both Islamic and 
Arabic culture, and claim that Islam is inherently incompatible with democracy: 
‘…the idea of democracy is quite alien to the mind-set of Islam’ (Kedourie, 1994: 1). 
Huntington argues that ‘cultures that are consumatory in character—that is, where 
intermediate and ultimate ends are closely connected—seem to be less favorable to 
democracy’ (1984: 208). Others argue that important elements of Islamic doctrine 
and tradition (such as the doctrine of ‘din wa dawla’—no separation between state 
and religion; the insistence on divine law and superiority; the suppression of women 
and other minorities; emphasis on order and obedience) are incompatible with de-
mocracy (Mozaffari, 1987; Pipes, 1983). In a well-know argument Huntington theo-
rizes that in the post-Cold War world, the differences between civilizations will shape 
cooperation and conflict, internationally as well as domestically (Huntington, 1993, 
1996). This controversial ‘clash of civilizations’ is hypothesized to have the bloodiest 
borders where Islam and the West meet. However, within Islam the divide between 
the Shia and Sunni strands is of significant importance, and is even described as a 
clash within civilizations (Trautner, 1999). 
The 1960s saw a renaissance of Weber and the old ‘national character’ school 
with Almond & Verba’s The Civic Culture (1963) which argues that particular values 
and attitudes could be attributed to peoples in a society, and that certain attitudes and 
habits are crucial in developing democracy. The study received a lot of criticism 
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based on its methodology, and the political culture paradigm faded during the 1970s 
and 1980s. Today, Hudson makes a case for carefully bringing political culture back 
into political science. ‘Political culture—especially as a single factor—is not likely to 
‘explain’ dependent variables as general as stability, democracy, or authoritarianism. 
But it might help explain why certain institutions (such as legislatures) function as 
they do’ (Hudson, 1995: 64).   
Brynen et al. summarize the middle-ground arguments in the political culture 
debate on democracy in the Arab world: ‘Political culture has considerable utility as 
an explanatory variable, but only if it is dealt with in nuanced way…both authoritar-
ian and participatory strands exist within the political culture of the region, with the 
latter expressed in Islamic principles of shura’ (emphasis in original, (1995: 7). 
Anderson dismisses the political culture argument all together: ‘… the nature of po-
litical regimes in the Arab world, like those elsewhere in the world, can best be un-
derstood as reflections of the political economy of the countries in question, particu-
larly the character of their integration into the world economy’ (1995: 78). 
Religion has for long provided an effective source for justification of and mo-
bilization into conflict. Historically, many religions have emphasized the duty of their 
followers to convert or kill infidels. The crusades and the European religious war, and 
to some extent the ‘white man’s burden’ of colonialism, serve as prime examples.  
Today, Muslim fundamentalism and Jihad (holy war) is an often-cited example of 
religious aggressiveness. The relationship between religion and conflict is controver-
sial. Are some religions more aggressive and conflict-prone than others? While Hunt-
ington’s quote might allude to that, there is little theoretical or empirical evidence that 
points to a causal relationship between certain religions and civil conflict. Midlarsky 
(1998) concludes that civilizational conflict is not likely in the future. The analysis by 
de Soysa (2002) refutes the theorized animosity between Islam and Christianity, and 
proposes a more structurally oriented explanation:  
Some of the bloodiest conflicts in Africa are raging in largely Catholic countries, 
such as Burundi, Rwanda, and Angola. These results taken together may be suggest-
ing that conflict is likelier in societies where church and state are driving competing 
authorities and possibly emasculating political institutions that mediate between state 
and society. Moreover, institutional factors that give the Catholic church and the 
Mosque an organizational advantage for mobilizing people possibly allows greater 
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degrees of conflict through communal polarization than because of hatred of any de-
fined ‘other’ (2002: 411) 
The literature on the relationship between democracy and religion is more 
theoretically elaborated and empirically tested (Hadenius, 1992; Huntington, 1993; 
Weber, 1904). The German sociologist Max Weber emphasized societal and struc-
tural consequences of religion. In The Protestant Ethic, Weber theorizes that both 
capitalism and democracy are unintended by-products of an ethic particular to Protes-
tantism. Firstly, Protestant beliefs, ideals and actions were conducive to economic 
development and capitalism due to its emphasis on hard work and pietism. According 
to Protestant doctrine, the fruits of success were not supposed to be used on luxury 
products and indulgence, but rather be reinvested. Secondly, the Protestant faith em-
phasizes individual responsibility for salvation. Also, skepticism towards authority 
and a history of rebellion are elements conducive to democracy.  
Writing in a period of skepticism towards the applicability of democracy out-
side its area of origin, Kennan argued that democracy ‘…evolved in the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries in northwestern Europe [and has]…a relatively narrow base 
both in time and space; and the evidence has yet to be produced that it is the natural 
form of rule for peoples outside those narrow perimeters’ (1977: 41-43). The ensuing 
third wave of democracy has lightened an increasing amount of research about the 
prospects for further spreading democracy, and few believe that the positive connec-
tion between Christianity and democracy excludes other cultures from developing 
democracy. As the most fervent opponent to democracy, stands most of the Muslim 
Middle East. The Middle East is a region dominated by Islam, and it is also a region 
with very few democratic regimes. Is there a connection between these two observa-
tions? Whether it is Islam itself, or certain aspects of Islam emphasized by rulers to 
justify their authoritarian regimes, which cause the current lack of democracy in Mus-
lim-dominated states, is an important one. The association between Islam and 
authoritarianism is apparent and striking, but the reason behind this is complex and 
controversial. Most certainly, the link between Islam and authoritarianism is not 
causal. Participatory strands within Islam exist, and so do Islamic liberalism, and 
secular states where Muslims constitute a religious majority.  
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Empirical research on the relationship between religion and democracy has 
been conducted, and the results indicate support for the association between Protes-
tant Christianity and democracy, but not for the negative link between Islam and de-
mocracy (Hadenius, 1992; Huntington, 1984, 1991; Midlarsky, 1998). ‘In the cate-
gory where Christianity predominates, the degree of democracy clearly exceeds the 
average for the third world as a whole, while the Muslim countries fall far short of 
this level’. Hadenius finds a significant relationship between Protestants and democ-
racy (1992: 120). However, he did not verify the opposite finding for Islam. When 
controlling for socio-economic status ‘the negative connection for Islam is then re-
duced to a low, insignificant level’ (1992: 121). 
In order to test for the whether it is Islam rather than the Middle East and 
North Africa region that is prone to conflict, I include a dummy for all Islamic coun-
tries ( all current member of the Organization of Islamic Conference) and advance the 
hypothesis: 
H14: Islamic countries are more prone to conflict than non-Islamic countries  
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3. Research Design 
This chapter opens with a brief discussion on the ongoing methodological debates, 
and highlights the strengths and weaknesses of both qualitative and quantitative re-
search methods. The Collier & Hoeffler model is then presented followed by the op-
erationalization of the variables. A summary of the hypotheses concludes the chapter.  
3.1 Qualitative vs. Quantitative Methods 
In the field of social science, antagonism between quantitative and qualitative re-
searchers has at times resembled a warlike situation. Within the quantitative field, 
political scientists and economists have dug their own trenches and seldom crossed 
over to see what is happening in the other camp. Attempting to bring this methodo-
logical war to an end, King, Keohane & Verba (1994) emphasize the centrality of one 
common standard: scientific inference. In order to claim to be doing social science, 
the common standard for all researchers is that a ‘coherent account of causality needs 
to specify how the effects are exerted’ (ibid: 85).  
The strengths of the case study literature lie in its detailed knowledge and 
presentation of a complex reality. Low-N studies aim at identifying necessary or suf-
ficient variables, in order to present a clear account of the causal mechanisms leading 
to the phenomenon that is being studied. In an ideal world, with abundant research 
funding and human resources, detailed case studies could be conducted on every sin-
gle event. This is far from a real life description. Limited resources force case studies 
to be selected out of a large universe of conflicts. Much of the conflict literature has 
been criticized for selecting cases on the dependent variable, i.e. only cases in which 
conflict has occurred (Gleditsch, 1998: 391; Levy, 2001). Also, researchers working 
in a conflict area can be blinded by the prevailing rhetoric. Collier (1999) emphasize 
the deluding role of the narrative: 
… since both greed-motivated and grievance-motivated rebel organizations will em-
bed their behaviour in a narrative of grievance, the observation of that narrative pro-
vides no informational content to the researcher as to the true motivation for rebel-
lion. To discover the truth we need a different research approach (1999:1-2) 
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Large-N researchers would argue that just like an impressionist painting, one 
needs to take a few steps back in order to see the full picture. Large-N studies cover 
large parts, or even the entire universe, of the research subject in question. Thus, they 
test hypotheses over a much broader set of contexts, and are less seldom criticized on 
the ground of case selection.  
A common criticism of large-N studies is that ‘correlation is not causation’ 
(King, Keohane & Verba, 1994: 75). However, this does not rule out that researchers 
can state causal hypotheses or draw causal suppositions. A significant statistical rela-
tionship does not imply that the relationship is causal, but can be right in predicting 
probabilistic, causal relationship (King, Keohane & Verba, 1994: 87.). 
The field of civil war studies is theoretically impoverished, and provides sev-
eral challenges to large-N studies of the area. A general problem is that lack of theory 
always will lead to an under-specified model. Another apparent weakness of quantita-
tive studies lies in the use of aggregated data. Most studies use states as the unit of 
analysis, and data on this level might be unsuitable for examining conflicts that are 
embedded in local or regional conditions. However, it is difficult to agree upon an 
appropriate sub-national level, and this would also make comparative studies very 
difficult. Until now, data on the national level are widely available, and most quanti-
tative studies therefore address this level. Quantitative and aggregated studies also 
suffer from the quality and availability of data. If data are not reliable and accessible, 
advanced statistical tools are of little help.  
In addition to the lack of a well-specified theory, the quantitative field of the 
study of civil war is riddled with methodological challenges. Gates (2002) outlines 
five fundamental problems affecting quantitative analysis of civil conflict: non-
independence (spatial and temporal dependence), unmeasured heterogeneity (omitted 
variable bias), endogeneity, missing data bias, and rareness of the outcome variable 
(2002: 20). 
While rareness of interstate wars is a problem, this is less so for the more fre-
quent civil wars (Gates 2002: 22). Correcting for spatial dependence is a fairly new 
development and is not used in this study. Gleditsch & Ward (2001) have developed 
elaborate techniques and a database. In this thesis, none of these techniques are used. 
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However, the regional dummies partly control for spatial dependence. Temporal de-
pendence is partly controlled for by including a variable measuring time since last 
conflict outbreak.  
Of particular importance to this analysis is endogenity and missing data bias. 
Endogenity presents a problem in that civil wars clearly affect central variables that 
are used to explain the causes of civil war, in particular economic development and 
democracy. Also, the quality and availability of data might be related to level of eco-
nomic development: poor and hungry people do not give priority to statistics. Corrupt 
regimes seldom present reliable statistics revealing the way and rate of spending of 
public funds. Models that include income inequality produce skewed samples: rich 
countries have fewer missing data than poor ones. Some statistical information, in 
particular income inequality and military spending, is misreported or not reported for 
political reasons. The problem of missing data can in some cases be solved by imput-
ing data. Gary King has developed the Amelia imputation program that assigns values 
to missing observations based on earlier or later observations for that unit, and aver-
age values of similar units. However, imputation is only appropriate when data is 
missing randomly, rather than systematically (King et al., 2001). 
Spillover effects and regional characteristics (spatial) and history (temporal) 
dependence also influence the results in quantitative analysis of civil wars. Political 
scientists and economists are continuously developing new methods and research 
techniques to address these challenges (Beck & Katz, 1997; Beck, Katz & Tucker, 
1998; Box-Steffensmeier & Zorn, 1998; Gleditsch & Ward, 2001; Murdoch & 
Sandler, 2002).  Despite these methodological challenges, this thesis bases its analy-
sis on the best data available and tries to address some of the methodological prob-
lems. Data and methods are constantly improving and the results from this thesis will 
hopefully be a small contribution in the right direction. 
3.2 Value Added to the Resources-Conflict Research 
A good amount of systematic, comparative and empirical research on the relationship 
between civil war and natural resources has been conducted. However, the results are 
diverging, and more research on the complex relationship between natural resources 
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and conflict is needed. This thesis will add to the resources-conflict nexus in several 
ways. First, Collier & Hoeffler’s model will be tested with different specifications for 
regime type, natural resources and conflict. This will allow us to investigate whether 
the five-year panel data design influence the Collier & Hoeffler results. Including a 
different measurement for regime type will hopefully shed some light on why, in con-
trast to a plethora of findings, Collier & Hoeffler find no significant results for regime 
type. However, CH only tested for a linear relationship between regime type and con-
flict. I include a squared term in order to investigate the possibility of a curvilinear 
relationship. Should the inverted-U relationship between regime type and conflict be 
found, this will strengthen both the grievance and opportunity aspect of CH’s model. 
The link between natural resources and conflict is tested for two sub-sets of primary 
commodities: oil and minerals. Also, the Collier & Hoeffler model is put to a harder 
test by using the PRIO/Uppsala conflict data, with a lower threshold of conflict. Fur-
thermore, the study examines the Middle East and North Africa. The region exhibits a 
unique combination of levels of natural resource dependence, economic development, 
social and political structure that demands particular investigation. Finally, this study 
goes beyond the time period investigated in the studies of de Soysa, 2002 (1989-99); 
Ellingsen & Gleditsch, 1997 (1973-92); Hauge & Ellingsen, 2001 (1980-92); Sachs 
& Warner, 2001; (1970-90).  
3.3 The Collier & Hoeffler Method 
Based on the model of civil war proposed by Collier & Hoeffler (2001), this thesis 
replicates the model and results in ‘On the Incidence of Civil War in Africa’ (2002), 
and uses their baseline model on the Middle East and North Africa region. The base-
line model used in the ‘On the Incidence of Civil War in Africa’ article (2002)—and 
the framework for the replication and analysis in this thesis—thus contain the vari-
ables GDP per capita, GDP growth, primary commodity export, social fractionaliza-
tion, ethnic dominance, peace duration, population size and dispersion.  
Collier & Hoeffler’s dataset comprises information on 161 states from 1960 to 
1999. The entire period of analysis is divided into eight sub-periods: 1960-64, 1965-
69, … 1995-99. The model uses simple logit regression to predict the probability of a 
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civil war breaking out in each of the five-year periods. Logistic regression (or logit) 
analysis is appropriate when the dependent variable is dichotomous and skewed. 
Also, logistic regression presupposes no assumed relationship between the dependent 
variable and the independent ones, and thus handles all forms of relationships be-
tween them, be it curvilinear, s-shaped or linear (Helland, 1999). The statistical pro-
gram STATA, version 7.0 (StataCorp., 2001) is used to run the analyses.  
The dependent variable takes the value 1 for periods when a conflict starts, as 
missing in the years that the conflict continues, and 0 for the non-event, periods with 
peace. The dependent variable is therefore dichotomous, and OLS regression is inap-
propriate as it may predict values outside the 0–1 interval. The logit model is speci-
fied as 
Log (Pit / (1-Pit) = α + ßXit + eit                                                                  ( 1 ) 
 
where α is the intercept, ßX is a set of explanatory variables with correspond-
ing coefficients, and e is the random error term, for country i at time t.  The probabil-
ity of a war start is calculated by applying the formula: 
 
pˆ  = exp Z / (1 + exp Z )                                          ( 2 )     
 
The Collier & Hoeffler Model and Design 
The theoretical aspects of the Collier & Hoeffler’s model were discussed in the pre-
vious chapter. The Collier & Hoeffler research design also merits commentary. While 
most analyses on civil war organize the data in a country-year structure, Collier & 
Hoeffler have chosen to use five-year periods as their unit of analysis. This design is 
often used in economics in order to stabilize the variables and lessen the impacts of 
possibly artificial fluctuations. Another advantage by using five-year periods could be 
that such a design has fewer missing data. However, interpolating data could have 
solved parts of this problem.  A problem with using this design is that abrupt changes 
from one year to another are covered up. 
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3.4 Operationalizations 
Sources used for generating the dataset are internationally recognized, and were read-
ily available in various databanks. In the five-year periods dataset, the total number of 
country-periods is 1,036. The most extensive regression contains 709 observations. In 
the one-year dataset, the total number of country-years between 1960 and 1997 is 
5,418. The most extensive regression contains 3,928 observations, the least extensive 
2,307 (when including regime type, oil and mineral dependency). I was unable to ob-
tain data on population beyond 1997. Therefore, all the analyses based on the annual-
ized dataset therefore cover ‘only’ the period from 1960 to 1997. Although not ideal, 
I do not believe the results are dramatically influenced by not including the years 
1998 and 1999.  
3.4.1 Domestic Armed Conflict 
The Collier & Hoeffler model predicts the probability that a civil war is initiated in 
the period of analysis. Studies on the causes of civil war vary in their choice of the 
dependent variable. While some researchers include war incidence (Gleditsch & He-
gre, 1997; Russett & Oneal, 2001: 95), Bremer (1992) argues that the reasons why 
war starts (onset) are different from the reasons why war continues (incidence, which 
includes all years of a conflict). Collier & Hoeffler follow Bremer’s line of arguing, 
and I follow Collier & Hoeffler’s. In this study the dependent variable is assigned the 
value 1 if a conflict starts in the period or year. In the cases where a war continues 
into the next period or year, the variable is coded as missing. In periods and year with 
no conflict onset or incidence (peace), the variable is coded as 0.  
The Correlates of War Project 
The Correlates of War (COW) Project9 has since 1963 studied the conditions associ-
ated with the outbreak of wars and militarized disputes. The COW Project has one of 
                                              
9First at University of Michigan (http://www.umich.edu/~cowproj/index.html), now at Pennsylvania State University 
http://cow2.la.psu.edu and Peace Science Society http://pss.la.psu.edu/DATARES.HTM    
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the leading data collection programs in the field of political science, and is one of the 
most frequently cited in quantitative comparative and international politics research. 
A civil war is defined by COW as a sustained combat between two armed op-
ponents within the territorial boundaries of a state resulting in at least 1,000 battle-
deaths per year (2002:)10. Collier & Hoeffler generated their dependent variable from 
COW data for the period 1960-92 (Singer & Small, 1994; Small & Singer, 1982). 
Based on their definitions, Nicholas Sambanis updated the dataset from 1993 to 1999. 
Collier & Hoeffler’s dataset contains 78 civil wars, of which 46 were included in the 
regression analysis. For the five-year period dataset, the average percentage of civil 
war onset is 7.3 percent 
While the 1,000 battle-deaths criterion is well accepted, there is disagreement 
on how to count deaths. In addition, the strict 1,000 battle-deaths criterion per year 
discriminates against countries with smaller populations, and therefore excludes well-
known and long-lasting conflicts such as in Northern Ireland. I therefore include an-
other dataset with a lower threshold for armed domestic conflict. The COW conflict 
data are only used in the first part of the analysis, when Collier & Hoeffler’s results 
are replicated. 
The PRIO/Uppsala Dataset  
The second dependent variable is taken from a newly expanded dataset created by 
researchers at the Department of Peace and Conflict Research at the University of 
Uppsala and the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (Gleditsch et al., 2002). 
The starting point was Wallensten & Sollenberg’s dataset on armed conflict from 
1989, which has been published annually since 1993 in the Journal of Peace Re-
search, and was extended to include the entire post-World War II era (1946-2001).  
Armed conflict is defined as a ‘contested incompatibility which concerns gov-
ernment and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which 
at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths’ 
(Wallensteen & Sollenberg, 1999: 605). A state is defined as  
an internationally recognized sovereign government controlling a specified territory, 
or an internationally unrecognized government controlling a specified territory 
                                              
10 http://www.umich.edu/~cowproj/dataset.html#CivilWar  
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whose sovereignty is not disputed by another internationally recognized sovereign 
government previously controlling the same territory (1999: 605). 
The PRIO/Uppsala dataset thus uses a lower threshold, but also divides conflict into 
three levels: minor, intermediate and war11. When using the PRIO/Uppsala data, I run 
the Collier & Hoeffler model on an annualized dataset and present the analysis for the 
highest level (civil war), as well as for all conflict levels. The correlation between 
civil war in COW and the PRIO/Uppsala dataset is high (Gleditsch et al., 2001). In 
the annualized dataset, only PRIO/Uppsala data are therefore used. In the period ana-
lyzed in this thesis (1960-97) 80 civil war onsets and 157 armed civil conflict onsets 
were recorded. Both civil wars and armed civil conflict onsets are rather rare events:  
1.6 percent of the country years experienced an outbreak of civil war, and armed do-
mestic conflict occurred in 3.4 percent of the observations.  
A possible downside of using a lower threshold for conflict is reduced reliabil-
ity. Due to ready access to information and modern forms of communication, the reli-
ability of the PRIO/Uppsala data is high for the years of the original dataset (1989-
2000). However, the recent backdating of the dataset back to 1945 is necessarily 
based on limited and inaccurate historical records, and thus increases the likelihood 
that episodes of armed conflict are underreported, with low-intensity armed conflicts 
being more likely to be underreported than wars. Also, smaller conflicts taking place 
in remote areas and in closed totalitarian/repressive regimes are more likely to go 
unnoticed by outside observers and international media. 
A problem for both the dependent variables is accounting for simultaneous 
conflict in a country. The number of such overlapping conflicts is greater for the 
PRIO/Uppsala data than COW, since the Uppsala data include a large number of low-
intensity conflicts. The PRIO/Uppsala dataset contain a substantial number of con-
flicts that broke out at a time when there was one or more other conflict going on in 
the same country. Large countries such as India and Indonesia are examples of this 
(see the PRIO/Uppsala dataset in Appendix 7).  Simultaneous conflicts pose a meth-
odological challenge since studies of armed conflict onset usually study transitions 
                                              
11 Minor armed conflict: the number of battle-related deaths during the course of the conflict is between 25 and 1,000. 
Intermediate armed conflict: more than 1,000 battle-related deaths recorded during the course of the conflict, but fewer than 
1,000 in any given year. War: more than 1,000 battle-related deaths in any given year (Wallensten and Sollenberg 1998, 
595). 
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from peace to war, omitting consecutive years of war. Urdal (2002) coded two different 
variables, ‘Onset1’ (armed conflicts that erupted in a state of peace) and ‘Onset2’ (all 
armed conflict onsets regardless of whether the conflict broke out when another con-
flict was taking place in the same country). Nevertheless, the difference between the 
two coding schemes did not influence the results much. This thesis notes this meth-
odological challenge, but in order to follow the CH design, and due to time and space 
constraints, it does not follow Urdal’s suggestion. Collier & Hoeffler censored simul-
taneous conflicts. When using conflict data from the PRIO/Uppsala dataset, I in-
cluded all outbreaks of new conflicts (civil war and armed civil conflict) as defined 
by the PRIO/Uppsala dataset’s conflict number and sub-ID (See Appendix 7).  
3.4.2 Economic Variables 
Data on economic variables originate from two well-reputed sources, the Penn World 
Tables (Summers & Heston, 1991) and the World Development Indicators (World 
Bank, various years). These sources are widely recognized to contain the best eco-
nomic data available. In the five-year period dataset, all data is measured at the be-
ginning of each sub-period, 1965, 1970, ..., 1995. 
GDP per capita 
The level of economic development can be measured in numerous ways, and com-
mon measurements are energy consumption per capita, level of education and GDP 
per capita.12 Collier & Hoeffler ran two models using male secondary schooling and 
GDP per capita. However, the two are highly correlated, and only GDP per capita is 
included in the final analysis. 
Income is measured as real purchasing power parity (PPP)-adjusted GDP per 
capita. The primary dataset is the Penn World Tables 5.6 (Summers & Heston, 1991), 
which covers the 1960-92 period. For the last period in the five-year dataset, growth 
rates of real PPP adjusted GDP per capita data from the World Bank’s World Devel-
opment Indicators 1998 was used to calculated income data for the 1995-99 period. 
                                              
12 Urdal (2002) argues for the inclusion of infant mortality rate as a measurement of economic development and income 
inequality. This thesis does not consider this measurement, but follows Collier & Hoeffler’s design rather strictly.  
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Income data is measured at the beginning of each sub-period, 1965, 1970, ... , 1995. 
In the annualized dataset, numbers of GDP per capita are only from the World Bank. 
In both datasets, the natural logarithm of GDP per capita was used instead of the 
original one, in order to take into account that a difference between say $200 and 
$700 is of greater importance to conflict than the difference between $ 20,000 and 
$20,500.  
GDP growth 
Based on the GDP per capita data, the average periodical/annual growth rate was cal-
culated based on the previous five-year period and year. GDP growth in the previous 
period/year is used as a proxy for economic opportunities. In both datasets, this in-
formation was then lagged with one period or year.  
3.4.3 Political Variables 
In the initial analysis, Collier & Hoeffler used data on regime type from the Polity III 
dataset (Jaggers & Gurr, 1995.) Regime type was excluded from the final analysis 
because it did not show any significant values in their analysis. This is in contrast to a 
plethora of empirical findings. Hegre et al. (2001) emphasize the importance of po-
litical stability as well as the level of democracy in the outbreak of civil war. In this 
study I therefore include variables for regime type and transition.  
Regime Type 
The Polity III Project (Jaggers & Gurr, 1995) has generated widely used indexes for 
institutionalized democracy and institutionalized autocracy for all independent states 
with population over 500,000 from 1800 to 1994. The index is created on the basis of 
characteristics such as competitiveness in political participation and executive re-
cruitment, openness of executive recruitment and the position of the chief executive. 
Level of democracy and autocracy varies from 0 (least) to 10 (most).  
Collier & Hoeffler used data on regimes from the Polity III dataset and found 
no significant results. Instead of using Polity III data this thesis uses ‘Polyarchy’, a 
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composite index of democracy developed by Tatu Vanhanen (2000).13 Polyarchy 
covers 187 countries from 1810 to 1998. Polyarchy ranges from 0 (least democratic) 
to 47.11 (most democratic). In the country-year dataset, the annual Polyarchy were 
kept. In the five-year period, the value for the first year in the period is assigned. Due 
to the discrepancy between the Collier & Hoeffler and Hegre et. al (2001), as well as 
the clear policy implications of the importance of regime type, this variable is given 
particular attention in this study. I suspect that the reason why results from the five-
year dataset are insignificant might be due to five-year period research design’s fail-
ure to account for possible swift changes in regime scores. This suspicion is exam-
ined when the Collier & Hoeffler model is run on an expanded dataset using a coun-
try year format.  
Regime Transition 
Semi-democracies are hypothesized to be the most conflict-prone. This category in-
cludes both regimes in transition and institutional inconsistent regimes. In order to try 
to control for whether transition might make up for parts of this relationship—as op-
posed to or institutional inconsistent regimes, transition is introduced as a dummy 
variable. The variable takes the value 1 if a change in the Polyarchy score doubles or 
halves from one year to the next. 
3.4.4 Natural Resource Dependence 
Collier & Hoeffler’s primary commodity export variable proxies the abundance of 
natural resources. Data on primary commodity exports and GDP were taken from the 
World Bank, and is measured in current US dollars. Collier & Hoeffler never states 
the exact content of this variable: ‘primary commodities include a variety of products 
such as oil, diamonds, metals, food, and beverages’ (2002: 16). One obvious criticism 
of Collier & Hoeffler is that this category is too wide to mean or measure anything. 
How are agricultural products supposed to fuel civil war? Agricultural products do 
not yield a high level of rent. Also, a main source of lucrative income that is not in-
cluded in this category at all is narcotics. However, for obvious reasons, it is next to 
                                              
13 See also http://www.sv.ntnu.no/iss/data/vanhanen/  
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impossible to obtain reliable data on drugs. Based on Le Billon and others, I argued 
that the category ‘primary commodity exports’ must be broken up. The unique tech-
nology, infrastructure and the dominant role of oil in the international commodity 
market, in addition to its influence on economic and political development, justifies 
paying particular attention to oil. While it would be interesting to test for other types 
of primary commodities (oil, minerals/diamonds, drugs, timber etc.) data constraints 
restrict the differentiation into two variables: oil and mineral export dependence. 
Breaking down the types of minerals yields a data matrix with very many missing 
variables. 
Natural resources dependence is proxied in three ways. In the five-year period 
dataset, data from WDI are used to calculate the ratio of primary commodity exports 
to GDP. The data were measured at the beginning of each sub-period. In the annual-
ized dataset, the values from the five-year period dataset were copied. This means 
that the value from the 1960 period was assigned to both 1960, 1961, 1962, 1963 and 
1964 in the annualized dataset. 
Data from WDI were also used to create the oil dependency and mineral de-
pendency variables. These variables were also calculated as the value of oil and min-
eral export to GDP. Following the suggestion from Sachs & Warner (1999) I correct 
the values for Singapore and Trinidad & Tobago to reflect their real export values. In 
the annualized dataset, primary commodity, oil and mineral dependency are set to 
0.001 for these two countries. 
3.4.5 Culture and Identity 
Social Fractionalization 
Collier & Hoeffler proxy social fractionalization as a combined measure of ethnic and 
religious fractionalization. The level of detail necessitates a complete quotation of 
their measurement: 
Ethnic fractionalization is measured by the ethnolinguistic fractionalization index. It 
measure the probability that two randomly individuals from a given country do not 
speak the same language. Data are only available for 1960. In the economic litera-
ture, this measure was first used by Mauro. Using data from Barret (1982) on reli-
gious affiliation, we constructed an analogous religious fractionalization index. Fol-
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lowing Barro (1997) we aggregated the various religious affiliations into nine cate-
gories: Catholic, Protestant, Muslim, Jew, Hindu, Buddhist, Eastern Religions (other 
than Buddhist), Indigenous Religions and no religious affiliation. Data is available 
for 1970 and 1980 and the values are very similar. For 1960, 1965 and 1970 we used 
the 1970 data and for 1980, 1985, 1990 and 1995 we use the 1980 data. For 1975 we 
use the average of the 1970 and 1980 data. 
The fractionalization indices range from zero to 100. A value of zero indicates that 
the society is completely homogenous whereas a value of 100 would characterize a 
completely heterogeneous society.  
We calculated our social fractionalization index as the product of the ethnolinguistic 
fractionalization and the religious fractionalization index plus the ethnolinguistic or 
the religious fractionalization index, whichever is the greater. By adding either index 
we avoid classifying a country as homogenous (a value of zero) if the country is eth-
nically homogenous but religiously divers, or vice versa. In Collier and Hoeffler 
(2000), Table 8, we show that this aggregation rule is superior to variants (2002: 26-
27) 
Ethnic Dominance 
This dummy variable takes the value 1 if a single ethnolinguistic group makes up 45-
90 percent of the total population. The variable takes the value 0 if not. The indicator 
of ethnic dominance was calculated using ethnolinguistic data from Department of 
Geodesy and Cartography (1964). In the annualized dataset, this variable was copied 
from Collier & Hoeffler’s original dataset. 
3.4.6 Other Variables 
Population 
This variable measures the total population in each country, and is taken from the 
World Bank’s Development Indicators from various years. In the five-year period, 
the values are taken from the first year in the period. In both dataset the variables are 
logged. Data were only available up until 1997. 
Geographic Dispersion 
Collier & Hoeffler generated a Gini coefficient of population dispersion for each 
country. The variable takes the value 0 if the total population is evenly distributed 
around the country, and 1 if it is concentrated in one area. Data were only available 
 61
for 1990 and 1995. For the six first periods, data from 1990 were used. In the annual 
dataset, this variable was copied. 
Peace Duration 
Both datasets include a variable measuring the time since the last civil conflict onset. 
In the five-year dataset, countries that never experienced a civil war are assigned the 
value 172 months (time since end of World War II until 1960), plus 60 months for 
each consecutive five-year period with peace. In the one-year dataset, the variable is 
measured in years. Countries are assigned the value 10 if the first year they are in-
cluded in the dataset is 1955. This is done on the underlying assumption that the 
country has been at peace since the end of World War II. Countries that join the data-
set in all other years than 1955 are assigned the value 1 in the first year. If the country 




To control for region specific effects Collier & Hoeffler included two dummies for 
Sub-Saharan Africa14 and French Sub-Saharan Africa.15 This thesis investigates the 
Middle East and North Africa. The Middle East and North Africa dummy takes the 
value 1 one for the following 19 countries: Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, 
Jordan, Israel, Lebanon, Syria, Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, United Arab 
Emirates, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman, Yemen. 
OECD 
I include a dummy variable on membership in the western-dominated Organization 
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). The OECD variable is used to 
                                              
14 Takes the value 1 for the following countries: Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, 
Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo Brazzaville, Djibouti, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Gabon, 
Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, 
Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Reunion, Rwanda, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, 
Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe 
15 Takes the value 1 for the following countries: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, 
Gabon, Ivory Coast, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo. 
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generate the ‘other developing countries’ group in the descriptive statistics for Sub-
Saharan Africa and the Middle East and North Africa. 
Islam 
I define a country as Islamic if it is a current member of the Organization of the Is-
lamic Conference (OIC). The organization was established in 1969, but all current 
members are assigned the value 1 and non-members the value 0, for the entire period. 
There are good reasons to argue that all current members have had a substantial Mus-
lim population. The following countries are members of the OIC: Afghanistan, Alba-
nia, Algeria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Benin, Brunei, Burkina Faso, Camer-
oon, Chad, Comoros, Ivory Coast, Djibouti, Egypt, Gabon, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-
Bissau, Guyana, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Kyrgystan, Leba-
non, Libya, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Mozambique, Niger, 
Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, So-
malia, Sudan, Suriname, Syria, Tajikistan, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, 
Uganda, United Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan and Yemen.16 Countries in italics were 
not included in the dataset. 
                                              
16 http://www.sesrtcic.org/members/default.shtml 
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3.5 Summary of Hypotheses 
The hypotheses were developed on the basis of the discussion in Chapter 2. I do not 
believe that the causes of civil war are different from the causes of armed civil con-
flict, and all hypotheses are therefore tested on both levels of conflict. The following 
hypothesis are tested in Chapter 4: 
 
Economic Aspects: 
H1: Countries with low levels of GDP per capita are more likely to experience civil  
       war than countries with high levels GDP per capita 
H2: Countries with lower rates of economic growth are more likely to experience  
       conflict that countries with higher growth 
 
Social and Cultural Aspects: 
H3: Socially fractionalized countries are more likely to experience civil war than  
       homogenous countries 
H4: Countries where one ethnic group constitute between 45 and 90 percent of the    
       population are more likely to experience civil war than countries with a very  
       large ethnic majority, or no ethnic majority at all 
H6: Countries with high levels of social fractionalization are less likely to experience  
       civil war 
H14: Islamic countries are more prone to conflict than non-Islamic countries 
 
Political Aspects: 
H5: Semi-democracies are more likely to experience civil war than either  
       democracies and autocracies 
H13: Countries in transition are more prone to civil war 
 
Natural Resources and Geographical Aspects: 
H7: Countries with medium levels of primary commodity dependence are more likely 
       to experience civil war, than countries with low and high levels 
H11: Oil dependence displays an inverted U-shaped relationship with civil war 
H12: Mineral dependency displays an inverted U-shaped relationship with civil war 
H8: Countries where the population us evenly spread around the country are more  
       likely to experience civil war than countries with concentrated populations 
 
Control: Size and Time  
H9: Countries with large populations are more likely to experience civil war than  
       countries with small populations 
H10: The longer time since a civil war broke out, the less likely a country is to  
       experience civil war 
 
 64
4. Results and Analyses 
This chapter is divided into two parts. The first part reexamines and replicates the 
model and results presented in Collier & Hoeffler’s article ‘On the Incidence of Civil 
War in Africa’ (2002). During the process of replicating the CH dataset, model and 
findings, I discovered several inaccuracies in the dataset. Nevertheless, when rerun-
ning the same regressions on my dataset, CH main findings hold true.  
Most quantitative analyses on the causes of civil war are conducted on a coun-
try-year basis. CH’s model is based on a five-year period design, and I develop the 
CH dataset into a country year format. The second part of this chapter runs CH’s 
baseline model on the annualized dataset. The change in the structure and setup of the 
dataset produced some interesting divergences from the original five-year design. 
 Finally, I apply the CH model on a more inclusive dataset using armed civil 
conflict from the PRIO/Uppsala dataset as the dependent variable. This variable sets a 
much lower threshold for armed conflict, using a criterion of 25 battle-related deaths 
per year. By analyzing this, I test if the CH model is appropriate for armed conflicts 
on a level that falls below the definition of a civil war. 
4.1 Replicating the CH Model 
The original dataset used by Collier & Hoeffler in the 2002 article is available on the 
website of the Journal of Conflict Resolution.17 During the process of replicating their 
findings and examining the data, I discovered several, smaller problems with the 
dataset. First, CH describe their dataset as consisting of information for 161 countries 
from 1960-99. The dataset is divided into eight five-year periods, and CH state that 
this yields ‘1,288 potential observations’ (2002: 26). CH’s dataset contain 1,288 ob-
servations, with the most observations for population (1,266) and the fewest for eco-
nomic growth (918). Not all countries existed in the entire period of analysis, but had 
been assigned values for several variables. These ‘fictitious’ variables are dropped 
                                              
17 http://www.yale.edu/unsy/jcr/jcrdata.htm 
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from the regression, but they are included in the calculation of the dataset’s mean val-
ues of the dataset. More seriously, a few countries that had been assigned values in 
year before they gained independence were included in the regression.18 Due to the 
discrepancies between the two datasets, Håvard Strand generated the annual dataset 
from the same sources as the ones used by Collier & Hoeffler. In my version of the 
dataset, I also excluded a few small island states.19 In my dataset, the highest potential 
number of observations is 1,036. Appendix 1 presents a complete list of all countries, 
periods and conflict onsets included in my five-year-period dataset and analyses.  
When running the baseline model regression, a maximum of 709 observations, 
as opposed to 750 in CH, were included. My analysis includes 52 conflicts, compared 
to 46 in CH. CH claim that their analysis covers the entire period from 1960 to 1999 
but this is not completely true. Information on economic growth for 1960 is missing 
for all countries.20 Consequently, the CH results cover only the 1965-99 period. CH’s 
published results are presented in Table 5, and the replication based on my dataset in 
Table 6. 
Table 5. Accounting for Civil War1965-99: Results from Collier & Hoeffler (2002) 
 β st.e. β st.e. β st.e. 
ln GDP per capita –0.950  (0.245)*** –1.053 (0.289)*** –0.965 (0.244)*** 
GDP growth t – 1 –0.098  (0.041)** –0.103 (0.042)** –0.098 (0.042)** 
Prim. comm. exports 16.773  (5.206)*** 16.691 (5.175)*** 15.989 (5.218)*** 
Prim. comm. exports 2 –23.800 (10.040)** –23.532 (9.958)** –22.942 (10.023)** 
Social fractionalization –0.0002  0.0001)*** –0.0002 (0.0001)** –0.0002 (0.0001)** 
Ethnic dominance 0.480  (0.328) 0.449 (0.331) 0.431 (0.330) 
Peace duration –0.004  (0.001)*** –0.004 (0.001)*** –0.004 (0.001)*** 
ln population 0.510  (0.128)*** 0.473 (0.137)*** 0.547 (0.130)*** 
Geographic dispersion –0.992  (0.909) –0.994 (0.907) –0.775 (0.933) 
Sub–Saharan Africa dummy   –0.370 (0.526)   
French SSA dummy     –0.885 (0.791) 
       














Number of wars included 46  46  46  
***, **, *  indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively 
CH did not report the value of the constant in their article 
                                              
18 In the regression Namibia (independent in 1990), Fiji (independenct in 1970), Djibouti (independent in 1977), Mauritius 
(independent 1968), Papua New Guinea (independent 1975) and Swaziland (independent 1968) were all included  from 
1965. 
19 The Bahamas, Belize, Cape Verde, Suriname, Vanuatu and West Samoa were excluded from my dataset. 
20 Economic growth is calculated as the difference between GDP per capita for one period and the following. Economic 
growth information is missing for 1960 because the dataset does not have numbers for the 1955-59 period. 
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Table 6. Accounting for Civil War 1965-99: Replicating Collier & Hoeffler (2002)  
 β st.e. β st.e. β st.e. 
ln GDP per capita –0.929  (0.244)*** –1.050 (0.288)*** –0.941  0.243)*** 
GDP growth t – 1 –0.096  (0.041)** –0.101 (0.042)** –0.096  (0.042)** 
Prim. comm.. exports 16.120  (5.213)*** 15.972 (5.164)*** 15.183  (5.233)*** 
Prim. comm.. exports 2 –22.602 (10.030)** –22.157 (9.908)** –21.520 (10.011)** 
Social fractionalization –0.0002  (0.0001)*** –0.0002 (0.0001)* –0.0002  (0.0001)** 
Ethnic dominance 0.501  (0.327) 0.466 (0.330) 0.454  (0.328) 
Peace duration –0.004  (0.001)*** –0.004 (0.001)*** –0.004  (0.001)*** 
ln population 0.485  (0.131)*** 0.437 (0.141)*** 0.442  (0.134)*** 
Geographic dispersion –1.084  (0.925) –1.102 (0.927) –0.853  (0.951) 
Sub-Saharan Africa dummy   –0.449 (0.537)   
French SSA dummy     –0.933  (0.791) 
       














Number of wars included 52  52  52  
***, **, *  indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively. 
 
While there are several minor differences from the original CH dataset, the re-
sults almost the same. Only social fractionalization drops down to a significance level 
of 0.10 for the regression including the dummy variable for Sub-Saharan Africa. 
Also, the regional dummies have slightly higher values. As in the CH article, when 
the model is rerun on my dataset, economic wealth and growth, social fractionaliza-
tion and longer periods peace reduce the propensity for conflict, while a large popula-
tion increases the risk. Primary commodity dependence displays a curvilinear rela-
tionship, while ethnic dominance is insignificant. Geographic dispersion is not sig-
nificant at the 0.05 level.  
Collier & Hoeffler dropped all insignificant independent variables sequen-
tially21 (2001: 11), and ended up with the model used in the second article (2002). In 
the 2002 analysis, both the ethnic dominance and the geographic dispersion variables 
are consistently insignificant. However, they are not dropped from the analyses. Geo-
graphical dispersion is missing for 11 countries: USA, Canada, Poland, Yugoslavia, 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, Yemen Arab Republic, Yemen People’s Republic, Bahrain, 
Republic of China (Taiwan), Cambodia and Singapore. These countries are therefore 
excluded in the regression analyses, and this leads to a loss of 72 observations in the 
                                              
21 This selection seems to have been made by only looking at the P-values/Z scores 
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dataset, and 39 in the logit regression.  Running the CH model without geographical 
dispersion did not significantly alter the results (Table 7, first column). The inclusion 
of the ethnic dominance variable does not lead to missing observations. Leaving it 
out of the model does also not change the results much (Table 7, third column). Only 
one conflict was added to the regression sample when geographic dispersion was left 
out. 
Table 7. Accounting for Civil War 1965-99: The CH Model without Geographical 
Dispersion, and without Geographical Dispersion and Ethnic Dominance 
 β st.e. β st.e. 
ln GDP per capita –0.829 (0.229)*** –0.788 (0.227)*** 
GDP growth t – 1 –0.111 (0.411)*** –0.107 (0.041)*** 
Prim. comm.. exports 12.899 (4.640)*** 12.414 (4.651)*** 
Prim. comm. exports 2 –17.972 (8.873)** –17.142 (8.876)** 
Social fractionalization –0.002 (0.0001)** –0.0002 (0.0001)** 
Ethnic dominance (45-90%) 0.477 (0.322)  
Peace duration –0.004 (0.001)*** –0.004 (0.001)*** 
ln population 0.422 (0.122)*** 0.393 (0.119)*** 
Geographical dispersion    











Number of wars included 53  53  
***, **, *  indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively. 
 
The other variables obtain very similar coefficients in both models with and 
without geographical dispersion. This suggests that geographical dispersion taps into 
an aspect of causes of civil war that is not explained by the other variables included in 
the model.  
A final criticism of the CH analysis is that the authors appear to determine 
whether the variables are significant or not, merely by looking at the significance 
level (p) returned by the computer program. This can be misleading and the re-
searcher risks overlooking possibly interesting relationships. At least two other possi-
bilities exist for assessing the importance of the variables included in the models. One 
is to compare the log likelihood value for a model with the variable in question, with 
the same model run on the same sample without the variables. The difference be-
tween the two models’ log likelihood scores must then be checked with the chi-
square/F-statistics table. For one degree of freedom (one variable added) the im-
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provement in log likelihood log likelihood must be at least 3.8 points in order to be 
significant at the five percent level (Hamilton, 1992: 354). Another way to interpret 
the results and coefficients in a logit regression is to generate a graph based on the 
logit function. This presents the researcher with a more intuitive and visual represen-
tation of the relationship between the dependent variable and one (or two) independ-
ent variable(s) (Helland, 1999). 
Comparing the log likelihood for a model with and without geographic disper-
sion, reveals that geographic dispersion significantly improves the models explana-
tory power (log likelihood is reduced from –153 to –146, which is significant for one 
degree of freedom.) Including ethnic dominance, however, does not significantly im-
prove the model’s log likelihood. 
The sub-Saharan Africa and French African colonies dummies were not sig-
nificant, and the replication therefore repeats CH’s finding that there is no particular 
Africa-effect on conflict. I comment on the regional aspect of the analyses in Section 
4.1.4 when I also run the baseline model with a dummy for the Middle East and 
North Africa region.  
4.1.1 The CH Model with Regime Type 
In the first model (2001), CH included only a linear term of regime type, using the 
well-known Polity index. Numerous studies confirm a curvilinear relationship be-
tween regime-type and civil war, but CH do not investigate this possibility. CH con-
clude that in a combined greed and grievance model, regime type is not significant. In 
this thesis, I investigate several other possible ways to include regime in the CH 
model. In the five-year period design, I replace Polity with a different measurement 
of regime type: the Polyarchy index developed by Vanhanen (2000). I ran the model 
with both a linear and squared terms. The results for the model with both terms are 
presented in the Table 8 below.  
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Table 8. Accounting for Civil War 1960-99: The CH Model with Regime Type 
Added 
 β st.e. 
ln GDP per capita –0.814 (0.274)*** 
GDP growth t – 1 –0.101 (0.041)** 
Prim. comm. exports 15.622 (5.284)*** 
Prim. comm. exports 2 –21.937 (10.027)** 
Social fractionalization –0.0002 (0.0001)** 
Ethnic dominance 0.474 (0.333) 
Peace duration –0.004 (0.001)*** 
ln population 0.491 (0.133)*** 
Geographic dispersion –1.175 (0.933) 
Polyarchy  –0.027 (0.060) 
Polyarchy 2 0.00002 (0.002) 
   








***, **, *  indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively. 
 
Neither the linear nor the squared term of Polyarchy display statistically sig-
nificant effects, either in terms of p or log likelihood. When comparing log likelihood 
for the original model with the model including the regime variable22, log likelihood 
is reduced from 146.04 to -142.74. For two degrees of freedom (two variables added) 
to display a significant improvement (at the 0.05 level), log likelihood needs an im-
provement of around six points. 
I also try to log, square and center the regime variables in order to check if the 
variable original distribution/skewness underreported its effect in the analysis. No 
significant results were found. Neither the Polyarchy nor Polity measurements of re-
gime type are statistically significant within the CH design. In section 4.2, I investi-
gate the possibility that regime type is sensitive to the research design chosen by CH. 
Regime scores can change rather swiftly, and using a five-year period design might 
underreport and not catch up on swift regime changes. The country year analysis will 
provide a better framework for analyzing the relationship between regime type and 
civil war.  
                                              
22 The two loglikelihood values can be compared directly because the model containing the regime variables is a subset of 
the original model. 
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4.1.2 The CH Model with Oil and Mineral Dependency 
In the theoretical chapter, I argued that different natural resources may have different 
effects on conflict, and that CH’s wide category of ‘primary commodity exports’ 
needed disaggregating. Due to data constraints, I could only include variables for oil 
and mineral dependency. I created a variable measuring the country’s dependence on 
oil or minerals exports as the ratio of each commodity’s to total export. The results 
are presented below in Table 9.   
Table 9. The CH Model with Oil and Mineral Dependency 
 β st.e. 
ln GDP per capita 0.962 (0.275)*** 
GDP growth t – 1 –0.061 (0.049) 
Oil dependency 5.633 (3.368)* 
Oil dependency 2 –2.779 (5.262) 
Mineral dependency 19.720 (49.616) 
Mineral dependency 2 –810.018 (1324.749) 
Social fractionalization –0.002 (0.001)* 
Ethnic dominance 0.648 (0.363)* 
Peace duration –0.003 (0.001)*** 
ln population 0.221 (0.121)* 
Geographic dispersion –0.648 (1.037) 
   








Number of wars included 40  
***, **, *  indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively. 
 
Due to missing information for many countries on the oil and mineral depend-
ency variables, the total number of observations included in the analysis is reduced to 
579. When comparing the log likelihood for the two models (with an N of 579), the 
model containing oil and mineral dependency (and their squared terms) improves the 
log likelihood by (123.3-116.8) 6.5 points. This is not significant for four degrees of 
freedom.  
The results and the coefficients in a logit regression are not intuitively easy to 
interpret and understand. Looking at the value and size of the coefficient is the first 
step. Both CH’s primary commodity variable and oil and mineral dependency are 
positive on their own, and have a negative squared term. This indicates that the rela-
tionship between these variables and the probability of conflict in curvilinear: first 
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growing and then decreasing. Graphing them presents an intuitive and visual inspec-
tion. Figure 3 is based numbers in Table 8.  







The relationship is indeed curvilinear, and the results strengthen Hypothesis 7. Pri-
mary commodity export peaks at 11.4 percent, which is 56 percent higher than the 
sample average for civil war onsets at 7.3 percent. Countries in the medium ‘primary 
commodity exports’ range, face a higher risk for experiencing a civil war outbreak 
than countries with low or high levels. 
 I added oil dependence in the same model as primary commodity dependence, 
but obtained very weak results for oil dependence. The correlation between primary 
dependence and oil dependence is very high (0.66), indicating that oil dependence 
makes up the bulk of the primary commodities variable. In Table 9, I replace primary 
commodity exports with oil dependence and mineral dependence. Based on this table, 
I graphed the relationship between oil dependence and civil war in Figure 4. 
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Rather surprisingly, the most oil-dependent countries are the most conflict-prone. In 
this dataset and design, more oil means more conflict. This is in contrast to rentier-
state theory which argues that more oil means more money to either repress or buy 
off a people. In contrast to Hypothesis 11, oil dependency does not display a curvilin-
ear relationship with civil war.  
 Also based on Table 9, I graphed the relationship between mineral dependence 
and civil war in Figure 5. Mineral dependency barely displayed the hypothesized cur-
vilinear shape, the variable was far from significance. The curve peaked around 0.05 
mineral export of total export, and obtained a maximum risk for conflict at 4.5 per-
cent. The sample’s average risk is 7.3 percent, and this implies that mineral depend-
ency does not have much explanatory power.  
In order to check for the possibility that oil and mineral dependency displays a 
linear relationship with conflict, I ran regressions with oil and mineral dependency 
without their squared terms. I checked p, log likelihood and plotted the graphs, but 
this did not reveal any interesting results.  
Having replicated the CH model, and examined the effects of regime and natu-
ral resource dependence, I now move on to examine the regional conflict correlates 
for Africa and the Middle East.  
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4.1.3 Sub-Saharan Africa 
Collier & Hoeffler’s analysis of civil war in Africa could not detect a particular ‘Af-
rica effect’ and CH conclude that civil wars in Africa were well explained by a gen-
eral model. The underlying risk of conflict, however, was higher in Africa, notably 
because of economic factors. While its fragmented societies dampened conflict, Af-
rica’s dire economic straits made the continent more prone to conflict. The descrip-
tive statistics tables reveals that this is also true for my dataset. I provide descriptive 
statistics for the entire sample, as well as for the observations included in the regres-
sion sample (See Appendix 3). This was done to examine the possibility that coun-
tries excluded from the regression due to missing data, are systematically different 
from countries included in the analysis.  
 The replication table, Table 6, confirms that the Africa dummies are not sig-
nificant. CH next generate a series of interaction variables in order to test for whether 
the variables might have differential effects in Africa. (2002: 20.) CH find that none 
of the interaction terms are significant, and so do I in my analysis. The CH model can 
therefore be applied to Africa, as the relationships found globally also apply to Af-
rica. 
Because the risk of conflict in Africa can be explained well with the CH 
model, CH then present an overview of their model’s predicted probability. The prob-
ability of conflict is calculated in two different ways. ‘Predicted incidence at the 
mean of the variables’ is calculated the following way. For each ‘region’ (global, sub-
Saharan Africa and other developing regions), the sample’s mean value for each re-
gion is multiplied with the coefficient. The sum of these products is then added to the 
regression constant. A ‘Z’ value for each region is then calculated into a probability 
for conflict using the formula P=Z/(1+Z). ‘Predicted incidence, average of individual 
country predictions’ is generated by letting STATA predict the probability of conflict 
based on each observation’s in each region mean value.23 CH’s ‘Table 3. Predicted 
Incidence of Civil War’ is reported with some comments in my Table 10.   
                                              
23 These results are obtained after running the specific regression in STATA, and then ask STATA to ‘predict phat’ and  
‘sum phat’ for the entire sample, and the two sub-samples Sub-Saharan Africa and Other Developing Regions. 
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Table 10. Predicted Incidence of Civil War, Collier & Hoeffler (2002: 21, Table 3) 
 Coefficients (b) 
Sample 
( x b ) 
Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
( x b ) 
Other Developing 
Regions 
( x b ) 
ln GDP per capita –0.950 –7.864 –6.656* –7.789 
GDP growth t – 1 –0.098 –0.153 –0.046 –0.184 
Prim. comm. exports 16.773 2.751 2.892 3.105 
Prim. comm. exports 2 –23.800 –0.640 –0.707 –0.815 
Social fractionalization –0.0002 –0.447 –0.842 –0.293 
Ethnic dominance 0.480 0.227 0.192 0.261 
Peace duration –0.004 –1.231 –1.185 –1.194 
ln population 0.510 8.718 0.812 0.884 
Geographic dispersion –0.992 –0.570 –0.550 –0.568 
     
Constant –3.438    
     
Predicted incidence at the mean of the 
variables 
 0.066 0.097 0.112 
Predicted incidence, average of individ-
ual country predictions 
 0.069 0.095 0.077 
Figures in italics, bold and * are misreported in CH’s ‘Table 3. Predicted Incidence of Civil War’ (p. 21). 
* In CH’s Table 2 (p. 19) the reported mean GDP per capita for Sub-Saharan Africa is $2000. This is a typo. The dataset‘s  
mean value ( x ) for income in Sub-Saharan Africa is $1,099. Nevertheless, CH have used ln $1,099 to generate x b  
(-6.656) in their Table 3.   
Figures in italics: a different mean value was used than the ones presented in CH’s Table 2: Descriptive Statistics (p. 19). 
Social fractionalization: Sample: CH report x = 1,784 in their descriptive table, but have used the figure 2,235 to generate 
the number in their Table 3. Sub-Saharan Africa: CH report x = 3,369 in their descriptive table, but have used 4,210 to 
generate the number in their Table 3. Other Developing Regions: CH report x = 1,171 in their descriptive table, but use 
1,465 to generate the number in their Table 3. Peace duration: Sample: CH report x = 327 in their descriptive table, but use 
the figure 307.7 to generate the number in their Table 3. Sub-Saharan Africa: CH report x = 314 in their descriptive table, 
but use 296.25 to generate the number in their Table 3. Other Developing Regions: CH report x = 316.8 in their descriptive 
table, but use 298.5 to generate the number in their Table 3.  
Figures in bold: The figures are typos. The decimal point should be moved one place to the right. The x b for Sub-Saharan 
Africa should be 8.12 and the x b for Other Developing Region should be 8.84. Compare with ln population for ‘sample’.  
By changing the figures mentioned above, recalculating the ‘predicted incidence at the mean of the variables’ produced 
only minor changes. The sample’s ‘predicted incidence at the mean of the variable for the sample is then 0.067, for Sub-
Saharan Africa 0.105, and for Other Developing Regions 0.110. 
 
Both types of prediction yield quite similar results. The largest difference be-
tween the two ways of predicting incidence (at mean value of variables or average of 
individual country predictions) is for ‘other developing regions’. There, using the 
mean of variable predicts war in 11.2 percent of the country periods, while the risk is 
almost halved (7.7 percent) when using the individual country predictions.  
However, the misreported numbers and an imprecise description of the calcu-
lation methods caused considerable worry. Firstly, I had a hard time figuring out how 
CH had calculated their means for GDP per capita and population.24 These two vari-
                                              
24 I thank Håvard Hegre for pointing out this possibility. 
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ables are logged in the dataset in order to reduce the influence of rich and populous 
countries. I therefore find it somewhat odd that instead of using the mean value of the 
variables included in the regression (namely logged GDP per capita and logged popu-
lation), CH used the mean of GDP per capita in constant US dollars25 and the mean 
value of population (in millions), and then logged them. These numbers (ln of the 
mean of GDP per capita and ln of mean for population) were used to generate the 
‘predicted incidence at mean of variables’. Using the mean of the variables in dollars 
and millions and then log-transforming them, creates a bias towards the high income 
and highly populated countries—the exact reason why these variables were log-
transformed in the first place. 
Secondly, I assumed that the mean values had been calculated on the basis of 
only the observations included in the regression (750 in CH and 709 in my dataset). 
However, after some effort I discovered that CH had based their mean values on the 
entire dataset. I would argue that it is more precise to use the mean values of the ob-
servations actually included in the regression since observations that are dropped 
from the regression due to missing data, might be systematically different from the 
ones included.  
The discussion on using means logged or logged means, and mean from the 
entire dataset or from only the regression might seem like hair splitting, but each 
method produced somewhat different results. In the tables based on my dataset, I 
therefore include both methods: CH’s way of using the mean of GDP per capita and 
population log transformed, and numbers based on dataset average, and my way us-
ing the mean value of log-transformed GDP per capita and log-transformed popula-
tion, based on observations included in the regression. The results are presented in 
Table 11.   
                                              
25 However, in the description of the variables they state that ‘we measure income as real purchasing power parity (PPP)-
adjusted GDP per capita’ (page 26). It is possible that the descriptive statistics table contain an error. If not, there is some 
confusion about which version of GDP per capita CH have used. 
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Table 11. Replication of CH’s Predicted Incidence of Civil War 
 Coefficient Sample Sub-Saharan Africa 
Other Developing 
Regions 
  CH MY CH MY CH MY 
Ln GDP per capita -0.929 -7.715 -7.772 -6.449 -6.293 -7.586 -7.310 
GDP growth t – 1 -0.096 -0.135 -0.146 -0.016 -0.022 -0.163 -0.185 
Prim. comm. exports 16.120 2.450 2.466 2.901 3.014 2.644 2.595 
Prim. comm. exports 2 -22.602 -0.522 -0.529 -0.732 -0.790 -0.608 -0.586 
Social fractionalization -0.0002 -0.362 -0.360 -0.726 -0.733 -0.228 -0.201 
Ethnic dominance 0.501 0.231 0.208 0.186 0.182 -0.273 0.240 
Peace duration -0.004 -1.295 -1.379 -1.278 -1.312 -1.216 -1.303 
ln population 0.485 8.374 7.692 7.767 7.410 8.532 7.842 
Geographic dispersion -1.084 -0.648 -0.661 -0.620 -0.614 -0.654 -0.687 
        
Constant -3.067       
        
Predicted incidence at the mean 
of the variables 
 0.064 0.048 0.116 0.098 0.112 0.065 
Predicted incidence, average of 
individual country predictions 
 0.073 0.103 0.082 
 
In my replication, using the ‘predicted incidence at mean of the variables’ 
yielded both somewhat lower as well as higher incidence of civil war than using indi-
vidual country prediction. Comparing the CH and my way of calculating ‘predicted 
incidence at the mean of the variables’ reveals quite considerable differences. Com-
paring the x b products indicates that the difference is produced mostly by the GDP 
per capita and population products. Most importantly, both CH and I find that pre-
dicted incidence of civil war is higher in Africa, both when compared to a global 
sample and to other developing countries. 
While Collier & Hoeffler argue that ‘mean of the variables’ is ‘merely a con-
venient simplification’ (p. 21) this measurement is used to generate Table 6 (p. 25) in 
CH analysis. This table clearly illustrates CH’s argument about conflict in Sub-
Saharan Africa: if Sub-Saharan Africa performed better economically, the incidence 
of conflict would have been much lower. 
Replicating CH Table 6 (p. 25) was a rather difficult exercise. CH are not clear 
about which regression they base their analysis on and how they proceed. Since they 
only present the figures for predicted incidence (and not the coefficient and mean 
values as they did their Tables 2 and 3), I was not able to replicate their exact find-
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ings. In Table 12, I report CH own result in columns two and three, and the results 
based on my dataset in columns four to seven.  
CH are ambiguous about the way they go about producing this table. In inter-
pret them in the following way: I use the same regression coefficients as reported in 
Table 11. I sum the mean values for the ‘regions’ for 1970 and 1995, and calculate 
the xb products. I then generate the predicted incidence by summarizing the products 
for each region, and calculate a predicted incidence using P=Z/(1+Z). In order to 
calculated the value ‘what if Africa had performed better’, I interpret CH the 
following way: The increase in percent of GDP per capita from 1970 to 1995 for 
other developing regions (ODR) is used to calculated the 1995 figure for Sub-
Saharan Africa (on the basis of the value SSA had in 1970). As for economic growth, 
SSA is given the same rate as ODR in 1995. As for primary commodity dependence, 
the rate of reduction from 1970 to 1995 for ODR is used to calculate SSA’s value in 
1995 (based on the figure for SSA in 1970). Following the same procedure as in 
Table 11, I calculate predicted incidence based both on CH’s method and my method, 
as described above. 
Table 12. Predicted Incidence of Civil War: Changes over Time 
 Collier & Hoeffler Replication based on my dataset  

















































1970       
     Sub-Saharan Africa 0.088  0.109  0.094  
     Other developing regions 0.145  0.133  0.081  
       
1995       
     Sub-Saharan Africa 0.086 0.047 0.093 0.056 0.097 0.051* 
     Other developing regions 0.054  0.075  0.035  
* To calculate this figure, the growth increase for GDP per capita was calculated as the increase in the logged GDP per 
capita variable. 
 
Despite the quibbling about procedures and methods for predicting incidence, 
the figures all show that the CH model predicts a lower incidence of conflict if Sub-
Saharan African economies had performed better.  
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4.1.4 The Middle East and North Africa 
Following the CH model for incidence of civil war in Sub-Saharan Africa, I use their 
model to investigate the Middle East and North Africa region: I start by adding a 
dummy variable for the region to the CH model. The results are shown in Table 12.  
Table 13. Accounting for Civil War 1960-99: The CH Model with a Middle East and 
North Africa Dummy 
 β st.e. 
ln GDP per capita -0.990 (0.258)*** 
(GDP growth) t - 1 -0.092 (0.041)** 
Prim. comm. exports 15.270 (5.248)** 
Prim. comm. exports 2 -21.461 (10.008)** 
Social fractionalization -0.0002 (0.0001)** 
Ethnic dominance 0. 464 (0.330) 
Peace duration -0.004 (0.001)*** 
ln population 0.466 (0.132)*** 
Geographic dispersion -1.129 (0.922) 
Middle East Dummy 0.510 (0.516) 
   








Number of wars included 52  
***, **, *  indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively. 
 
Including a Middle East and North Africa dummy in the CH baseline model 
produced the same result as for the Africa dummies: it is not significant. There is no 
particular effect of either the Africa or the Middle East regions. For all models 
including regional dummies, the other explanatory variables display very similar 
coefficients. However, while the African dummies display negative terms (Sub-
Saharan Africa: -0.370, French Colonized Africa: -0.933), the Middle East dummy 
yields a positive coefficient (0.510). For the observations included in the regression, 
the average value of war starts is slightly higher in the Middle East (11.5) than in sub-
Saharan Africa (9.5), and much higher than French Colonized Africa (2.4). In order 
to check for the fact that the Middle East might be sensitive to a certain variable, I 
constructed interaction variables with the Middle East dummy and all the other vari-
ables. None of these were significant, and the CH model is therefore appropriate to 
use to analyze conflict in the Middle East.   
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Appendix 3 presents the descriptive statistics for the Middle East, the sample 
and other developing regions (ODR). Middle Eastern countries have enjoyed slightly 
higher levels of GDP per capita than the world average, and almost four times higher 
than Sub-Saharan Africa. As for economic growth, the Middle East region has been 
better off than sub-Saharan Africa, but more volatile than the global sample. Up until 
the mid-1980s the Middle East had equally high or even higher economic growth 
than the global sample. From 1985 the Middle East experienced two decades of de-
cline and limited growth. In the 1995 period, however, the region experienced growth 
higher than the world sample. Table 13 illustrates the divergent economic growth 
patterns. 
Table 14. Economic Growth Rates Compared 
 WORLD MIDDLE EAST AFRICA 
 Mean St.dev. N Mean St.dev. N Mean Std. Dev. N 
1960          
1965 2.58 3.09 103 4.47 2.96 11 0.59 3.77 31 
1970 3.03 2.85 109 2.91 2.60 11 2.12 3.69 35 
1975 2.54 3.62 120 5.18 2.41 13 1.39 4.53 40 
1980 1.93 3.40 122 2.47 4.61 14 0.38 3.46 41 
1985 -0.53 3.72 126 -2.08 6.25 17 -1.38 3.21 41 
1990 0.47 3.13 121 -1.92 3.97 15 -0.46 2.31 38 
1995 0.25 4.62 121 1.30 4.61 15 -1.24 3.34 37 
 
Not surprisingly, the Middle East has higher levels of primary commodity de-
pendence. Also, not surprisingly, when broken down into oil and mineral depend-
ency, the Middle East countries have much higher dependence on oil, but a much 
lower dependence of minerals than the global average. The Middle East is a homoge-
nous region, scoring much lower on fractionalization and somewhat higher on ethnic 
dominance, than the global as well as the ODC sample. However, both these vari-
ables treat Islam as one group, and the difference between Shia and Sunni Muslims 
are not accounted for—a source of much antagonism and conflict in the Muslim 
world. Here there is clearly room for data improvement. On the other hand, where 
does one draw the line? Should we start treating Protestantism, Catholicism and Or-
thodox Christianity separately? Where do the Anglicans belong? What about Bud-
dhist and Hindi sects?  
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 There is little difference the geographic dispersion averages, and the Middle 
East region scores somewhat lower on the peace variable (307 vs. 344), indicating a 
higher propensity for conflict in the MENA region. Following the CH analysis, Table 
14 presents the two types of predicted incidence of civil war for the Middle East. 
Table 15. Predicted Incidence of Civil War in the Middle East 
 Coefficient Sample Middle East and North Africa 
  CH MY CH MY 
Ln GDP per capita -0.929 -7.715 -7.772 -6.449 -6.293 
GDP growth t - 1 -0.096 -0.135 -0.146 -0.016 -0.022 
Prim. comm.. exports 16.120 2.450 2.466 2.901 3.014 
Prim. comm.. exports 2 -22.602 -0.522 -0.529 -0.732 -0.790 
Social fractionalization -0.0002 -0.362 -0.360 -0.726 -0.733 
Ethnic dominance 0.501 0.231 0.208 0.186 0.182 
Peace duration -0.004 -1.295 -1.379 -1.278 -1.312 
ln population 0.485 8.374 7.692 7.767 7.410 
Geographic dispersion -1.084 -0.648 -0.661 -0.620 -0.614 
      
Constant -3.067     
      
Predicted incidence at the mean 
of the variables 
 0.064 0.048 0.116 0.098 
Predicted incidence, average of 
individual country predictions 
 0.073 0.092 
 
As for the same table on Africa, the predicted incidence when using the mean 
of the variables in CH’s way yields higher risk for conflict, than when using my pro-
cedure. The main difference is again found for the x b for GDP per capita and popula-
tion. When using the individual country predictions, the results are mixed. In sum 
however, all three types of predictions are higher for the Middle East and Africa than 
the sample average, and around the same level as Sub-Saharan Africa. 
4.1.5 Africa and the Middle East Compared 
The procedure for generating ‘predicted incidence at the mean of the variables’ is 
rather complicated. When comparing regions and trends over time, I only include the 
actual observed starts of war and ‘predicted incidence, average of individual country 
predictions.’ These values for global sample, Sub-Saharan Africa, and the Middle 
East and North Africa are summarized in Table 15. The model predicts slightly 
higher values for Sub-Saharan Africa, and slightly lower values for the Middle East. 
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Figure 6 presents the conflict trends over time for the global sample, Sub-Saharan 
Africa and the Middle East and North Africa. 
Table 16. Comparison of Observed and Predicted Probability of Civil War 
 M SD Min Max N 
Sample      
War starts (observed) 0.073 0.261 0 1 709 
Predicted incidence. Average of individ-
ual country predictions (sum phat) 
0.073 0.101 0.00001 0.760 709 
Sub-Saharan Africa      
War starts (observed) 0.096 0.296 0 1 239 
Predicted incidence. Average of individ-
ual country predictions (sum phat) 
0.103 0.118 0.0027 0.760 239 
Middle East and North Africa      
War starts (observed) 0.115 0.322 0 1 78 
Predicted incidence. Average of individ-
ual country predictions (sum phat) 
0.092 0.113 0.00001 0.509 78 
















A very different picture of the conflict trends in the two regions emerges in 
Figure 5. Both regions are more conflict-prone than the global average, but the model 
predicts quite divergent trend for two regions. While the two regions’ predicted risk 
for conflict is relatively equal in the period from 1965 to 1985, this changes radically 
in the last period. From 1990 to 1995, the CH model predicts a sharp rise in conflict 
in Sub-Saharan Africa and a significant decline in the Middle East and North Africa.  
 82
4.2 The CH Model in a Country-year Dataset 
The five-year period design used by CH is seldom used in quantitative studies of civil 
war. A much more common design is a country-year structure. I therefore now move 
on to apply the CH model on a country-year dataset. This section is broken into two 
parts. The first runs the CH model on an annualized dataset with civil war onset as 
the dependent variable. While CH use COW data as their dependent variable, I use 
civil war as defined by the PRIO/Uppsala dataset (Gleditsch et al., 2002). Their defi-
nition of civil war matches COW’s requirement of a threshold for 1,000 battle-deaths 
per year, and the correlation between COW and PRIO/Uppsala’s civil war coding is 
high (Gleditsch et al., 2001: 17). 
The second part uses armed civil conflict onset in the PRIO/Uppsala dataset as 
the dependent variable, and applies the CH model to armed civil conflicts with a 
threshold of 25 battle-related deaths per year. The PRIO/Uppsala dataset includes 80 
civil war onsets and 157 armed civil conflict onsets in the period 1960 to 1997, the 
temporal domain covered by the analyses in this thesis (See Appendix 7 for details).  
In the tables, I report more detailed results than CH. In particular, I include the 
odds ratio measure in the table. The odds ratio measurement tells us how much the 
odds for civil war increases or decreases when an independent variable increases with 
one unit (and all other independent variables are kept constant at mean value). Odd 
ratios are transferred into probabilities with the simple equation:  OR = P/(1-P) = ez  . 
Coefficients significant at the 0.05 level are highlighted in bold. Coefficients signifi-
cant at the 0.10 level are marked in bold and italics. 
4.2.1 Accounting for Civil War with PRIO/Uppsala Conflict Data 
The original CH dataset was developed into an annualized dataset by either gathering 
new variables in an annual form or copying variables from the CH dataset (see Chap-
ter 3). Variables marked with (c) are copied values. These were generated based on 
the original CH variables because they were hard to obtain in an annualized form (es-
pecially geographic dispersion and primary commodity dependence). I could not ob-
tain data on population after 1997, and the analyses from here on are therefore only 
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covering the period 1960-97. Table 16 presents the CH model on an annualized data-
set. 
Table 17. Accounting for Civil War 1960-97: The CH Model with PRIO/Uppsala 
Data 
 β st.e. p-value Odds Ratio
ln GDP per capita -0.263 0.127 0.039 0.769
GDP growth  -3.690 1.751 0.035 0.025
Prim. comm.. exports (c) 15.487 4.723 0.001 5.320.803
Prim. comm.. exports2 (c)  -27.970 10.626 0.008 7.13e-13
Social fractionalization (c) -0.0001 0.0001 0.500 1.000
Ethnic dominance (c) 0.849 0.296 0.004 2.337
Peace years -0.027 0.011 0.015 0.973
ln population 0.605 0.112 0.000 1.832
Geographic dispersion (c) 0.335 0.871 0.700 1.398
    
Constant -13.507 2.343 0.000 








Number of conflict onsets included 56   
Sample average conflict onsets 0.014   
 
Running the CH model on a country-year annual dataset produced some inter-
esting differences with the five-year-period design format. Geographic dispersion 
continues to be insignificant in terms of p, but is now also insignificant in terms of 
improving the model’s log likelihood. Furthermore, geographic dispersion is now 
positive, as opposed to negative in the five-year period design. CH argued that con-
flict is more likely to take place when the population is dispersed because it is harder 
for the government to control remote part (as in Zaire). According to my results, a 
positive geographic dispersion coefficient indicates that conflict is more like to take 
place in countries where the population is concentrated in one area. Removing geo-
graphic dispersion from the model adds around 200 observations, but changes the 
results minimally, and I therefore leave it in to ease comparability with the original 
CH model. 
Most notably, social fractionalization is no longer significant, while ethnic 
dominance is. While fractionalization is still negative, it is no longer significant, and 
weakens CH’s argument about fractionalization hindering mobilization and conse-
quently impeding rebel organization and cohesion. In this regression, ethnic domi-
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nance emerges as significant, giving some support to the grievance perspective. This 
is in line with the finding of Gurr (1993) that a dominant ethnic group that represses 
and exploits a large minority is conducive to conflict. A further testing of the impor-
tance of political variables is presented in the next table. Here regime type (as meas-
ured by Polyarchy) is added to the CH model. Social fractionalization and geographi-
cal dispersion are insignificant (in terms of both p or log likelihood). In order to ease 
comparability with the original CH model, these variables were kept in the model.   
Table 18. Accounting for Civil War 1960-97: The CH Model with PRIO/Uppsala 
Data, Regime Added 
 β st.e. p-value Odds Ratio
ln GDP per capita -0.168 0.153 0.272 0.845
GDP growth  -3.611 1.762 0.040 0.027
Prim. comm. exports (c) 14.203 4.692 0.002 1,473,299
Prim. comm. exports2 (c)  -25.787 10.385 0.013 6.32e-12
Social fractionalization (c) -0.00004 0.0001 0.602 1.000
Ethnic dominance (c) 0.840 0.300 0.005 2.316
Peace years -0.027 0.011 0.017 0.974
ln population 0.601 0.113 0.000 1.824
Geographic dispersion (c) 0.293 0.899 0.745 1.340
Polyarchy 0.061 0.045 0.178 1.063
Polyarchy2 -0.003 0.002 0.120 0.997
    
Constant -13.998 2.393 0.000 








Number of conflict onsets included 55   
Sample average conflict onsets 0.014   
 
When adding regime type to the model, GDP per capita is no longer significant. 
This is most likely due to the variable’s high correlation with Polyarchy (0.7). De-
mocracy and economic development are closely connected, and using different 
measurements (both for regime and economic development) did not yield much lower 
correlations. I replaced the GDP per capita and Polyarchy variables with an interac-
tion term between GDP per capita and Polyarchy squared. The interaction term was 
statistically significant (0.048) and the coefficient negative, indicating that both eco-
nomic development and autocracies/democracies reduce the probability for conflict. 
Adding the odds ratio measurement reveals that primary commodity exports yield 
terrible odds for civil war. Economic development and growth; peace, population 
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size, primary commodity exports are show the same results as in CH analysis, while 
ethnic dominance again is significant. 
Corresponding with CH’s findings, regime is not significant at the five percent 
level. However, the squared term is borderline significant, and I investigate the rela-
tionship between regime type, conflict and primary commodity by graphing them in a 
three-dimensional graph (see Figure 6). 





















  * Figure 7 is generated on the basis of Table 18 
 
The graph visualizes the complex relationship, and verifies an inverted U-
shaped relationship for both regime type and primary commodity dependence. The 
curvilinear relationship for regime type is repeated for all levels of primary commod-
ity, except at the extremely high levels. However, very few countries are in this 
range. Only 70 observations in this sample have a score of more than 0.6 on the pri-
mary commodity variable. The curve peaks at 0.3 for primary commodity depend-
ence. Interestingly, at medium levels of primary commodity, the Polyarchy curve 
peaks at a score of around 9, implying that fewer democracies experience civil war. 
Countries around the peak area have almost 80 percent higher probability for conflict 
than the sample average (2.5 vs. 1.4 percent). For lower and higher levels of primary 
commodity dependence, the curve for regime type still persists, but is less pro-
nounced.  
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I then move on to break down primary commodity exports into oil and mineral 
dependency. Due to missing data, the model containing oil and mineral dependency 
looses 11 conflict onsets and almost 1,300 observations compared to the model with 
the primary commodity dependence.  
Table 19. Accounting for Civil War 1960-97: The CH Model with PRIO/Uppsala 
Data, Oil and Mineral Dependency Added 
 β St.e. p-value Odds Ratio
ln GDP per capita -0.504 0.163 0.002 0.604
GDP growth  -4.933 2.856 0.084 0.007
Oil dependency 5.509 3.597 0.126 246.909
Oil dependency2  -8.111 7.126 0.255 0.0003
Mineral dependency 35.732 32.620 0.273 3.30e+15
Mineral dependency2  -616.190 593.630 0.299 2.47e-268
Social fractionalization (c) -0.0001 0.0001 0.540 1.000
Ethnic dominance (c) 0.657 0.347 0.059 1.929
Peace years -0.030 0.014 0.027 0.971
ln population 0.422 0.108 0.000 1.524
Geographic dispersion (c) 0.640 1.053 0.543 1.896
    
Constant -7.574 2.424 0.002 








Number of conflict onsets included 44   
Sample average conflict onsets 0.017   
 
In this model, oil and mineral dependence are not significant, neither in terms 
of p or log likelihood improvement. However, the positive linear term and the nega-
tive squared term indicate a curvilinear relationship. I also tried to add regime type to 
the model with oil and mineral dependence but found rather weak results (Table 20). 
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Table 20. Accounting for Civil War 1960-97: The CH Model with PRIO/Uppsala 
Data, Regime Type, Oil and Mineral Dependency Added 
 β p-value Odds Ratio
-0.381 0.196 0.052 
GDP growth  -4.916 0.082 0.007
4.796 3.633 0.187 
Oil dependency   2 6.930 0.300 
St.e. 




Mineral dependency 30.930 32.738 0.345 2.71e+13
Mineral dependency2  -563.775 592.187 0.341 1.43e-245
Social fractionalization (c) -0.00003 0.0001 0.734 1.000
Ethnic dominance (c) 0.688 0.350 0.049 1.991
Peace years -0.029 0.014 0.972
ln population 0.429 0.114 0.000 1.535
Geographic dispersion (c) 0.504 1.072 0.639 1.655
Polyarchy 0.042 0.052 0.426 1.043
Polyarchy2 -0.002 0.002 0.286 0.998
    
Constant -8.470 6.637 0.001 








Number of conflict onsets included 44   
Sample average conflict onsets 0.017   
0.034 
 
Keeping the other variables at mean value (for observations in the regression), 
I graph the relationship between oil dependence and regime type in Figure 7.  























   * Figure 7 is generated on the basis of Table 20 
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As for primary commodity exports, regime and civil war, the same curvilinear rela-
tionship between oil dependence, regime type and civil war is confirmed here. For 
countries with medium levels of both oil dependence and democracy, the risk of con-
flict is more than the double of the sample average (3.2 percent compared to 1.7). 
For the models with primary commodity dependence, oil and mineral depend-
ence, both without and with regime type, I added regional dummies with all the re-
gression, but found no significant results. A discussion of regions is provided after 
the analysis of armed civil conflicts. 
4.2.2 Accounting for Armed Conflict with PRIO/Uppsala Conflict 
Data 
The last part of the analysis runs the CH model with a dependent variable with a 
lower threshold for conflict. Instead of the 1,000 battle-related deaths required in the 
COW dataset and by the PRIO/Uppsala ‘civil war’ definition, I use the PRIO/Uppsala 
dataset’s definition of ‘armed civil conflict’ (25 battle-related deaths per year). The 
variables  primary commodities, social fractionalization, ethnic dominance and geo-
graphic dispersion were copied from the five-year-period dataset. Data on GDP per 
capita, economic growth, population, regime type, oil and mineral dependence are in 
an annual format.    
Table 21. Accounting for Armed Conflict 1960-97: The CH Model with 
PRIO/Uppsala Data 
 β st.e. p-value Odds Ratio
ln GDP per capita -0.368 0.088 0.000 0.692
GDP growth -4.252 1.401 0.002 0.014
Prim. comm. exports (c) 1.756 2.111 0.406 5.788
Prim. comm. exports 2 (c) -0.592 3.271 0.856 0.553
Social fractionalization 0.00002 0.0001 0.683 1.000
Ethnic dominance 0.424 0.200 0.034 1.529
Peace duration -0.019 0.008 0.022 0.981
ln population 0.373 0.070 0.000 1.452
Geographic dispersion (c) 0.795 0.585 0.174 2.214
    
Constant -7.417 1.449 0.000 








Number of conflict onsets included 117   
Sample average conflict onsets 0.033   
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As before, high levels of economic development and growth, and longer peri-
ods with peace decrease the likelihood for conflict. Interestingly, social fractionaliza-
tion continues to be insignificant in an annualized format, but is now positive. Also as 
opposed to the CH finding (but in line with the findings on civil war in my annual 
dataset), ethnic dominance is significant at the 10 percent level. These results contrast 
CH’s argument about cohesion and mobilization. A high score on ‘social fractional-
ization’ implies a large number of ethnic, linguistic and religious groups within the 
country. According to CH, fractionalization should impede mobilization to conflict, 
and consequently displays a negative relationship. This is not supported by my find-
ings. Rather, the presence of a dominant ethnic group and possible political exclusion 
of a large minority by a majority both yields higher probability for conflict. This is 
the line with Hegre et al. who find a weak correlation between fragmentation and 
civil war (Hegre et al., 2001), while Ellingsen finds that ‘multiethnicity has a quite 
strong and significant impact on domestic conflict’ (2000: 17). However, both Hegre 
and Ellingsen also found that political and socioeconomic factors are more important 
in predicting conflict: political and economic factors influence the centrality of ethnic 
identities; play a major role in the possibility for conflict-mobilization, and affects 
whether conflict escalates to a violent level.  
Rather surprisingly, primary commodity exports are no longer significant. This 
contradicts CH’s and my earlier findings. Why shouldn’t primary commodity exports 
be relevant in an analysis of armed civil conflict, when it repeatedly has been signifi-
cant on conflicts with a higher level of battle-related deaths? The difference between 
small and large civil conflicts is their intensity. Could it be that less intensive con-
flicts display a linear relationship with primary commodity exports? If the conflicts 
surpass 1,000 battle-related deaths, could it be that the stakes (read: access to natural 
resource) are so important that the government would be involved in the extraction of 
natural resources, and consequently would quell down ‘large’ rebellions? I test this 
by leaving the exponential primary commodity export term out of the model. 
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Table 22. Accounting for Armed Civil Conflict: The CH Model with Linear Primary 
Commodity 
 β st.e. p-value Odds Ratio
ln GDP per capita -0.369 0.087 0.000 0.692
GDP growth -4.246 1.401 0.002 0.014
Prim. comm. exports (c) 1.400 0.798 0.079 4.055
Social fractionalization (c) 0.00002 0.0001 0.648 1.000
Ethnic dominance 0.421 0.199 0.034 1.523
Peace duration -0.019 0.008 0.023 0.981
ln population 0.370 0.067 0.000 1.447
Geographic dispersion (c) 0.805 0.582 0.166 2.238
    
Constant -7.332 1.371 0.000 








Number of conflict onsets included 117   
Sample average conflict onsets 0.033   
 
Rerunning the model shows that primary commodity exports at least is more signifi-
cant here, although only at the ten percent level. Again, the other variables are almost 
unchanged by from the previous model. The relationship between armed civil conflict 
and primary commodity dependence is graphed below: 
















     * Figure 8 is generated on the basis of Table 22 
 
The linear positive relationship reveals a tripling of the conflict probability for a 
country with low dependence compared with a country with high dependence. To this 
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model, I now add regime type. The results and the graph based on the results in Table 
22 are presented below.  
Table 23. Accounting for Armed Conflict 1960-97: The CH Model with 
PRIO/Uppsala Data, Regime Type Added 
 β st.e. p-value Odds Ratio
ln GDP per capita -0.360 0.108 0.001 0.698
GDP growth  -4.431 1.425 0.002 0.012
Prim. comm. exports (c) 1.157 0.839 0.168 3.182
Social fractionalization (c) 0.00003 0.0001 0.619 1.000
Ethnic dominance (c) 0.401 0.200 0.045 1.494
Peace years -0.018 0.008 0.037 0.982
ln population 0.370 0.068 0.000 1.448
Geographic dispersion (c) 0.847 0.603 0.160 2.334
Polyarchy 0.081 0.030 0.007 1.084
Polyarchy2 -0.003 0.001 0.019 0.997
    
Constant -7.594 1.429 0.000 








Number of conflict onsets included 116   
Sample average conflict onsets 0.033   
 






























     * Figure 9 is generated in the basis of Table 23 
 Interestingly, regime type is significant at the five percent level. The other co-
efficients remain almost the same, while primary commodity dependence is no longer 
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significant. The graph reveals that semi-democracies are the most conflict prone—for 
all levels of primary commodity dependence. Again, a variable measuring regime 
transition was added to the model, but was not significant, and therefore dropped 
from the model. It is interesting to note that the graph is tilting towards the democ-
ratic end of the Polyarchy score, indicating that a lower risk for conflict within de-
mocracies. 
I then move on to an analysis containing more specified measurements for 
natural resources. The hypothesis on oil and mineral dependence and conflict were 
not supported in the five-year analysis, and were not significant in the annualized 
analysis of civil war. The results for the annualized analysis of armed civil conflict 
are presented below. 
Table 24. Accounting for Armed Conflict 1960-97: The CH Model with 
PRIO/Uppsala with Oil and Mineral Dependency 
 β st.e. p-value Odds Ratio
ln GDP per capita -0.441 0.112 0.000 0.644
GDP growth  -6.408 2.281 0.005 0.002
Oil dependency 3.762 3.302 0.255 43.056
Oil dependency2 -8.086 7.065 0.252 0.0003
Mineral dependency 2.387 7.612 0.754 10.884
Mineral dependency2 -9.086 31.038 0.770 0.0001
Social fractionalization (c) -0.00003 0.0001 0.692 1.000
Ethnic dominance (c) 0.412 0.250 0.099 1.511
Peace years -0.014 0.011 0.184 0.986
ln population 0.450 0.085 0.000 1.568
Geographic dispersion () -0.009 0.750 0.990 0.991
    
Constant -7.369 1.790 0.000 








Number of conflict onsets included 78   
Sample average conflict onsets 0.034   
 
Unfortunately, including the variables for oil and mineral dependency pro-
duces a loss of 38 armed civil conflict onsets and almost 1,200 observations in the 
regression. Missing data is one serious problem that is the burden of quantitative 
studies, and one that is hard to accommodate.  
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Table 25. Accounting for Armed Conflict 1960-97: The CH Model with 
PRIO/Uppsala Data, Regime, Oil and Mineral Dependency Added 
 Β st.e. p-value Odds Ratio
ln GDP per capita -0.370 0.142 0.009 0.691
GDP growth  -6.348 2.302 0.006 0.002
Oil dependency 3.484 3.257 0.285 32.601
Oil dependency2 -7.683 6.701 0.252 0.0004
Mineral dependency 1.859 7.614 0.807 6.420
Mineral dependency2 -7.853 30.303 0.796 0.0004
Social fractionalization (c) -6.94e-06 0.0001 0.919 1.000
Ethnic dominance (c) 0.418 0.249 0.093 1.519
Peace years -0.013 0.011 0.213 0.987
ln population 0.442 0.087 0.000 1.556
Geographic dispersion (c) -0.006 0.774 0.994 0.994
Polyarchy 0.072 0.035 0.040 1.075
Polyarchy2 -0.003 0.001 0.042 0.997
    
Constant -7.892 1.920 0.000 








Number of conflicts included 78   
Sample average conflict onsets 0.034   
 
In this regression, peace years drop out of the significant list. Oil and mineral 
dependency follow the hypothesized shape of their relationship with conflict. How-
ever, the variables are not significant. A possible reason for the lack of significance, 
is that few countries are on the upper level of the dependency scale.  
Although the oil dependency variables are not significant, I graph this below to 
inspect the relationship. Figure 10 displays the hypothesized relationship for both 
regime type and oil dependence.  
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Figure 10. The Effect of Regime Type and Oil Dependency on the Probability of 

























     ‘ Figure 10 is generated on the basis of Table 25 
 
The three-dimensional model displays a clear curvilinear relationship between 
regime type and conflict. The relationship between oil dependency and conflict is 
also curvilinear, although it peaks around 0.3 percent of exports. For high levels of oil 
dependency, the probability for conflict is very small! However, very few observa-
tions are found for high levels of oil dependence. This finding strengthens the hy-
potheses on regime and oil dependency, and is in line with rentier theory. Neverthe-
less, oil and regime type are strong explanatory variables. In the sample, the average 
conflict onset is 3.3 percent. Only a few observations are found in the area above that 
level. The figure’s maximum conflict onset level is 4.6 percent.26 The peak of the 
curves for oil dependency and regime is around the double of the average sample 
probability at 3.3 percent for the sample with oil and mineral dependency, and when 
all the other independent variables are held at mean value.  Oil and mineral depend-
ency explain little. Economic development and economic growth are much stronger 
variables. The two next figures exemplify. Rich countries have a much lower prob-
                                              
26 For mineral dependency, the relationship displays a curvilinear U-shaped relationship. However, as the lack of signifi-
cance in terms of both p-values and improvement in log likelihood scores, and graphing the model reveal that mineral 
dependency explain little of the causes for armed civil conflict. 
 
 95
ability for conflict than poor countries.27 Whereas rich countries have a maximum 
conflict probability of around 1.5 percent, poor countries have an almost six time 
higher risk: 8.8 percent. 




















   * Figure 11 is generated on the basis of  Table 25 

























   * Figure 12 is generated on the basis of Table 25 
 
                                              
27 75 percentile: GDP per capita 9.205, economic growth 0.045 percent. 25 percentile: GDP per capita 6.475, economic 
growth –0.004 percent. 
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In order to further investigate the relationship between oil, economic develop-
ment and regime type, I constructed several interaction variables between oil depend-
ence and regime type as well as oil dependence and GDP per capita. These were all 
negative, but not significant at even the 0.10 level. Both the interaction between oil 
dependence and the linear and squared regime type variable was negative. This indi-
cates that a high level of oil dependence reduces conflict, both for democratic and 
authoritarian regimes. The interaction terms between GDP per capita and oil depend-
ence (linear and squared) were also negative, indicating that having little or a lot of 
oil reduces the risk of conflict. Finally, I investigated the possibility that it might be 
better to treat oil dependence in the form of a dummy variable. Assuming that the 
effect of being dependent on oil ‘kicks in’ at a high level. This is what de Soysa 
(2002) found in his study covering the period 1989-99. In my analysis, all countries 
where oil constituted more than 40 percent of total exports were given the value 1. In 
this way, I could include oil dependence in the same model as primary commodity 
dependence. In my analysis the oil dummy was negative, in contrast to de Soysa’s 
finding. The major difference between these findings is probably attributed to the 
period of analysis. It is possible that countries that have been oil dependent for a 
while have learned to do other things. This is probably the case for many of the Gulf 
countries, but not the case for Venezuela, Nigeria and Indonesia.28 
4.2.3 Regional Differences 
Following CH’s design, I added a dummy variable for both the Sub-Saharan Africa 
and the Middle East North Africa regions in all the regressions reported. None of the 
regional dummies were significant in any of the regressions, which was also the case 
with the Africa dummy in CH’s analysis. The model on the five-year period dataset 
predicted a slightly higher conflict risk for Sub-Saharan Africa than for the Middle 
East, while the observed values were the other way around (see Table 15). Using the 
CH model to calculate the incidence of civil war over time showed predicted an in-
crease in the risk for conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa, and a reduction in the risk of the 
                                              
28 Thanks to Indra de Soysa for discussing these issues per e-mail. 
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Middle East region (Figure 6). Since my analysis on the annualized dataset contains 
so many different regressions, I do not examine the two types of predicted incidence 
that were discussed in sections 4.1.3. and 4.1.4. The regional differences are rather 
compared by generating time-trend figures and by comparing the actual conflict out-
break with the ‘predicted incidence, average of individual conflict predictions’. Fig-
ures 13 and 14 present the time trend for civil war and armed civil conflict.  



















































































For civil wars, both Africa and the Middle East are generally above the global 
average. In contrast to what Figure 6 showed for the five-year period design, the time 
trend based on the annualized design and the PRIO/Uppsala conflict data indicates a 
less drastic increase in conflicts in Africa in the 1990s. The figure on civil war does 
not paint a clear picture of whether Africa or the Middle East is more prone to con-
flict. The predicted incidence of civil war varies from around 1.0 percent to 2.7 per-
cent.  
For armed civil conflicts, the difference between the predicted incidences for 
the two regions is more pronounced, with Africa notably above the Middle East. For 
Africa the model predicts a sharp increase from 1991 to 1992, and a continued high 
risk that only has gone down slightly from 1996 to 1997. The model predicts a sub-
stantial higher risk for armed civil conflict in Africa in almost all years. The predicted 
incidence of armed civil conflict spans from 2.0 percent to 6.1 percent.  
I further examine the regional differences between Sub-Saharan Africa and the 
Middle East and North Africa by comparing the dataset’s actual observed conflict 
onsets with the model’s predicted probability of conflict for the sample and the two 
regions. The results are presented in Table 26. 
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Table 26. Comparison of Observed and Predicted Probability of Civil War and 
Armed Civil Conflict  
 M SD Min Max N 
Civil War*      
Sample      
Conflict onsets (observed) 0.014 0.118 0 1 3,881 
Predicted incidence. Average of individ-
ual country predictions (sum phat) 
0.014 0.019 0.000 0.329 3,881 
Sub-Saharan Africa      
Conflict onsets (observed) 0.014 0.118 0 1 1,203 
Predicted incidence. Average of individ-
ual country predictions (sum phat) 
0.014 0.016 0.003 0.162 1,203 
Middle East and North Africa      
Conflict onsets (observed) 0.019 0.136 0 1 428 
Predicted incidence. Average of individ-
ual country predictions (sum phat) 
0.017 0.021 0.000 0.104 428 
      
Armed Civil Conflict**      
Sample      
Conflict onsets (observed) 0.033 0.179 0 1 3,495 
Predicted incidence. Average of individ-
ual country predictions (sum phat) 
0.033 0.038 0.000 0.691 3,495 
Sub-Saharan Africa      
Conflict onsets (observed) 0.041 0.198 0 1 1,127 
Predicted incidence. Average of individ-
ual country predictions (sum phat) 
0.043 0.033 0.002 0.297 1,127 
Middle East and North Africa      
Conflict onsets (observed) 0.044 0.205 0 1 342 
Predicted incidence. Average of individ-
ual country predictions (sum phat) 
0.030 0.020 0.001 0.103 342 
* The regression in Table 18 is the basis for these values 
** The regression in Table 23 the basis for these values 
 
Comparing the actual onset and the CH model’s predicted incidence of conflict 
in Sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East and North Africa is a useful exercise. For 
civil wars, the Middle East region’s observed and predicted civil war incidence is 
slightly higher than Africa. The actual and predicted incidences are the same for Af-
rica.  
For armed civil conflict the picture is more diverse. For Africa the predicted in-
cidence and the actual onset are close, with the CH model predicting a slightly higher 
value. For the Middle East, the difference between observed conflict onset and pre-
dicted value is rather large. While observed conflict is 4.4 percent, the predicted inci-
dence is around 40 percent lower at 3.0 percent. This pattern was also found in the 
comparison of observed and predicted probability of civil war in the five-year period: 
war starts in the Middle East is higher than for Africa, while the CH model predicts a 
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higher incidence for Africa than in the Middle East. Does CH’s model then ‘favor’ 
variables that explain conflict in Africa, and ‘overlook’ variables that are of impor-
tance to conflict in the Middle East? An examination of causes of conflict in the Mid-
dle East and the CH model’s possible bias is discussed in the next section.  
4.3 The Middle East and North Africa: Islam, Democracy 
and Conflict 
Collier & Hoeffler’s analysis clearly shows that economic development is the most 
important element of explaining conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa. What explains con-
flicts in the Middle East? Do the variables in the CH model fail to register the sources 
of conflict in the Middle East? I will examine the various variables in the CH model 
sequentially below. 
 Economic development and growth in the CH model is based on measures of 
GDP per capita. Within this framework the Middle East region seem to do be doing 
quite well. However, economic development in the Middle East region has been oil 
and state driven, and has not followed the modernization path of economic diversifi-
cation, social liberalization, occupational specialization an education The Middle East 
is the home to some of the most as well as the least developed countries in the world. 
Over the last 15 years, the entire region has performed poorly, and suffers from a de-
velopment deficit (Richards, 2001). Primary commodity dependence displays a curvi-
linear relationship with conflict. For high levels of dependence, the risk of conflict is 
low. However, resource dependence has an important impact on economic as well as 
political variables. Oil in the Middle East is to a large extent to blame for the lack of a 
healthy economic development.  
Religion, ethnicity and social fractionalization are included in almost any 
study of armed domestic conflict. A prominent feature of the Middle East is the pres-
ence and dominance of Islam. Should we look at Islamic countries as one region, 
rather than the Middle East and North Africa? I included a dummy variable for all 
countries that are members of the Organization of Islamic Conference, and added that 
to various versions of CH’s model on both civil war and armed civil conflict. The 
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Islam dummy variable was never significant. There is nothing about unique about 
Muslim countries that explain conflict within the CH model. 
Social fractionalization and ethnic dominance are modeled to be positively 
and negatively, respectively, related to conflict in CH’s model. For the annualized 
dataset, I found that fractionalization was not significant, while ethnic dominance 
was. This suggests that ethnic dominance and political exclusion are related to con-
flict. However, both these variables and others29 fail to take into account the divisions 
within Islam. The major divide and source of much conflict is between Shia and 
Sunni Islam. However, several other Muslim sects differ from the main strands of 
Islam, and have often been discriminated against. In Syria, the Alawites have consti-
tuted the backbone of Assad regimes. The variables used in the CH model, and in 
many other datasets, do not account for important religious and ethnic groups that 
diversify the picture of the Middle East as a uniform cultural and religious region that 
‘social fractionalization’ and ‘ethnic dominance’ variables paint. Data in this area are 
notoriously poor. It has not been in the interest of regimes to record groups they 
wished never existed (Kurds in Turkey have for long been considered as ‘Mountain 
Turks’). The current variables used in the CH model are therefore likely to ‘under-
predict’ conflict in the Middle East because the variables do not measure important 
division within Islam and possibly also other ethnic and religious divisions. 
 Finally, I have demonstrated the relevance of regime type within the CH 
model. However, authoritarian and democratic regimes are theorized to be less prone 
to conflict than regimes in the middle category. Within this framework, conflict in the 
Middle East would not be fewer if the region had been democratic. The key to under-
standing conflict in general, lies in the interrelatedness of the variables in the CH 
model, and the impact of external factors on these variables. The Middle East region 
has enjoyed a buffer effect of oil revenues for a long time. Due to the international 
allies and the importance of petroleum in world economies, external actors have sup-
plied the region with abundant amount of military equipment and encouraged authori-
tarian leaders to quell and put a lid on dissent and opposition. However, the chal-
                                              
29 Initially, I also added the variable ‘ethnical heterogeneity’ used in Hegre et al. (2001). The variable measures the size of 
the largest group (s) and is calculated as 1-s2.  This variable combines both the ‘ethnic dominance’ and social fractionaliza-
tion variables. 
 102
lenges the incumbent regimes are facing in order to provide food and jobs to their 
populations are serious. Although the authoritarian regimes so far have been success-
ful in quelling serious political and domestic armed conflict, they have not success-
fully managed the economic and social platform for the future.  
The 1973 oil crisis had worldwide economic and political consequences. 
Global repercussion on the same scale is likely to materialize if widespread civil un-
rest takes place in the Arab Gulf in the near future. The abundance of oil boosted the 
economic welfare of the Arab Gulf countries, but the political and economic struc-
tures oil has brought about provide a fruitful base for civil protest, and even war. 
Loot-seeking behavior aimed at controlling oil and its revenues does not characterize 
civil war in the Middle East. Collier & Hoeffler’s model does not really fit in this re-
gard. The rentier-concept provides a more fruitful explanation for the current and up-
coming economic and political challenges oil-produces in the Middle East are facing 
and will increasingly face in the near future. These economic and political challenges 
fits into a more traditional perspective on civil war: grievance. Lack of economic and 
political opportunities provide fruitful based for frustration and opposition. Unless the 
regimes become increasingly repressive, the future bodes for growing political unrest 
and even civil war in the Gulf. Sick & Potter suggest that the Gulf countries are ex-
periencing ‘a crisis in slow motion’ (1997: 12). In order to deal with these challenges, 
the Gulf regimes will be forced to loosen up their control of economic markets.  
 By opening up for privatization and taxation, political measures must be taken 
as well. Despite Western interest and protection of the current regimes, it is doubtful 
that they will continue to support increasingly repressive regimes. Not because they 
suddenly had a moral change of heart, but because the potential for unrest is so large. 
Even Martin Indyk, former US ambassador to Israel, special assistant to the president 
and secretary for Near East Affairs, has changed his mind. Indyk is now arguing for a 
post-nuptial agreement between the US and its Arab allies.  
The United States can no longer allow its Arab allies to ward off democratic reform 
… revolution in Saudi Arabia and Egypt could have a devastating impact on U.S. in-
terests in the Middle East … The way out is to develop a middle path, working with 
the Egyptian and Saudi governments to promote political and economic reform—
even if doing so required them to loosen some controls and take some risks (Indyk, 
2002: 85-86). 
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Russia is currently working hard to increase it share of the international oil and gas 
market (Morse & Richard, 2002). The willingness of Russia to put up a fight with 
OPEC and the potential of Central Asia in providing energy to Western markets is a 
slap in the face for many current Gulf rulers, but an olive branch to their people. 
While no wave of democratization is likely to take place, the underlying, ineffective 
economic structure cannot be maintained for much longer. With unclear rules of suc-
cession, growing populations and unemployment, and regime unwilling or unable to 
meet these challenges in their current form, the Middle East will continue to provide 
a breeding ground for militant Islamists. Aspiring democrats have for long been disil-
lusioned and disenfranchised with the lack of support for democratic change by 
Western regimes. By following a liberal peace-based recipe, the Middle East might 
prevent its economic and political witches-brew from boiling over.  
A more plausible explanation for the inter-linkage between natural resource 
abundance and conflict in the Middle East, does not lie in the greed explanation em-
phasized by Collier & Hoeffler, but in the traditional rentier-state literature. The eco-
nomic and political effects of oil—corruption, slow growth and authoritarianism—
create basis for grievance-based conflict. Conflict in the Middle East seems best to be 
explained by a deficit in both democracy and development.  
4.4 Summary of Results 
The analysis in this study was conducted in three stages. The first replicated the CH 
model on a five-year period dataset. Although there were some discrepancies between 
the published CH results and my replication, the findings remained much the same: 
economic development and growth, social fractionalization and peace reduced the 
propensity for conflict. A large population and primary commodity dependence in-
creased the risk. Geographical dispersion was not significant in terms of p, but in 
terms of log likelihood improvement. The coefficient was negative, and implied that a 
geographically dispersed population increases the risk of conflict. Zaire was used as 
an example. CH found no effect of the regime measurement ‘Polity’ in their analysis. 
Adding an alternative regime-type variable, ‘Polyarchy’, did not produce significant 
results either. Breaking up primary commodity exports into oil and mineral depend-
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ency did not produce the hypothesized relationship. Neither the Sub-Saharan Africa 
nor the Middle East dummies were significant, and no particular, undefined regional 
effect was detected. Comparing the two regions, however, the model predicted 
widely different conflict risks for the two regions. From 1990 to 1995, the model pre-
dicts a sharp increase in the onset of conflict for Sub-Saharan Africa and a substantial 
decrease for the Middle East and North Africa.  
 I argued that the findings of Collier & Hoeffler might be influenced by the re-
search design they had chosen. I therefore developed an annualized version of the CH 
dataset, and applied it on a dataset including civil war and armed civil conflict. For 
civil war, the analysis of the annualized dataset produces rather different results than 
the findings in CH’s analysis. Most interestingly, social fractionalization and ethnic 
dominance ‘switched places’. While social fractionalization was significant in the 
five-year analysis, it was no longer so in the annualized version. Ethnic dominance 
was not significant in the five-year analysis, but strongly significant in the annual-
ized. This contrasts CH findings on mobilization (weakens their opportunity model) 
and political exclusion (strengthens the grievance perspective). Regime type dis-
played a curvilinear relationship with civil war, suggesting that opportunity as well as 
grievance is important. For civil war, primary commodity exports displayed an in-
verted U-relationship with conflict. Breaking down primary commodities to oil and 
mineral dependency also revealed a curvilinear pattern, but also here the coefficients 
were not statistically significant. 
 Some interesting changes also occurred when the threshold of conflict is low-
ered to include conflict with a minimum of 25 battle-related deaths per year. For 
armed civil conflict the social fractionalization continued to be insignificant while 
ethnic dominance was positively related to conflict. I draw the conclusion that the 
mobilization aspect is less important, and that grievance is more important than what 
CH argue. Quite surprisingly, primary commodity display a positively, linear rela-
tionship with armed civil conflict. Breaking down primary commodities into oil and 
mineral dependence led to a loss of around 1,300 observations and 35 conflicts. Oil 
and mineral dependency displayed only curvilinear relationships, although not at sta-
tistically significant levels. CH dropped regime type (as a linear term) from their 
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model because it was not significant. On the annualized dataset and using both the 
linear and squared term of regime type the hypothesized inverted U-relationship was 
recurrently present. .  
 In conclusion, applying the CH model to an annualized dataset was a useful 
experience. It shed some light on the fact that their very research design might have 
influenced their results. Using an annualized dataset design, both the opportunity 
(rather than the greed) and grievance aspects are strengthened. This study shows that 
regime type is relevant for an analysis of civil armed conflict. Regime type makes a 
difference. In some of the three-dimensional figures, the conflict curve is tilting to-
wards the authoritarian side, possibly hinting that also democracy makes a difference.   
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5. Conclusion 
The ‘greed and grievance’ approach to the study of civil war has received a lot of at-
tention. However, the catchy title does not accurately represent the results of the re-
search. While Collier’s earlier work emphasized greed,30 the most recent work by 
Collier & Hoeffler (2001, 2002) strengthen both the combined greed/opportunity and 
the grievance perspectives. Within the CH model, dependence on primary commodi-
ties can be interpreted as causing conflict through the mechanisms of both ‘greed’ 
and ‘opportunity.’ Natural resources exhibit a curvilinear relationship with conflict. 
This indicates that at low levels, rebels motivated by grievance are unable to finance 
a rebellion. High levels indicate that the price for controlling the resources is high, 
and the government is likely to be in control of the resource. For medium levels, 
when combined with either grievances or greed, rebels have the opportunity to fi-
nance their rebellion. The opportunity perspective, and its interrelatedness with 
grievance, is strengthened by the consistent, curvilinear relationship between regime 
type and conflict. Authoritarian and repressive regimes might host groups that hold 
objective grievances, but have less conflict because there is no opportunity to organ-
ize a rebellion. Dissenting and dissatisfied groups in democratic regimes have the 
opportunity to express opposition, but there should be less ground for grievance. 
Sources of both grievance and opportunity are found in semi democracies, and create 
a higher risk of conflict. This study has focused on the inter-linkages between re-
sources, regimes and rebellion. The results clearly strengthen the opportunity per-
spective and puts regime type back in the CH model. 
However, greed as the link between natural resources and conflict is highly 
relevant to conflict in several places. Renner31 classifies the conflicts in Afghanistan, 
Angola, Burma, Cambodia, Columbia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Indonesia, 
Liberia, Nigeria, Papua New Guinea and Sierra Leone as ‘resource-related conflicts.’  
Renner points to Western consumerism (the consumption of oil, natural gas, precious 
                                              
30 ‘The true cause of much civil war is not the loud discourse of grievance, but the silent force of greed’ (Collier, 1999: 8).  
31 Renner’s report The Anatomy of Resource War was described in a press release on 17 October 2002 at 
http://www.worldwatch.org  
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stones and minerals, timber, drugs) and new technology32 as important forces behind 
these conflicts. There is little doubt that greed is relevant in explaining conflict in 
several resource-rich countries. However, the link between natural resources and con-
flict requires a much more complex explanation than what the mechanism of pure 
greed provides. 
 
Resources, Regimes and Rebellion 
CH’s analysis show that primary commodities export to GDP displays a curvilinear 
with civil conflict. I find the same result, and also for it for oil and mineral exports. In 
his typology of types of natural resource, Le Billon’s (2001) places oil as a commod-
ity that is only likely to remain in government control or be useful to rebels seeking a 
coup d’état or launching a secessionist war. I believe it is crucial that future studies 
on natural resources and conflict pay attention to the fact natural resources are NOT 
the same. Oil is very different, for geographical, physical, economic and political rea-
sons.  
Natural resources are important in explaining the onset and continuation of 
civil war. However, they are also of paramount importance to other aspects that influ-
ence the likelihood of conflict. Having abundant natural resources in one’s territory 
does not predestine a country for specific patterns of economic and political devel-
opment. Governance is the most important factor in deciding how natural resources 
are managed. The difference between oil producing countries is a useful example. 
Norway’s stable democracy is different from the factionalized democracies in Latin 
America. These are again very different from the traditional-based autocracies in the 
Gulf, and the predatory and modernizing authoritarian states of Nigeria and Nigeria 
(Eifert, Tallroth & Gelb, 2002). In the Middle East and North Africa abundant access 
to oil has created a peculiar regional system, as well as ties to the international mar-
kets and political actors. The failure to modernize and democratize has so far not lead 
to major internal rebellions in the Middle East. So far, oil money has bought some of 
the countries enough carrots and sticks to keep their populations still. In non-oil 
countries, crude repression does the job. In the long-term perspective, one wonders 
                                              
32 Coltan is used in the production of cellular phones, and has only for the last decade or so been an lucrative commodity 
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what will happen when the oil wells run dry. There is reason to believe that deterio-
rating economic conditions and the lack of democracy in the Middle East (to a large 
extent caused by the region’s resource wealth) has created a fertile based for griev-
ance-based rebellions. 
The challenges that resource dependence presents to a country’s economic and 
political development, should serve as useful warnings for resource-rich states that 
are in the process of establishing institutions and markets. The ‘perils of the petro-
state’ and the curse of natural resource are not deterministic, but can be mitigated by 
good governance. This if of crucial importance to resource rich East Timor and the 
Central Asian republics, states who are all in the making. Signs of the direction of 
these states’ development both politically and economically are not promising. This 
should be a reminder for international as well as national policymakers. In resource 
abundance countries, control of the state, and its resources, offers a nice price. Cor-
rupt and poor governance creates a fertile ground for future rebellion. 
 
Natural Resources Research, Data and Methods 
A recurring problem in the quantitative field of social science is access to good data. 
This study has shown that the link between natural resources and conflict is complex 
and that the area needs better data. The World Bank has started a new research pro-
ject trying to map the existence and exploitation of natural resources. In addition to 
the lack of data, another problem complicating the quantitative approach is that natu-
ral resources that are of importance to conflicts might not be reported at all. This is in 
almost all cases true for drugs—an illegal substance that no government is able or 
willing to include in their reports to the IMF, World Bank and other financial institu-
tions. Also, diamonds and smuggled timber operate in gray zones where their value 
and contribution to the national economy is underreported, at best. Even many gov-
ernments’ trade with legal commodities in a highly regulated international market 
falls outside the realm of official statistics. This is especially true when the country is 
involved in a conflict. Angola is an example per se. The illegal trade of the country’s 
precious alluvial diamonds, used to buy weapons on an international illegal market, is 
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not estimated in international statistics.33 Even though the government of Angola 
deals with international oil companies (including two Norwegians), the figures mak-
ing it to the national budget are only fractions of what has been lost in the chain of 
corruption and lack of governance. International oil companies are not encouraging 
more transparency by signing so-called ‘confidentiality agreements,’ promising not to 




Based on my findings and remarks above, future research within the quantitative field 
should focus on providing better data. This goes for both data on natural resources 
and ethnic and religious groups. A joint project between PRIO and the World Bank34 
will addresses the first aspect. Other researchers should embark on improving the 
quality of data on ethnic and religious groups. Ellingsen (2002) has conducted com-
mendable work in that field. However, treating Islam as one, united religion over-
looks an important source of conflict. 
 All conflicts take place in a specific context. There is never one single cause of 
conflict, but the interrelatedness of the variables that explain the outcome. More case 
studies on the complex relationship between natural resources, regimes, economic 
development and inequality, ethnic domination and conflict should be conducted. The 
works of Hauge (2002) and Ross (2002) are praiseworthy in this regard. 
 
Future of the Middle East and other Developing Regions 
Replicating Collier & Hoeffler’s analysis of civil war in Africa and the Middle East 
revealed that there was no mysterious Africa or Middle East effect on conflict. Con-
flict in these regions is well explained by the CH model on civil war. The opportunity 
to rebel (measured by regime type) and the existence of grievances (measured by po-
litical exclusion) emerged as statistically significant variables. Collier & Hoeffler 
                                              
33 The 08.00 am news at the Norwegian Broadcasting Company on 18 October 2002, reported that a report from the Inter-
national Monetary Fund claim that NOK 8 billion had vanished from Angola’s budget in 2001. The amount is more than 
four times the size of  foreign aid given to Angola that year. 
34 http://www.prio.no/research/project.asp?ProsjektID=66  
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conclude that Africa would have seen less conflict if the region’s economic develop-
ment had equaled the world’s. This study clearly shows that economic development 
is of importance to all conflicts. How does the future of (conflict in) the Middle East 
fit into this picture? The first UNDP Arab Human Development Report (AHDR)35 
released this summer provides a sober assessment of the challenges the region is fac-
ing. The report concluded that the Middle East and North Africa region’s most seri-
ous challenges are the unequal distribution of wealth, the limitations on personal 
freedoms and the region’s archaic educational systems. The region is lagging severely 
behind in economic, social and political aspects. The AHDR was written by Arab 
researchers and enjoy legitimacy in the region. Although this is positive, there are 
few signs that the incumbent regimes will agree to drastic social and economic 
change.   
The interrelatedness of domestic conditions and external factors are crucial to 
the examination of the conflict. The geostrategic importance of the Middle East and 
the economic importance of its oil reserves, support for authoritarian regimes and 
Israel, are international aspects that have shaped and continue to shape the develop-
ment of Middle East societies, economies, conflicts—and future. The region’s au-
thoritarian regimes remain in power to a large extent due to external (read: Western 
and in particular US) support. These regimes enjoy low levels of legitimacy, and 
place the West in an awkward light in many Arab eyes.  
Ensuring economic development remains the key to prevent future conflicts. 
Improved management of resources, natural as well as human, development of more 
transparent and legitimate, if not democratic, regimes, is the most efficient means 
towards preventing new conflicts, in the Middle East as well as other developing re-
gions. The same recipe would also be effective in the ‘war on terror.’ Real and per-
ceived sense of grievance in a context of poor governance, lack of impartial informa-
tion and no channels of legal opposition fuels both fundamentalism and terror. 
 














Civil War Onsets 
in Dataset (69)
Civil War Onsets 
in Regression (52)
2 USA 1960-95  
20 Canada 1960-95  
40 Cuba 1960-95  
41 Haiti 1960-95 1965-95 
42 Dominican Republic 1960-95 1965-95 1965 1965
51 Jamaica 1960-95 1965-95 
52 Trinidad & Tobago 1960-95 1965-95 
70 Mexico 1960-95 1965-95 
90 Guatemala 1960-95 1965, 1975-95 1965, 1975 1965, 1975
91 Honduras 1960-95 1965-75, 1985-95
92 El Salvador 1960-95 1965-95 1975 1975
93 Nicaragua 1960-95 1965-80, 1995 1975, 1980 1975, 1980
94 Costa Rica 1960-95 1965-95 
95 Panama 1960-95 1965-95 
100 Columbia 1960-95 1965-80 1980 1980
101 Venezuela 1960-95 1965-95 
110 Guyana 1960-95 1970-95 
130 Ecuador 1960-95 1965-95 
135 Peru 1960-95 1965-80 1980 1980
140 Brazil 1960-95 1965-95 
145 Bolivia 1960-95 1965-95 
150 Paraguay 1960-95 1965-95 
155 Chile 1960-95 1965-95 
160 Argentina 1960-95 1965-95 
165 Uruguay 1960-95 1965-95 
200 United Kingdom 1960-95 1965-95 
205 Ireland 1960-95 1965-95 
210 Netherlands 1960-95 1965-95 
211 Belgium 1960-95 1965-95 
212 Luxemburg 1960-95 1965-95 
220 France 1960-95 1965-95 
225 Switzerland 1960-95 1965-95 
230 Spain 1960-95 1965-95 
235 Portugal 1960-95 1965-95 
260 German Federal Republic 1960-95 1965-95 
265 
German Democratic Repub-
lic 1960-1985  
290 Poland 1960-1990  
305 Austria 1960-95 1965-95 
310 Hungary 1960-95 1975-95 
315 Czechoslovakia 1960-1990  
316 Czech Republic 1990-95  
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317 Slovakia 1990-95  
325 Italy 1960-95 1965-95 
339 Albania 1960-95  
343 Macedonia 1990-95  
344 Croatia 1990-95  
345 Yugoslavia 1990-95  1990, 1995
346 Bosnia-Herzegovina 1990-95  
349 Slovenia 1990-95  
350 Greece 1960-95 1965-95 
352 Cyprus 1960-95 1965-90 1970 1970
355 Bulgaria 1960-95 1985-95 
359 Moldova 1990-95  
360 Romania 1960-95 1965-95 1985 1985
365 Russia 1960-95 1965-85 1990, 1995
366 Estonia 1960-95  
367 Latvia 1960-95  
368 Lithuania 1960-95  
369 Ukraine 1990-95  
370 Belarus 1990-95  
371 Armenia 1990-95  
372 Georgia 1990-95  
373 Azerbaijan 1990  
375 Finland 1960-95 1965-95 
380 Sweden 1960-95 1965-95 
385 Norway 1960-95 1965-95 
390 Denmark 1960-95 1965-95 
395 Iceland 1960-95 1965-95 
404 Guinea-Bissau 1970-95 1975-95 
411 Eq. Guinea 1965-95  
420 Gambia 1965-1990 1965-95 
432 Mali 1960-95 1965-95 
433 Senegal 1960-95 1965-95 
434 Benin 1960-95 1965-90 
435 Mauritania 1960-95 1965-95 
436 Niger 1960-95 1965-95 
437 Ivory Coast 1960-95 1965-95 
438 Guinea  1960-95 1965-95 
439 Burkina Faso 1960-95 1965-95 
450 Liberia 1960-95 1965-85 1985, 1990 1985
451 Sierra Leone 1960-95 1970-95 1990, 1995 1990, 1995
452 Ghana 1960-95 1965-95 
461 Togo 1960-95 1965-95 
471 Cameroun 1960-95 1965-95 
475 Nigeria 1960-95 1965-95 1965, 1980 1965, 1980
481 Gabon 1960-95 1965-95 
482 Central African Republic 1960-95 1965-95 
483 Chad 1960-95 1965-80, 1990-95 1980 1980
484 Congo 1960-95 1965-95 1995 1995
490 Zaire 1960-95 1970-95 1960, 1990, 1995 1990, 1995
500 Uganda 1960-95 1965-80, 1990-95 1965, 1980 1965, 1980
501 Kenya 1960-95 1965-95 
510 Tanzania 1960-95 1965-85 
516 Burundi 1960-95 1965-90 1970, 1985, 1990 1970, 1985, 1990
517 Rwanda 1960-95 1965-95 1990 1990
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520 Somalia 1960-95 1965-85 1980, 1985 1980, 1985
522 Djibouti 1975-95 1980-85 
530 Ethiopia 1960-95 1965-70, 1995 1970 1970
531 Eritrea 1990-95  
540 Angola 1975-95 1975, 1990 1975, 1990 1975, 1990
541 Mozambique 1975-95 1975, 1995 1975 1975
551 Zambia 1960-95 1965-95 
552 Zimbabwe 1960-95 1965-70, 1980-95 1970 1970
553 Malawi 1960-95 1965-95 
560 South Africa 1960-95 1965-95 
565 Namibia 1990-95 1990-95 
570 Lesotho 1965-95 1965-95 
571 Botswana 1965-95 1970-90 
572 Swaziland 1965-95 1970-95 
580 Madagascar 1965-95 1965-95 
581 Comoros 1975-95  
590 Mauritius 1965-95 1970-95 
600 Morocco 1960-95 1965-75, 1990-95 1975 1975
615 Algeria 1960-95 1965-90 1990 1990
616 Tunisia 1960-95 1965-95 
620 Libya 1960-95  
625 Sudan 1960-95 1975-80 1960, 1980 1980
630 Iran 1960-95 1965-95 1970, 1975, 1980 1970, 1975, 1980
640 Turkey 1960-95 1965-90 1990 1990
645 Iraq 1960-95 1965-70, 1980-85 1960, 1970, 1985 1970, 1985
651 Egypt 1960-95 1965-95 
652 Syria 1960-95 1965-95 
660 Lebanon 1960-95  1975
663 Jordan 1960-95 1965-95 1970 1970
666 Israel 1960-95 1965-95 
670 Saudi Arabia 1960-95 1965-95 
678 Yemen Arab Republic 1960-1985  1960
679 Yemen Arab Republic 1990-95  1990
680 Yemen People's Republic 1965-1985  1985
690 Kuwait 1960-95 1985-95 
692 Bahrain 1970-95  
694 Qatar 1970-95  
696 United Arab Emirates 1970-95  
698 Oman 1960-95 1975-95 
700 Afghanistan 1960-95  1975, 1990
701 Turkmenistan 1990-95  
702 Tajikistan 1990-95  
703 Kyrgyz Republic 1990-95  
704 Uzbekistan 1990-95  
705 Kazakstan 1990-95  
710 China 1960-95 1965-95 1965 1965
712 Mongolia 1960-95 1990-95 
713 Republic of China (Taiwan) 1960-95  
731 Korea, North 1960-95  
732 Korea, South 1960-95 1965-95 
740 Japan 1960-95 1965-95 
750 India 1960-95 1965-80, 1995 1965, 1980 1965, 1980
760 Bhutan 1960-95  
770 Pakistan 1960-95 1965-95 1970 1970
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771 Bangladesh 1970-95 1975-95 
775 Burma 1960-95 1965, 1980 1965, 1980 1965, 1980
780 Sri Lanka 1960-95 1965-80 1970, 1980 1970, 1980
790 Nepal 1960-95 1965-95 
800 Thailand 1960-95  
811 Cambodia 1960-95  1970
812 Laos 1960-95 1990 1960
816 Vietnam, Dem. Republic of 1960-95  1960
817 Vietnam, Republic of  1960-1970  
820 Malaysia 1960-95 1965-95 
830 Singapore 1960-95  
840 Philippines 1960-95 1965-70 1970 1970
850 Indonesia 1960-95 1965-75, 1985-95 1975 1975
900 Australia 1960-95 1965-95 
910 Papua New Guinea 1975-95 1975-95 
920 New Zealand 1960-95 1965-95 
950 Fiji 1960-95 1970-95 
* Countrycodes refer to Singer & Small (1994) numbers 
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2 USA  
20 Canada  
40 Cuba  
41 Haiti 1961-1996 
42 Dominican Republic 1960-1997 
51 Jamaica 1963-1997 
52 Trinidad & Tobago 1965-1977 
70 Mexico 1960-1997 
90 Guatemala 1960-1997 
91 Honduras 1960-1997 
92 El Salvador 1960-1992 
93 Nicaragua 1960-1997 
94 Costa Rica 1960-1997 
95 Panama 1960-1997 
100 Columbia 1960-1997 
101 Venezuela 1960-1997 
110 Guyana 1970-1997 
130 Ecuador 1960-1997 
135 Peru 1960-1997 
140 Brazil 1960-1997 
145 Bolivia 1960-1997 
150 Paraguay 1960-1997 
155 Chile 1960-1997 
160 Argentina 1960-1997 
165 Uruguay 1960-1997 
200 United Kingdom 1960-1997 
205 Ireland 1960-1997 
210 Netherlands 1960-1997 
211 Belgium 1960-1997 
212 Luxemburg 1960-1997 
220 France 1960-1997 
225 Switzerland 1960-1997 
230 Spain 1960-1997 
235 Portugal 1960-1997 




290 Poland  
305 Austria  
310 Hungary 1960-1997 
315 Czechoslovakia 1960-1992 
316 Czech Republic  
317 Slovakia  
325 Italy 1960-1997 
339 Albania  
343 Macedonia  
344 Croatia  
345 Yugoslavia  
346 Bosnia-Herzegovina  
   
   
   
349 Slovenia  
350 Greece 1960-1997 
352 Cyprus 1961-1997 
355 Bulgaria 1970-1996 
359 Moldova  
360 Romania 1961-1997 
365 Russia 1960-1997 
366 Estonia  
367 Latvia  
368 Lithuania  
369 Ukraine  
370 Belarus  
371 Armenia  
372 Georgia  
373 Azerbaijan  
375 Finland 1960-1997 
380 Sweden 1960-1997 
385 Norway 1960-1997 
390 Denmark 1960-1997 
395 Iceland 1960-1997 
404 Guinea-Bissau 1975-1997 
411 Eq. Guinea  
420 Gambia 1966-1997 
432 Mali 1965-1997 
433 Senegal 1961-1997 
434 Benin 1961-1994 
435 Mauritania 1961-1997 
436 Niger 1961-1997 
437 Ivory Coast 1961-1997 
438 Guinea  1960-1997 
439 Burkina Faso 1962-1997 
450 Liberia 1961-1986 
451 Sierra Leone 1965-1997 
452 Ghana 1960-1997 
461 Togo 1961-1997 
471 Cameroun 1961-1997 
475 Nigeria 1961-1997 
481 Gabon 1961-1997 
482 Central African Republic 1961-1997 
483 Chad 1961-1997 
484 Congo 1961-1997 
490 Zaire 1961-1997 
500 Uganda 1965-1997 
501 Kenya 1965-1997 
510 Tanzania 1966-1997 
516 Burundi 1965-1997 
517 Rwanda 1965-1997 
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520 Somalia 1965-1989 
522 Djibouti 1980-1997 
530 Ethiopia 1960-1997 
531 Eritrea  
540 Angola 1990 
541 Mozambique 1976-1997 
551 Zambia 1965-1997 
552 Zimbabwe 1966-1997 
553 Malawi 1965-1997 
560 South Africa 1960-1997 
565 Namibia 1991-1997 
570 Lesotho 1967-1997 
571 Botswana 1970-1994 
572 Swaziland 1970-1997 
580 Madagascar 1961-1997 
581 Comoros  
590 Mauritius 1970-1997 
600 Morocco 1961-1996 
615 Algeria 1965-1993 
616 Tunisia 1961-1997 
620 Libya  
625 Sudan 1962-1994 
630 Iran 1960-1997 
640 Turkey 1960-1991 
645 Iraq 1960-1987 
651 Egypt 1960-1997 
652 Syria 1962-1997 
660 Lebanon 1991-1997 
663 Jordan 1960-1997 
666 Israel 1962-1996 
670 Saudi Arabia 1961-1997 
678 Yemen Arab Republic  
679 Yemen Arab Republic  
680 Yemen People's Republic  
690 Kuwait 1965-1997 
692 Bahrain  
694 Qatar  
696 United Arab Emirates  
698 Oman 1972-1995 
700 Afghanistan  
701 Turkmenistan  
702 Tajikistan  
703 Kyrgyz Republic  
704 Uzbekistan  
705 Kazakstan  
710 China 1960-1997 
712 Mongolia 1985-1997 
713 Republic of China, Taiwan  
731 Korea, North  
732 Korea, South 1991-1961 
740 Japan 1960-1997 
750 India 1960-1997 
760 Bhutan 1990-1997 
770 Pakistan 1960-1997 
771 Bangladesh 1975-1997 
775 Burma 1961-1992 
780 Sri Lanka 1960-1994 
790 Nepal 1961-1997 
800 Thailand  
811 Cambodia  
812 Laos 1985-1994 
816 
Vietnam, Dem. Republic 
of 1987-1997 
817 Vietnam, Republic of   
820 Malaysia 1961-1997 
830 Singapore  
840 Philippines 1960-1997 
850 Indonesia 1961-1997 
900 Australia 1960-1997 
910 Papua New Guinea 1977-1997 
920 New Zealand 1960-1996 
950 Fiji 1972-1997 
 
* Countrycodes refer to Singer & Small (1994) 
numbers. 
 
** The list of countries are period is based on the 
observations included in the regression including 
the largest number of observations. Although 
countries might drop out in some year, the period 
listed is the first and last year the country was 








2 USA  
20 Canada  
40 Cuba  
41 Haiti  
42 Dominican Republic  
51 Jamaica  
52 Trinidad & Tobago  
70 Mexico  
90 Guatemala  
   
   
   
91 Honduras  
92 El Salvador  
93 Nicaragua  
94 Costa Rica  
95 Panama  
 117
100 Columbia  
101 Venezuela  
110 Guyana  
130 Ecuador  
135 Peru  
140 Brazil  
145 Bolivia  
150 Paraguay  
155 Chile  
160 Argentina  
165 Uruguay  
200 United Kingdom  
205 Ireland  
210 Netherlands  
211 Belgium  
212 Luxemburg  
220 France  
225 Switzerland  
230 Spain  
235 Portugal  




290 Poland  
305 Austria  
310 Hungary  
315 Czechoslovakia  
316 Czech Republic  
317 Slovakia  
325 Italy  
339 Albania  
343 Macedonia  
344 Croatia  
345 Yugoslavia  
346 Bosnia-Herzegovina  
349 Slovenia  
350 Greece  
352 Cyprus  
355 Bulgaria  
359 Moldova  
360 Romania  
365 Russia  
366 Estonia  
367 Latvia  
368 Lithuania  
369 Ukraine  
370 Belarus  
371 Armenia  
372 Georgia  
373 Azerbaijan  
375 Finland  
380 Sweden  
385 Norway  
390 Denmark  
395 Iceland  
404 Guinea-Bissau  
411 Eq. Guinea  
420 Gambia  
432 Mali  
433 Senegal  
434 Benin  
435 Mauritania  
436 Niger  
437 Ivory Coast  
438 Guinea   
439 Burkina Faso  
450 Liberia  
451 Sierra Leone  
452 Ghana  
461 Togo  
471 Cameroun  
475 Nigeria  
481 Gabon  
482 Central African Republic  
483 Chad  
484 Congo  
490 Zaire  
500 Uganda  
501 Kenya  
510 Tanzania  
516 Burundi  
517 Rwanda  
520 Somalia  
522 Djibouti  
530 Ethiopia  
531 Eritrea  












553 Malawi  




572 Swaziland  
580 Madagascar  
581 Comoros  
590 
600  
615 Algeria  
616 Tunisia  
620 Libya  
625 Sudan  
630 Iran  
640 Turkey  
645 Iraq  
651 Egypt  
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652 Syria  
660 Lebanon  
663 Jordan  
666 Israel  
670 Saudi Arabia  
678 Yemen Arab Republic  
679 Yemen Arab Republic  
680 Yemen People's Republic  
690 Kuwait  
692 Bahrain  
694 Qatar  
696 United Arab Emirates  
698 Oman  
700 Afghanistan  
701 Turkmenistan  
702 Tajikistan  
703 Kyrgyz Republic  
704 
Mongolia  








705 Kazakstan  
710 China  
712 
713 
Republic of China (Tai-
wan)  
 
732 Korea, South 
 
750 India  
760 Bhutan  
770  
771 Bangladesh  
775  
780 Sri Lanka  
790 Nepal  
800 Thailand  
811 Cambodia  
812 Laos  
816 
Vietnam, Dem. Republic 
of  
817 Vietnam, Republic of   
820 Malaysia 
830 Singapore  
840 Philippines 
850 Indonesia  
900 Australia  
910 Papua New Guinea  
920 New Zealand  
950 Fiji  
* Countrycodes refer to Singer & Small (1994) 
 Appendix 3: Descriptive Statistics, Five-year Dataset (1960-99) 
Entire Dataset 
 Sample Africa* Other Developing Countries** 
  SD       N   M  Min Max N M SD Min Max M   SD Min Max N
War starts 0.0       0.292    0.085   72 0.259 0 1 959 0.094 0 1 276 0.280 0 1 492
GDP per capita 4045.8 4398.9 222.0 33946.1          930 1035.3 894.0 222 6833 287 3517.5 3578.7 316.0 33946.1 451
Logged GDP/cap 7.76             451 1.07 5.40 10.43 930 6.73 0.59 5.40 8.83 287 7.84 0.78 5.76 10.43
GDP cap growth 1.41              3.76 -22.08 14.41 822 0.17 3.69 -10.49 12.29 263 1.70 4.18 -22.08 14.41 391
Primary commod. 
exports/GDP 
0.15               0.15 0.002 1.198 997 0.18 0.14 0.009 0.568 290 0.16 0.17 0.003 1.198 515
Oil dependence 0.04               0.11 0 0.96 763 0.04 0.12 0 0.798 198 0.054 0.127 0 0.960 394
Mineral depend. 0.014   0.31 790       0.03    0.037 0 0.03 0.06 <0.00 0.31 206 0.012 0 0.278 408
Social fractionaliz.  1811            4   1935 4 6975 995 3630 1936 20 6975 298 1141 1383 5168 505
Ethnic dominance 0.46           0.50 0   0.50 0 1 1016 0.37 0.48 0 1 298 0.54 1 526
Peace duration 324             167 1 592 959 320 171 1 592 276 304 169 1 592 492
Population (mill.) 31.5             105.6 0.17 1203.32 1030 9.0 13.8 0.28 111.27 297 43.6 141.0 0.171 1203.3 541
Logged population 15.87        1     541 1.56 12.05 20.91 1030 15.31 1.20 12.55 18.53 297 6.03 1.63 12.05 20.91
Geogr. Dispersion 0.60      0.18 0       490 0.20 0 0.97 964 0.57 0.86 298 0.60 0.21 0.003 0.92
Polyarchy 8.93               12.22 0 43.75 1028 2.02 4.27 0 21.66 294 6.03 8.97 0 42.52 542
Observations Included in the Analyses  
Sample  Africa* Other Developing Countries** 
        Max    M SD Min Max N M SD Min N M   SD Min Max N
War starts 0.073     0.0           0.261 0 1 709 96 0.296 0 1 239 0.088 0.284 0 1 317
GDP per capita 40       683  239 33      22.15 4075.13 222 18993 709 1089.08 955.28 222 3 26.92 2422.50 415.00 14009 317
Logged GDP/cap 7.77 1.06       317 5.40 9.85 709 6.77 0.60 5.40 8.83 239 7.87 0.70 6.03 9.55
GDP cap growth 1.52               3.50 -13.09 14.41 709 0.23 3.77 -10.49 12.29 239 1.92 3.61 -13.09 14.41 317
Primary commod. 
exports/GDP 
0.153              0.139 0.002 0.935 709 0.187 0.139 0.022 0.568 239 0.16 0.15 0.003 0.94 317
Oil dependence 0.04               0.11 0 0.96 578 0.05 0.13 <0.00 0.80 163 0.510 0.12 0 0.96 280
Mineral depend. 0.016               0.042 0 0.31 596 0.03 0.06 <0.00 0.31 167 0.01 0.03 0 0.28 290
Social fractionaliz.  1797.78     366        2001.29 12 6975 709 6.58 1924.55 68 6975 239 1006.57 1374.40 12 5168 317
Ethnic dominance 0.42 0.49       239      0 1 709 0.36 0.48 0 1 0.48 0.50 0 1 317
Peace duration 344.86             162.22 1 592 709 328.05 168.24 1 592 239 325.69 167.44 1 592 317
Population (mill.) 32.26               113.84 0.19 1203.32 709 8.62 14.12 0.28 111.27 239 53.88 165.94 0.52 1203.32 317
Logged population 15.86              1.53 12.18 20.91 709 15.28 1.17 12.55 18.53 239 16.17 1.64 13.16 20.91 317
Geogr. dispersion 0.61               0.20 0 0.97 709 0.57 0.19 0 0.85 239 0.63 0.21 0.005 0.92 317
Polyarchy 10.32        2        13.12 0 43.75 707 2.00 4.26 0 1.66 237 7.50 9.80 0 42.52 317
*: See research design for definition. **: non-OECE. non-African countries
 Entire Dataset 
 Sample Middle East* Other Developing Countries** 
 M          SD Min Max N M SD Min Max N M   SD Min Max N
War starts 0.072   1            0.259 0 959 0.110 0.314 0 1 127 0.085 0.279 0 1 648
GDP per capita 4045.8 4398.9 222.0     809.      633 33946.1 930 5587.5 5690.3 0 33946.1 113 2013.0 1876.9 222.0 15906.0
Logged GDP/cap 7.76  5.40 10.43            1.07 930 8.26 0.84 6.70 10.43 113 7.27 0.81 5.40 9.67 633
GDP cap growth 1.41               3.76 -22.08 14.41 822 1.44 4.97 -13.85 14.41 96 1.04 3.87 -22.08 12.29 565
Primary commodity 
exports /GDP 
0.15               0.15 0.002 1.198 997 0.25 0.25 0.006 1.198 131 0.15 0.14 0.003 0.761 682
Oil dependence 0.04 0.11 0     <0 104      0.96 763 0.14 0.20 .00 0.96 0.03 0.09 0 0.80 496
Mineral depend. 0.014    790 0.01 0.02     0.04 0   0.037 0 0.31 0 0.15 104 0.02 0.31 518
Social fractional. 1811               1935 4 6975 995 251 237 4 938 125 2376 2013 20 6975 686
Ethnic dominance 0.46               0.50 0 1 1016 0.55 0.50 0 1 130 0.47 0.50 0 1 702
Peace duration 324               167 1 592 959 295 177 1 592 127 313 168 1 592 648
Population (mill.) 31.5 1               05.6 0.17 1203.32 1030 13.02 15.31 0.171 61.64 133 34.89 123.9 0.28 1203.3 713
Logged population  15.87               1.56 12.05 20.91 1030 15.57 1.45 12.05 17.94 133 15.84 1.55 12.55 20.91 713
Geogr. dispersion 0.60 0.20 0             0.97 964 0.61 0.26 0.003 0.923 122 0.59 0.19 0 0.905 674
Polyarchy 8.93           7.88 0   12.22 0 43.75 1028 3.78 8.66 0 33.42 134 4.94 42.52 710
Observations Included in the Analyses  
Sample  Middle East* Other Developing Countries** 
 M            SD Min Max N M SD Min Max N M   SD Min Max N
War starts 0.073 0.261              0 1 709 0.115 0.322 0 1 78 0.089 0.284 0 1 484
GDP per capita 4022.15               4075.13 222 18993 709 4449.44 3116.61 1024 14009 78 2033.91 1829.92 222 11262 484
Logged GDP/cap 7.77 1.06 5.40          9.85 709 8.18 0.67 6.93 9.55 78 7.28 0.81 5.40 9.33 484
GDP cap growth 1.52          1.08     3.50 -13.09 14.41 709 2.02 4.71 -13.09 14.41 78 3.57 -10.49 12.29 484
Primary commod. 
exports /GDP 
0.153               0.137 0.002 0.935 709 0.21 0.20 0.018 0.94 78 0.165 0.136 0.003 0.71 484
Oil dependence 0.04               0.11 0 0.96 578 0.12 0.18 <0.00 0.96 74 0.04 0.10 0 0.80 375
Mineral depend. 0.016               0.042 0 0.31 596 0.007 0.012 <0.00 0.06 74 0.02 0.05 0 0.31 389
Social fractional. 1797.78 2001.29            12 6975 709 219.55 163.79 12 462 78 2439.40 2098.85 42 6975 484
Ethnic dominance 0.42 0.49          0 1 709 0.55 0.501 0 1 78 0.42 0.49 0 1 484
Peace duration 344.86  1            162.21 592 709 307.64 173.90 1 592 78 330.47 166.03 1 592 484 
Population (mill.) 32.26           0.2    113.84 0.19 1203.32 709 17.07 16.72 0.85 61.18 78 37.33 136.35 8 1203.32 484
Logged population  15.86  1            1.53 2.18 20.91 709 16.09 1.16 13.65 17.93 78 15.76 1.57 12.55 20.91 484
Geogr. dispersion 0.61             0.90  0.20 0 0.97 709 0.66 0.22 0.005 0.92 78 0.59 0.20 0 484
Polyarchy 10.32               13.12 0 43.75 707 4.47 9.56 0 33.42 78 5.39 8.25 0 42.52 482
*: See research design for definition. **: non-OECE. non-Middle Eastern countries.  
 Appendix 4: Descriptive Statistics, One-year Dataset (1960-97) 
 Entire Dataset Sub-Saharan Africa Middle East and North Africa 
          M SD Min Max N M SD  Min Max N M   SD Min Max N
Civil war onsets 0.016           0.     0.124 0 1 5131 0.015 0.123 0 1 1367 0.018 133 0 1 666
Peace years (CW) 23.941       0        13.816 0 52 5131 17.211 10.738 45 1367 21.829 13.857 0 52 666
Armed civil conflict 
onsets 
0.034 0.180         557 0 1 4670 0.043 0.203 0 1 1277 0.036 0.186 0 1
Peace years (ACC) 20.822    13.662    1277      13.895 0 52 4670 9.787 0 43 16.989 12.185 0 52 557
GDP per capita 5231           245.    8248 76.63 47821 4820 607 816 84.7 8502 1432 5812 8340 3 47502 561
GDP per capita 
(logged) 
7.409  4820   4 7.888 1.223    1.571 4.339 10.775 6.000 0.803 .440 9.048 1432 5.502 10.769 561
Economic growth  0.019   1.546      1391      0.072 -0.722 4728 0.009 0.070 -0.397 0.670 0.018 0.082 -0.437 0.418 548
Primary commodity 
dependence 
0.153               0.153 0.002 1.198 4724 0.180 0.136 0.009 0.568 1372 0.250 0.247 0.006 1.198 621
Oil dependence 0.035 0.109 0          0   1.138 3079 0.037 0.120 0 1.086 680 0.135 0.212 1.138 435
Mineral dependence 0.014             0.038 0 0.412 3274 0.028 0.062 0 0.412 769 0.010 0.021 0 0.154 433
Social fractionaliza-
tion 
1806.99       1      595 1933.88 4 6975 4714 3632.40 1933.77 20 6975 406 251.119 236.690 4 938
Ethnic dominance 0.461 0.499           0 1  0 1 4813 0.372 0.484 0 1 1406 0.550 0.498 618
Population (million) 30.5   12  5198   0.206 11        104 0.122 3 8.9 13.8 8 1467 12.8 15.3 0.122 63.7 665
Population (logged) 15.851   20.928     18.585      1.554 11.712 5198 15.257 1.261 12.235 1467 15.527 1.460 11.712 17.970 665 
Geographical disper-
sion 
0.598               0.198 0 0.971 4555 0.572 0.182 0 0.858 1406 0.607 0.255 0.003 0.923 576
Polyarchy 9.755          0   12.570 0 47.11 5266 2.849 5.260 0 27.66 1454 3.892 8.898 37.52 689
*: See research design for definition. 
 122
Appendix 5: Correlation Matrix, Five-year Dataset (1960-99) 
 Variables, labels as in dataset:             
Variables, full name:   gy1      frac       francz  
Civil war starts   












1   
GDP per capita -0.183  
  
  
  1  
   
  1  
   
  1  
   
  
   
    
    
 
   1  
    
    
    
1   
Economic growth -0.087 0.216 1   
Primary comm. dep. 0.041 -0.007 -0.051 1   
Primary comm.  
dependence sq. 0.011 0.069 0.005 0.928  
Oil dependence 0.094 0.145 -0.041 0.616 0.660 1  
Oil dependence sq. 0.092 0.100 -0.011 0.523 0.641 0.903  
Mineral depend. -0.075 -0.193 -0.131 0.387 0.320 -0.076 -0.055 1  
Mineral depen. sq.  -0.056 -0.163 -0.122 0.349 0.311 -0.065 -0.042 0.934  
Social fractionaliz. 0.058 -0.508 -0.147 0.244 0.165 0.094 0.080 0.206 0.184 1  
Ethnic dominance 0.050 0.103 -0.036 -0.011 0.015 0.028 0.000 -0.056 -0.006 0.002 1  
Peace months -0.209 0.416 -0.109 0.026 0.047 0.052 0.017 0.066 0.055 -0.169 0.012 1  
Population 0.109 0.017 0.094 -0.396 -0.290 -0.055 -0.043 -0.200 -0.153 -0.110 -0.047 -0.098 1
Geographic disper. -0.043 0.104 0.021 -0.017 0.005 0.031 -0.010 0.061 0.015 -0.188 0.039 0.001 0.122 1
Polyarchy -0.150 0.702 0.074 -0.229 -0.182 -0.166 -0.133 -0.106 -0.085 -0.322 0.033 0.392 0.054 -0.022 1  
Polyarchy sq. -0.140 0.681 0.073 -0.229 -0.181 -0.150 -0.117 -0.105 -0.088 -0.312 0.014 0.384 0.052 -0.015 0.960
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.027 -0.664 -0.245 0.160 0.086 0.038 0.057 0.210 0.181 0.697 -0.091 -0.131 -0.242 -0.145 -0.425 -0.371 1
French Col. Africa -0.054 -0.340 -0.106 0.082 0.056 0.071 0.044 0.004 -0.035 0.416 -0.052 0.044 -0.229 0.026 -0.268 -0.223 0.570 1
Middle East and 
North Africa 






Appendix 6: Correlation Matrix, One-year Dataset (1960-97) 
 
                Variables, labels as in dataset:










s1sxp      
1                  













Civil war onset   
Peace years (CW) -0.066                  
              
.068 1             
             
            
            
  1           
          
           
        
         
        
       
      
Geographic dispersion      
    
   
 -0.009 0.045 0.058 -0.028 0.067 0.056   
  -0.356 -0.119 0.043  0.233   
1   
Armed civil conflict onset 0.454 -0.051 1     
Peace years (ACC) -0.070 0.711 -0     
GDP per capita -0.085 0.502 -0.115 0.520 1   
GDP growth -0.013 -0.013 -0.060 0.018 0.088 1   
Primary comm. dep 0.004 -0.121 0.011 -0.186 -0.066 -0.073 1   
Primary comm. dep sq. -0.008 -0.092 0.012 -0.141 0.028 -0.060 0.936   
Oil dependence 0.005 0.041 0.006 -0.064 0.035 -0.107 0.498 0.524 1   
Oil dependence sq. -0.006 0.002 -0.005 -0.069 0.022 -0.100 0.397 0.470 0.901 1   
Mineral dependence -0.021 -0.085 -0.003 -0.092 -0.189 -0.101 0.361 0.298 -0.063 -0.046 1   
Mineral dependence sq. -0.015 -0.106 -0.003 -0.075 -0.146 -0.089 0.309 0.275 -0.050 -0.030 0.914 1   
Social fractionalization 0.059 -0.421 0.049 -0.366 -0.501 -0.070 0.219 0.138 0.021 0.033 0.239 0.206 1   
Ethnic dominance 0.034 -0.155 0.024 -0.145 0.013 -0.038 0.021 0.053 0.024 0.015 -0.074 -0.030 0.029 1   
Population 0.046 0.159 0.095 0.061 0.000 0.075 -0.412 -0.315 -0.012 -0.017 -0.188 -0.130 -0.122 -0.067 1   
0.010 0.110 0.009 0.002 0.004 0.026 -0.092 -0.101 -0.025 -0.055 0.083 0.028 -0.134 0.060 0.157 1   
Polyarchy -0.043 0.442 -0.068 0.466 0.714 0.040 -0.253 -0.213 -0.155 -0.112 -0.130 -0.098 -0.310 -0.009 0.072 -0.040 1   
Polyarchy sq. -0.045 0.445 -0.078 0.487 0.712 0.041 -0.246 -0.204 -0.134 -0.100 -0.127 -0.099 -0.305 -0.034 0.071 -0.043 0.957 1   
Middle East/North Africa -0.015 -0.015 0.079 -0.029 0.007 -0.052 0.090 0.106 -0.168 -0.076 0.126 0.088 1
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.020 -0.474 0.006 -0.617 0.114 0.024 0.039 0.196 0.703 -0.085 -0.195 -0.084 -0.433 -0.377 -0.098 1
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Appendix 7: The PRIO/Uppsala Conflict Database, 1946-2001 
ID SubID Location Side_A Side_B Begin Intensity*1  End Type*2
2370 1 Afghanistan Afghanistan, Soviet Union   Various organizations 1979 1988 3 4
2370     
      
    
      
    3  
    
    1 3 
      
      
  
   
   
     
 0   1  
2260 0 Bangladesh   1987 1992 2 3 
1010 0 
     




0 Afghanistan Afghanistan Various organizations 1978 1978 3 3
2370 2 Afghanistan Afghanistan Various organizations 1989 2001 3 3
2930 0 Algeria Algeria FIS, Expiation and Sin, Exile and Redemption, The Faithful 1992 1992 1 3 
    of the Sermon, The Brigades of God, GIA, Dawa wal Jihad     
2930 0 Algeria Algeria FIS, Expiation and Sin, Exile and Redemption, The Faithful 1993 2001 3 3 
    of the Sermon, The Brigades of God, GIA, Dawa wal Jihad     
2310 0 Angola Angola, Cuba 
 
UNITA , South Africa, FNLA , Zaire 
 
1975 1989 3 4 
2310 1 Angola Angola UNITA 1990 1994 3 3
2310
2310










 Angola 1992 1992
1994
1 3
 Angola Angola FLEC 1994
2940 0
2
 Angola Angola FLEC 1996 1997 1 3
2310  Angola Angola, Namibia
 
UNITA 2000 2001 3 4
1500 0 Argentina Argentina Military faction 1955 1955 1 3 
1500 0 Argentina Argentina Military faction 1963 1963 1 3 
1500 0 Argentina 
Argentina 
Argentina ERP , Montoneros 1973 1974 1 3 
1500 
1500 
0 Argentina ERP , Montoneros 1975 1975 3 3 
0 Argentina Argentina ERP , Montoneros 1976 1977 2 3 
2950 0 Azerbaijan Azerbaijan Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh, Armenia 1992 1993 3 4 
2950 1 Azerbaijan Azerbaijan 
Azerbaijan 
Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh 1994 1994 3 3 
3030 0 
0
Azerbaijan Husseinov military faction 
 
1993 1993 1 3 
3030  Azerbaijan
 Bangladesh 





2260 Bangladesh JSS/SB/Shanti Bahini 3
Bangladesh JSS/SB/Shanti Bahini
Bolivia Bolivia Popular Revolutionary Movement 
 
1946 1946 3 3 
1010 1 Bolivia Bolivia MNR 1951 1951 1 3
1 3 1010 1 Bolivia Bolivia ELN 1967 1967
2960 0 
Bosnia and Herzeg
vina Bosnia and Herzegovina 
 
Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina 3 
 
4 















Croatian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatian irregulars 
     
      
      
1240 
    3 
      
      
      
   1  
   1  
     
     
      
      
     
      
     
1670 0     
3050 0 
Bosnia and Herzeg
vina Bosnia and Herzegovina Croatian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina 1993 1993 3 4 
    Croatia, Croatian irregular     
2960 0 
Bosnia and Herzeg
vina Bosnia and Herzegovina 1995 2 3 





vina Bosnia and Herzegovina 1994 1994 2 3 
3 0 Burkina Faso Burkina Faso Popular Front 1987 1987
1949
1 
1230 0 Burma Burma KNU and KNDO 1948 3 3 










0 Burma Burma KNU 1995 2 3





0 Burma Burma BCP, leftist organisations 1948 3 3 
0 Burma Burma BCP, leftist organisations 1954 1967 2 
3 
3 
0 Burma Burma BCP, leftist organisations 1968 1978 3 
1240 0 Burma Burma BCP, leftist organisations 
 
1979 1988 2 3 
1240 0 Burma Burma ABSDF 1991 1992 1
1250 0
0
 Burma Burma Arakan Insurgents 1948 1988 1 3
1250  Burma Burma Arakan Insurgents 1991
1994
1992 1 3
1250 0 Burma Burma
Burma 
Arakan Insurgents 1994 1 3



















31340  Burma Burma KIO 3
1340 1 Burma Burma KIO 1976 1992 2 3
1560 0 Burma Burma KNPP
KNPP 
1957 1957 1 3
1560 1 Burma Burma 1992 1992 1 3
1560 1 Burma Burma KNPP 1996 1996 1 3
1670 0 Burma Burma SSA and SSIA 1960 1963 1 3 
1670 0 Burma Burma SSA and SSIA 1964 1970 3 3 
3 1670 0 Burma Burma SSNPLO, SSRA, MTA, and PSLO 
MTA 
1976 1988 2 
1670 0 Burma
Burma 
Burma 1994 1994 3 3
Burma MTA 1995 1995 2 3
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1670 0 Burma Burma SSA, SURA, SSNA 1997 1999
     
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
    
      
     
  Vietnam 
   
   
   
3 4 
CNR, FNT, FARF, MDJT 
   1  
 
      
     
     






0 Burma Burma SSA, SURA, SSNA 
 
2001 2001 2 3 
0 Burundi Burundi Military faction 1965 1965 1 3
1900 1 Burundi Burundi Ubumwé, Palipehutu, CNDD, Frolina, CNDD-FDD 1990 1992 1 3 
1900 1 Burundi Burundi Ubumwé, Palipehutu, CNDD, Frolina, CNDD-FDD 1995 1996 1 3 
1900
1900
1 Burundi Burundi Ubumwé, Palipehutu, CNDD, Frolina, CNDD-FDD 1997 1997 2 3 
1 Burundi Burundi Ubumwé, Palipehutu, CNDD, Frolina, CNDD-FDD 1998 1998 3 3 
1900 1 Burundi Burundi Ubumwé, Palipehutu, CNDD, Frolina, CNDD-FDD 1999 1999 2 3 
1900 1 Burundi Burundi Ubumwé, Palipehutu, CNDD, Frolina, CNDD-FDD 2000 2001 3 3 
2030 1 Cambodia Cambodia, USA, South Vietnam FUNK, North Vietnam 1970 1973 3 4 
2030 1 Cambodia Cambodia FUNK, North Vietnam 1974 1975 3 4 
2030 3 Cambodia Cambodia, Vietnam
 




1988 2 4 
2030 0 Cambodia Cambodia Khmer Rouge 1967 3 3





2030 2 Cambodia Cambodia
Cambodia, 
KNUFNS 1978 3 3
4 2030
2030





KR/PDK, KPNLF, FUNCINPEC/ANS 
 
1990 1998 2 4 
2590 0 Cameroon Military faction 1984 1984 1 3
4 3250 
 
0 Central African Republic 
 









1910 0 Chad Chad Various groups, Libya 
MDD (-FANT), CSNPD, 
1965 1988
19941910 1 Chad 
Chad 
Chad 1991 1 3 
3 1910 
1910 





2 0 Chad Chad Military faction , MOSANAT, Islamic Legion, Libya 4 





2250 0 Chile Chile Military faction
Peoples Liberation Army
1973 3
1030 0 China China 1946 1949 3 3 





1390 0 China China
China 
Tibet 1950 1 3
1390 0 China Tibet 1956 1956 3 3
1390 0 China China Tibet 1959 1959 3 3
1920 0 Colombia Colombia FARC , ELN , EPL , M-19 1965 1979
1988
1 3 
1920 0 Colombia Colombia FARC , ELN , EPL , M-19 1980 2 3 
1920 0 Colombia Colombia FARC , ELN, EPL, Faction of FARC 1989 1990 3 3 
   Faction of ELN, MAO, Quintin Lame 
same groups as above 
    




1920 0 Colombia 
      
     
    1  
   
     
   pposition militias 
      
      
  
  
1860 2  4 
3170     
  
 
   
    3 
     
Colombia same groups as above 1992 1993 3 3 
1920 0 Colombia Colombia same groups as above 
same groups as above 
1994 1997 2 3 
1920 0 Colombia Colombia 1998
1989
2001 3 3 
2680 0 Comoros Comoros Presidential guard
 
1989 1 3
3160 0 Comoros Comoros MPA 1997 1997 1 3
1680 0 Congo/Zaire Congo/Zaire Katanga 1960 1962 3
1690 0 Congo/Zaire Congo/Zaire Independent Mining State of South Kasai 
 
1960 1962 1 3 
1860
1860
0 Congo/Zaire Congo/Zaire CNL
O
1964 1965 3 3
1 Congo/Zaire Congo/Zaire 1967 1967 1 3 
1860 1 Congo/Zaire Congo/Zaire FLNC 1977 1977 1 3
1860 1 Congo/Zaire Congo/Zaire FLNC 1978 1978 2 3
1860 2 Congo/Zaire Congo/Zaire AFDL, Rwanda, Angola 1996 1996 1 4 
1860 2 Congo/Zaire Congo/Zaire AFDL, Rwanda, Angola 1997 1997 3 4 
1860 2 Congo/Zaire Congo/Zaire, Zimbabwe RCD, RCD faction, MLC 1998 1999 3 4 
   Angola, Namibia, Chad Rwanda, Uganda     
1860 2 Congo/Zaire Congo/Zaire, Zimbabwe RCD, RCD faction, MLC 
Rwanda, Uganda 
2000 2000 3 4 
   Angola, Namibia     
 Congo/Zaire Congo/Zaire, Zimbabwe RCD, RCD faction, MLC 2001 2001 2 
   Angola, Namibia Rwanda, Uganda 
 
    





Congo-Brazzaville, Angola Opposition militias 1999 3 4 
1270 0 Costa Rica National Liberation Army 1948 1948
1993
3 3 




Serbian irregulars, Serbian Republic of Krajina, Yugoslavia 1993 1 4 
2970
2970
0 Serbian irregulars, Serbian Republic of Krajina 1992 1992 1 3 
2 Croatia Croatia Serbian irregulars, Serbian Republic of Krajina 1995 1995 1 3 
1450 1 
0
Cuba Cuba National Revolutionary Council, USA 
 
1961 1961 1 4 
1450  Cuba Cuba Military faction 1953 1953 1
1450 0 Cuba Cuba Movimiento 26 De Julio: 26th of July Movement 1957 1957 1 3 
1450 0 Cuba Cuba Movimiento 26 De Julio: 26th of July Movement 1958 1958 3 
3 
3 
2270 0 Cyprus Cyprus Turkish Cypriots, Turkey 
 
1974 1974 4 
2860
1930 
0 Djibouti Djibouti FRUD 1991 1994 1 3
0 Dominican Republic 
Egypt 
Dominican Republic Military faction 1965 1965 1 3 
2980 0 Egypt al-Gamaa al-Islamiyya , al-Jihad  al-Islamiy, Tala i al-Fath 
Military faction 
1992 1998 1 3 
2200 0 El Salvador 
El Salvador 
El Salvador 1972 1972
1980
1 3 
2200 0 El Salvador ERP , FAL, FARN, FPL, PRTC 
ERP , FAL, FARN, FPL, PRTC 
1979 1 3 
3 2200 0 El Salvador El Salvador 1981 1990 3 
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2200 0 El Salvador El Salvador 
Equatorial 





  Guinea Military  3 
1700 0     
 1   
     
      
     
    
     
      
  ARDUF 1 3 
   
   
     
      
   
    
   
   1  
    3 
     
      
     
   
   
   
   
   
     
      
2 3 





Ethiopia Military faction 1960 1
3 
3
1700  Ethiopia Ethiopia EPRP, TPLF , EPDM,  OLF 
 
1976 1991 3 
2330 0 Ethiopia Ethiopia, Cuba WSLF 1975 1976 1 4
2330 0 Ethiopia
Ethiopia 
Ethiopia, Cuba WSLF 1977 1978 3 4
1780 0 Ethiopia ELF , ELF factions, EPLF 
ELF , ELF factions, EPLF 
1962 1967 1 3 
1780 0 Ethiopia Ethiopia 1968 1973
1991
2 3 
1780 0 Ethiopia Ethiopia ELF , ELF factions, EPLF 
 

























 Ethiopia 1996 1996
19973140
3140





 Ethiopia Ethiopia al-Itahad al-Islami 
 
1999 1 3 
3220  Ethiopia Ethiopia OLF 1999 2001 1 3
1730 0 France France OAS 1961 1962
1964
3 3




1964 1 4 
2500 0 Gambia SRLP 1981
1991
1981 1 3
2870 0 Georgia Georgia Anti-government alliance 
 
1992 1 3 
2870 1 Georgia Georgia Zviadists 1993 1993
1992
3
2990 0 Georgia Georgia Republic of Abkhazia 
Republic of Abkhazia 
1992 1 3 
3 2990 0 Georgia Georgia 1993 1993 3 
3000 
1980
0 Georgia Georgia Republic of South Ossetia 
 
1992 1992 1 3 
0 Ghana
 Ghana 
Ghana Military faction 1966 1966 1
1980 1 Ghana Military faction 1981 1981 1 3
1980 1 Ghana Ghana Military faction
 
1983 1983 1 3
1040 0 Greece Greece DSE 1946 1949 3 3
3 1360 0 Guatemala Guatemala Military faction 1949 1949 1 
1360 0 Guatemala Guatemala Forces of Carlos Castillo Armas 1954 1954 1 3 
1360 1 Guatemala Guatemala MR-13 , FAR , EGP , PGT , ORPA 1965 1967 1 3 
1360 1 Guatemala Guatemala MR-13 , FAR , EGP , PGT , ORPA 1968 1968 2 3 
1360 1 Guatemala Guatemala MR-13 , FAR , EGP , PGT , ORPA 
 
1969 1987 3 3 
1360 1 Guatemala Guatemala URNG 1988 1991 2 3




1360      
    




     
    
      
     
      
     
      
      
     
      
      
      
     
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
     





URNG 1993 1995 2 3
2110 0 Guinea Guinea Military faction 1970 1970 1 3
2110 1 Guinea Guinea Military faction 2000 2001 1 3
3190 0 Guinea-Bissau Guinea-Bissau, Senegal, Guinea Military faction 1998 1998 3 4 
3190 0 Guinea-Bissau
 
Guinea-Bissau, Senegal, Guinea 
 
Military faction 1999 1999 2 4 
2880 0 Haiti Haiti Tonton Macoute/Military faction 
 





CPI 1947 1948 3 3
1290 0 India India CPI 1948 1951 3 3
1290 1 India India Naxalites/CPI (-Marxist)
 
1967 1972 1 3
1290 2 India India Naxalites/PWG, MCC 1989 1994 1 3
1290 2 India India Naxalites/PWG, MCC
 
1996 2001 1 3
1540 0 India India NNC, NSCN 1956 1959 1 3
1540 0 India India NNC, NSCN 1961 1968 1 3
1540 1 India India NNC, NSCN
 
1989 1997 1 3
1990 0 India India MNF 1966 1968 1 3
2390 0 India India TNV 1978 1988 1 3
2390 0 India India ATTF 1993 1993 1 3
2390 0 India India ATTF, NLFT
 
1995 2001 1 3
2530 0 India India PLA 1982 1989 1 3
2530 0 India India PLA 1991 1994 1 3
2530 0 India India UNLF, KNF, PLA 1997 2000 1 3 
2570 0 India India Sikh insurgents 1983 1986 1 3
2570 0 India India Sikh insurgents 1987 1987 2 3
2570 0 India India Sikh insurgents 1988 1992 3 3





2700 0 India India Kashmir Insurgents 1989 1989 1 3
2700 0 India India Kashmir Insurgents 1990 1993 3 3
2700 0 India India Kashmir Insurgents 1994 1998 2 3
2700 0 India India Kashmir Insurgents
 
1999 2001 3 3
2710 0 India India ABSU, BPAC
 
1989 1990 1 3
2710 0 India India ULFA 1991 1991 3 3
2710 0 India India BDSF, ULFA, ULFA faction, BLTF, NDFB 1992 2001 2 3 




Jharkand Mukti Morcha 1993 1993 1 3 
1400 0 Republic of South Moluccas 1950 1950 3 3 
1460 0 Indonesia Indonesia Darul Islam Movement 1953 1953 3 3 
1460 0 Indonesia Indonesia PRRI, Permesta movement, Darul Islam Movement 1958 1961 2 3 
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1940      
      
   Fretilin   
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
     
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
     
      
     
      
     
     3 
      
      
      
      
      
      
0 Indonesia Indonesia OPM 1965 1965 1 3
1940 1 Indonesia Indonesia OPM 1976 1978 3 3
2340 0 Indonesia Indonesia 1975 1978 3 3
2340 0 Indonesia Indonesia Fretilin 1979 1989 2 3
2340
2340
0 Indonesia Indonesia Fretilin 1992 1992 2 3
0 Indonesia Indonesia Fretilin 1997 1998 2 3
2720 0 Indonesia Indonesia GAM 1989 1989 1 3
2720 0 Indonesia Indonesia GAM 1990 1990 3 3
2720 0 Indonesia Indonesia GAM 1991 1991 2 3
2720 0 Indonesia Indonesia GAM 1999 2001 2 3
1060 0 Iran Iran Republic of Kurdistan/KDPI, Soviet Union 1946 1946 1 4 
1070 0 Iran Iran Republic of Azerbaijan, Soviet Union 
 
1946 1946 1 4 
1060 1 Iran Iran KDPI 1966 1968 2 3
1060 1 Iran Iran KDPI 1979 1980 3 3
1060 1 Iran Iran KDPI 1981 1981 2 3
1060 1 Iran Iran KDPI 1982 1982 3 3
1060 1 Iran Iran KDPI 1983 1988 2 3
1060 1 Iran Iran KDPI 1990 1990 2 3
1060 1 Iran Iran KDPI 1993 1993 2 3
2440 0 Iran Iran Mujahideen e Khalq 1979 1980 1 3 
2440 0 Iran Iran Mujahideen e Khalq 1981 1982 3 3 
2440 0 Iran Iran Mujahideen e Khalq 1986 1988 2 3 
2440 0 Iran Iran Mujahideen Khalq 1991 1993 2 3
2440 0 Iran Iran Mujahideen Khalq
 
2000 2001 2 3
2450 0 Iran Iran APCO 1979 1980 1 3
1620 0 Iraq Iraq Military faction
 
1958 1958 1 3
1620 0 Iraq Iraq Nationalists 1959 1959 1 3
1620 0 Iraq Iraq Military faction
 
1963 1963 1 3
1620 1 Iraq Iraq SAIRI 1982 1984 1 3
1620 1 Iraq Iraq SAIRI 1987 1987 1
1620 1 Iraq Iraq SAIRI 1991 1991 3 3
1620 1 Iraq Iraq SAIRI 1992 1996 2 3
1740 0 Iraq Iraq KDP, PUK 1961 1963 3 3
1740 0 Iraq Iraq KDP, PUK 1964 1964 2 3
1740 0 Iraq Iraq KDP, PUK 1965 1966 3 3




1740    1969  3 
   1970   
      
1740 0 Iraq  3  
      
  Iraq 3  
      
      
      
  
i-
    2 3 
     
     
 0   1  
2470 2 Liberia   1992 1992 3 3 
2470 2      
     
    1 3 
0
0





1740  Iraq Iraq 2 3
1740 0 Iraq Iraq KDP, PUK
KDP, PUK 
1973 1973 2 3
Iraq 1974 1975 3





1740 0 Iraq 1988 3
1740 0 Iraq Iraq DPK , PUK 1989 1990 2 3 
1740 0 Iraq Iraq DPK , PUK 1991 1991 3 3 
1740 0 Iraq Iraq DPK , PUK 1992 1993 2 3 
1370 0 Israel Israel Palestinian insurgents 1949 1954 1 3
1370 0 Israel Israel Palestinian insurgents 1955 1964 2 3
1370 0 Israel Israel PLO  groups 1965 2001 2 3 
2540 0 Kenya Kenya Military faction 1982 1982 1 3
1650 1 Laos Laos, Thailand Pathet Lao, Neutrals 1960 1961 3 4 




Laos, USA, South Vietnam, Tha
land Pathet Lao, North Vietnam 1969 1969 3 
3 
4 
1 Laos Laos, USA, South Vietnam 
Laos 
Pathet Lao, North Vietnam 
Pathet Lao, Neutrals 








 Laos Laos ULNLF 1989
1630 0 
1 
Lebanon Lebanon Independent Nasserite Movement / Mourabitoun militia 1958 1958 3 3 
1630 Lebanon Lebanon Various organizations, Syria, Israel 1975 1975 1 4 
1630 1 Lebanon Lebanon Various organizations, Syria, Israel 1976 1976 3 4 
1630 1 Lebanon Lebanon Various organizations, Syria, Israel 1977 1979 2 4 
1630 1 Lebanon 
Lebanon 
Lebanon Various organizations, Syria, Israel 1980 1982 3 4 
1630 
1630 
1 Lebanon Various organizations, Syria, Israel 1983 1988 2 4 
1 Lebanon Lebanon Various organizations, Syria, Israel 
 
1989 1990 3 4 
3200 0 Lesotho Lesotho Military faction 1998 1998 1 3
2470 1 Liberia Liberia 
Liberia 
NPFL, Burkina Faso, INPFL 1990 1990 3 4 
2470 1 
0
Liberia NPFL, Burkina Faso, INPFL 
 
1991 1991 2 4 
2470  Liberia
 Liberia 





2470 Liberia NPFL, INPFL 3
Liberia NPFL, INPFL
 Liberia Liberia NPFL, INPFL
 
1993 1995 2 3
2470 3 Liberia Liberia Ulimo-J 1996 1996 1 3
2470 3 Liberia Liberia LURD 2000 2001
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3260 0 Macedonia Macedonia 
Madagascar 
UCK (Ushtria Çlirimtare Kombetare: National Liberation Army) 2001 2001
    
      
     
    
     
     3 
      
     
     
     
     3 
     
      
1720  1  
     
     3 
     
      
      
  1  
     
     3 
      
      
    faction   
     
2290 0     
     
1 3 
3 2140 0 Madagascar Monima National Independence Movement 1971 1971 1 
1640 0 Malaysia Malaysia, UK 
 
Communist Party of Malaya 
 
1958 1960 1 4 
1640 1 Malaysia Malaysia CPM 1974 1975 1 3















0 Mali Mali 1994 1994 1 3
0 Mexico Mexico EZLN 1994 1994
1992
1
3010 0 Moldova Moldova Dniestr Republic
 
1992 1 3












1 Morocco Morocco POLISARIO 1980 3 3












Renamo 1981 1992 3 3
0 Nepal Nepal Nepali Congress
 
1960 1962 3
1720 1 Nepal Nepal CPN-M/UPF 1997 2000 1 3





 Nicaragua Nicaragua FSLN 1978 1979 3 3
2400  Nicaragua Nicaragua Contras 1981
1983
1982 1 3





2400 1 Nicaragua 
 

















2800  Niger Niger UFRA 1
3150 0 Niger Niger FDR 1996 1996 1 3
3150 0 Niger Niger FARS
Military
1997 1997 1 3
2000 0 Nigeria Nigeria 1966 1966 1 3
2070 0 Nigeria Nigeria Republic of Biafra 1967 1970 3 3 
1610 0 Oman Muscat and Oman, UK State of Oman/Free Oman 1957 1957 1 4 
2210 0 Oman Oman, Iran, Jordan, UK PFLOAG, South Yemen 1972 1975 1 4 
3 2160 0 Pakistan Pakistan Mukti Bahini: Liberation Force 
Baluchi separatists 
1971 1971 3 
2290 0 Pakistan
Pakistan 














      
  
  
     
      
     
      
      
     
      
     
      
     
   
  
   
   MNLF   
    3 
    3  
      
    3  
     
   
0 Panama Panama Military faction 1989 1989 1 3
0 Papua New Guinea Papua New Guinea BRA 1989 1990 1 3
2760 0 Papua New Guinea Papua New Guinea BRA 1992 1996 1 3
1220 0 Paraguay Paraguay Opposition coalition (Febreristas, Liberals and Communists) 
 
1947 1947 3 3 
1220
1220
1 Paraguay Paraguay Military faction 1954 1954 1 3
2 Paraguay Paraguay Military faction 1989 1989 1 3
1950 0 Peru Peru MIR , Túpac Amaru , ELN 
 
1965 1966 1 3 
1950 1 Peru Peru Sendero Luminoso 1980 1980 1 3
1950 1 Peru Peru Sendero Luminoso 1981 1985 3 3
1950 1 Peru Peru Sendero Luminoso 1986 1987 2 3
1950 1 Peru Peru Sendero Luminoso, Sendero Rojo, MRTA 1988
1993
1992 3 3 
1950 1 Peru Peru Sendero Luminoso, Sendero Rojo, MRTA 
 
1999 2 3 
1100 0 Philippines Philippines Huk 1946 1954
1980
3 3
1100 1 Philippines Philippines
Philippines 
NPA 1972 1 3
31100
1100
1 Philippines NPA 1981 1981 2
1 Philippines
 Philippines 
Philippines NPA 1982 1986 3 3
1100 1 Philippines NPA 1987 1988 2 3
3 1100 1 Philippines Philippines
Philippines 
NPA, RAM-SFP, Military faction 1989 1992 3 
1100 1 Philippines NPA, RAM-SFP, Military faction 
 
1993 1994 2 3 
2 3 1100 1 Philippines Philippines NPA 1999 2001
19712120 0 Philippines
 Philippines 
Philippines 1970 1 3
2120
2120





0 Philippines Philippines MNLF 3
2120 0 Philippines Philippines MNLF 1979 1980
1981
2 3
2120 0 Philippines Philippines MNLF
MNLF 
1981 3
2120 0 Philippines Philippines 1982 1988 2 3
2120 0 Philippines Philippines Abu Sayyaf, MILF 1994
2000
1999 2 3 
2120 0 Philippines Philippines 
Philippines 
Abu Sayyaf, MILF 2000 3 3 
2120 0 Philippines Abu Sayyaf, MILF 2001 2001 2 3 
2220 0 Rhodesia Rhodesia ZANU , ZAPU 1972 1975 1 3 
2220 0 Rhodesia Rhodesia ZANU , ZAPU 1976 1979
1989
3 3 




National Salvation Front 
 
1989 1 3 
3070 0
0 
 Russia Russia Parliamentary forces 1993 1993 1 3
3090 Russia Russia Republic of Chechnya 










Russia 3 3 
3090 Russia Republic of Chechnya 1999 2001 3 3 
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3230 0 Russia Russia Republic of Dagestan 
FPR 
1999 1999 1 3 
2810     
      
      
    3  
      
      
    
      
      
      




0 Rwanda Rwanda 1990
1991
1990 1 3
2810 0 Rwanda Rwanda FPR 1992 3 3
2810 0 Rwanda Rwanda FPR 1993 1994 2 3
2810 0 Rwanda Rwanda Opposition alliance 1998 1998 3
2810 0 Rwanda Rwanda Opposition alliance 1999 2000 2 3
2810
2460 
0 Rwanda Rwanda Opposition alliance
Juhayman Movement 
2001 2001 3 3




1979 1979 1 3 
2820 0 Senegal Senegal MFDC 1990 1990 1 3
2820 0 Senegal Senegal MFDC 1992 1993 1 3
2820 0 Senegal Senegal MFDC 1995 1995 1 3
2820 0 Senegal Senegal MFDC 1997 2001 2 3
2890 0 Sierra Leone Sierra Leone RUF, AFRC, ECOMOG, Kamajors 1991 1993 1 3 
2890 0 Sierra Leone Sierra Leone RUF, AFRC, ECOMOG, Kamajors 1994 1997 2 3 
2890 0 Sierra Leone Sierra Leone RUF, AFRC, ECOMOG, Kamajors 
RUF, AFRC, ECOMOG, Kamajors 







Sierra Leone, United Kingdom 
 
2000 2000 2 4 
 Somalia Somalia Military faction 1978 1978 1
2410 
2410 
0 Somalia Somalia SSDF , SNM, SPM 1981 1986 1 3 
0 Somalia Somalia SSDF , SNM, SPM 1987
1989
1988 2 3 
2410 0 Somalia 
Somalia 
Somalia SNM , Military faction , SSDF , USC, USC faction 1992 3 3 
2410 0 Somalia SNM , Military faction , SSDF , USC, USC faction 1993 1996
1978
2 3 




SWAPO 1966 1 3 
2010 
2010 
0 SWAPO 1979 1979 2 3 
0 South Africa South Africa SWAPO 1980 1983 3 3 
2010 0 
0 
South Africa South Africa SWAPO 1984 1985 2 3 
3 2010 South Africa South Africa SWAPO 1986 1988 3 
2510 0 South Africa South Africa ANC, PAC, Azapo 1981 1988 1 3 
2510 0 South Africa South Africa ANC, PAC, Azapo 1989 1993 3 
3 
3 
1320 0 South Korea South Korea, USA Leftist insurgents (e.g. Inmin-gun: Peoples Army, military faction) 1948 1950 4 
1520 
1520 
0 South Vietnam South Vietnam, USA FNL 1962 1964 3 4
0 South Vietnam 
Soviet Union 
South Vietnam FNL 1955 1961 3 3
1110 0 Soviet Union Forest Brothers 
LTS(p)A, LNJS, and LNPA 
1946 1948 2 3 
1120 0 Soviet Union 
Soviet Union 
Soviet Union 1946 1947
1947
2 3 
1130 0 Soviet Union BDPS 
BDPS 
1946 3 3 
3 1130 0 Soviet Union Soviet Union 1948 1948
1948
2 










Soviet Union UPA 1949  3 
0 
   
      






    
     
    1  
   
   Brotherhood  3 
      
  
  
     
     
     
    
      
 




Soviet Union Government of Armenia and ANM 1990 1 
1 
3 




Azerbaijani Popular Front 
 
1990 1990 3 
2480 0 Spain Spain ETA 1980 1981 1 3
2480 0 Spain
 Spain 
Spain ETA 1987 1987 1 3
2480 0 Spain ETA
JVP 
1991 1992 1 3
2170 0 Sri Lanka Sri Lanka 1971 1971
1989
3 3










Sri Lanka LTTE, TELO, PLOTE 
LTTE, TELO, PLOTE 
1984 1 3 










2 3 2580 0 
0 












 Sudan Sudan Anya Nya
 
1972 3 3
1850  Sudan Sudan SPLM 1983 1992 3 3
1850 1 Sudan Sudan SPLM, Faction of SPLM, NDA 1993 1994
2001
2 3 
1850 1 Sudan Sudan 
Sudan 
SPLM, Faction of SPLM, NDA 1995 3 3 
2130 0 Sudan Sudanese Communist Party 1970
1976
1970 1 3 










2020 0 Syria Syria Military faction
Muslim 
1966 1 3
2020 1 Syria Syria 1979 1981 1
2020
3020 
1 Syria Syria Muslim Brotherhood 1982 1982 3 3
41 Tajikistan 
Tajikistan 
Tajikistan, Russia, Uzbekistan UTO 1993 1993 3
3020 1 Tajikistan, Russia, Uzbekistan 
 
UTO 1994 1994 2 4
3020 1 Tajikistan Tajikistan, Russia
 
UTO 1995 1996 2 4
3020 0 Tajikistan Tajikistan UTO 1992 1992 3 3
3 3020 2 Tajikistan Tajikistan Movement for Peace in Tajikistan 1998 1998 1 
1430 0 Thailand Thailand Military faction (Navy) 
 





CPT 1974 1982 2 3
2640 0 Togo Togo MTD 1986 1986 1 3
2640 0 Togo Togo Military faction 1991 1991 1 3
2850 0 Trinidad and Tobago 
 
Trinidad and Tobago 
 
Jamaat al-Muslimeen 1990 1990 1 3 
2490 0 Tunisia Tunisia Résistance Armée Tunisienne 
 
1980 1980 1 3 
2600 0 Turkey Turkey PKK 1984 1986 1 3
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2600      
      
      
      
    
     
      




     
     
      
of Yemenite Socialist Party 
0 Turkey Turkey PKK 1987 1991 2 3
2600 0 Turkey Turkey PKK 1992 1997 3 3
2600 0 Turkey Turkey PKK 1998 2001 2 3
2900 0 Turkey Turkey Devrimci Sol 1991 1992 1 3
2180 1 Uganda Uganda, Libya UNLA , Tanzania 1978 1978 1 4 
2180 1 Uganda Uganda, Libya 
 
UNLA , Tanzania 
 
1979 1979 3 4 
2180 0 Uganda Uganda Military faction
 
1971 1971 1 3
2180 0 Uganda Uganda UPA 1972 1972 1 3
2180 0 Uganda Uganda Military faction 1977 1977 1 3
2180 2 Uganda Uganda
NRA, UFM, UPM, UNRF, UFDM, UPF, UPDA, UPC, UNLA, FOBA, 
HSM 1981 1988 3 3
2180 2 Uganda Uganda Faction of UPDA, UPA, HSM, UDCM, UPDCA 1989 1989 3 3 
2180 2 Uganda Uganda Faction of UPDA, UPA, HSM, UDCM, UPDCA 1990 1990 2 3 
2180 2 Uganda Uganda Faction of UPDA, UPA, HSM, UDCM, UPDCA 1991 1991 3 3 
2180 3 Uganda Uganda LRA, WNBF, ADF 1994 1995 1 3 
2180 3 Uganda Uganda LRA, WNBF, ADF 1996 2001 2 3 
2190 0 United Kingdom United Kingdom PIRA 1971 1977 1 3
2190 0 United Kingdom United Kingdom PIRA 1978 1993 2 3
2190 0 United Kingdom United Kingdom Real IRA 1998 1998 2 3 
2230 0 Uruguay Uruguay MLN  or Tupamaros 1972 1972 1 3 





   Germany, Italy, Japan, Jordan  
   Netherlands, Poland, Russia, Turkey, UK 
 
    
3240 0 Uzbekistan Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan
 
MIU 2000 2000 1 4
1800 0 Venezuela Venezuela Military faction 1962 1962 1 3
1800 1 Venezuela Venezuela Military faction 1992 1992 1 3
3100 0 Yemen Yemen Democratic Republic of Yemen 1994 1994 3 3 
1330 0 Yemen (North) Yemen (North) Opposition coalition 1948 1948 3 3 
1330 2 Yemen (North) Yemen (North) National Democratic Front 1980 1982 1 3 
1330 1 Yemen (North) Yemen (North), Egypt Royalists 1962 1964 3 4 
1330 1 Yemen (North) Yemen (North), Egypt Royalists 1965 1965 2 4 
1330 1 Yemen (North) Yemen (North), Egypt Royalists 1966 1967 3 4 




1968 1970 2 4 
2650 0 Yemen (South) 1986 1986 3 3 
2910 0 Yugoslavia Yugoslavia Republic of Slovenia 1991 1991 1 3 




3210 1 Yugoslavia Yugoslavia UCK, Belgium, Canada, Czech Rep ,Denmark ,France ,Germany 1999 1999 3 4 
    Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway  
 
  
    Polen, Portugal ,Spain ,Turkey ,United Kingdom ,United States 
 
   
3210     0 Yugoslavia Yugoslavia UCK 1998 1998 3 3
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